Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

On the morning of the day of the accident, the pilot, accompanied by a passenger, flew under IFR flight mode from La Môle (83) to Quiberon (56). The flight took 3 hours and 40 minutes and the return was scheduled in the afternoon. After landing in Quiberon, the pilot learned that there was no possibility to refuel with AVGAS, information that was not specified by NOTAM. The pilot then decided to refuel at Vannes-Meucon Airport before leaving to St Tropez-La Môle. He said he was upset by this situation and by the bad weather conditions in the area. During the pre-flight visit to Quiberon, the pilot added oil. He indicates that he also carried out a pre-flight inspection before takeoff from Vannes. During the takeoff roll from runway 22 at Vannes-Meucon Airport, the rotation took place in the first third of the runway. Just after liftoff, he saw the engine cowling open. He immediately thaught he forgot to tighten the dipstick and decided to abort the takeoff and landed on the remaining runway. The runway being long, he believed he can stop before the runway end. He put the power levers in the "full, reduced and choke" position and tried to land the plane quickly. As the aircraft already reached a high speed, it landed 200 metres short of runway end and deviated longitudinally and crossed the runway end safety area, known as RESA. It came to a stop a 100 metres further on an embankment. The left wing was partially torn off and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. There was no fire. Both occupants escaped uninjured.

On October 2, 2020, about 1512 central daylight time (CDT), a Piper PA-46-500TP, N62ZM, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lake Elmo, Minnesota. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff from runway 32 at the Lake Elmo airport (21D) and following landing gear retraction, he noticed a “hiccup” in the engine power and immediately started a turn back towards the airport. During the turn, all engine power was lost and the pilot executed a forced landing into a field of standing corn. The airplane impacted the terrain, bounced, and came to rest upright in the corn about ½ mile northwest of the departure end of runway 32. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing as a result of the impact and post-crash fire. The airplane was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney PT6A turboprop engine.

While in cruise flight at 19,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot declared an emergency to air traffic control and stated that the airplane had lost engine power and that he needed to divert. The pilot elected to divert to an airport that was about 5 miles south of his position. Archived automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data and commercially available flight track data showed that a descent was initiated from 19,000 ft and the airplane proceeded directly to, and circled around, the airport one time while descending. The last data point showed the airplane at 1,250 ft msl (about 750 ft above ground level) and about 1 mile north of the approach end of the runway. From the cruise altitude of 19,000ft until the last data point, about 12 minutes and 45 seconds had elapsed, which equated to an average descent rate of about 1,392ft per minute. Witnesses located about 1/4 mile south of the end of the runway on a miniature golf course noticed the propeller on the airplane was not turning. They stated that they saw the airplane in a “really hard” left bank; the nose of the airplane dropped, and it impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. The airplane came to rest along a road about 200 ft south of the airport property. The airplane impacted the terrain in a nose low, near vertical attitude and sustained substantial damage to fuselage and both wings. It is likely that, based on the location of the runway, relative to the miniature golf course, the pilot initiated the left bank to avoid bystanders on the ground and inadvertently exceeded the wing’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. The airplane was equipped with an engine trend monitor (ETM), which captured various events concerning the accident flight, including engine start, operating limit exceedances, and power checks. The ETM captured a power check while the airplane was at 19,100 ft. About 3 minutes 32 seconds later, an engine off event was recorded. The ETM further captured a logon message, which was consistent with the power being cycled, at an altitude of 3,542 ft, 9 minutes, 52 seconds later. The ETM did not record any start attempts between the logged engine off event and when power was lost to the unit. A postaccident examination of the airframe, engine, and accessories did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although it cannot be determined whether a restart attempt would have been successful, the data were consistent with a restart not being attempted. Both the engine failure and power off landing checklists contained instructions for the pilot to establish the airspeed at 90 knots; however, when the winds aloft were applied to the reported groundspeeds, it was evident this did not occur. Furthermore, the power off landing checklist instructed the pilot to be about 1,500 ft above the airport on the downwind leg; however, data indicate that the airplane was about 5,000 ft above the airport on the downwind leg. The rapid descent from 5,000 ft on the downwind leg to about 750 ft above ground level on the final leg resulted in an unstabilized approach.

The instructor pilot reported that while practicing an engine-out landing in the traffic pattern, the pilot-rated student overshot the turn from base leg to final rolling out to the right of the runway centerline. The student pilot attempted to turn back toward the runway and then saw that the airplane’s airspeed was rapidly decreasing. The instructor reported that when he realized the severity of the situation it was too late to do anything. The student attempted to add power for a go-around but was unable to recover. The airplane stalled about 10 ft above the ground, impacted the ground right of the runway, and skidded onto the runway where it came to rest. Both wings and the forward fuselage were substantially damaged. Both pilots stated there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot departed on an instrument flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers. While enroute at a cruise altitude about 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot discussed routing and weather avoidance with the controller. The controller advised the pilot there was a gap in the line of weather showing light precipitation, and that the pilot could pass through it and then proceed on course. The controller assigned the pilot a heading, which the pilot initially acknowledged, but shortly thereafter, he advised the controller that the airplane was pointed directly at a convective cell. The controller explained that the heading would keep the pilot out of the heavy precipitation and that he would then turn the airplane through an area of light precipitation. The pilot responded, saying that the area seemed to be closing in fast, the controller acknowledged and advised the pilot if he did not want to accept that routing, he could be rerouted. The pilot elected to turn toward a gap that he saw and felt he could fly straight through it. The controller acknowledged and advised the pilot that course would take him through moderate precipitation starting in about one mile extending for about four miles; the pilot acknowledged. Radar information indicated that the airplane entered an area of heavy to very heavy precipitation, likely a rain shower updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preaccident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The airplane was equipped with the capability to display weather radar "mosaic" imagery created from Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) data and it is likely that the pilot was using this information to navigate around precipitation when the airplane encountered a rain shower updraft with likely severe turbulence. Due to latencies inherent in processes used to detect and deliver the NEXRAD data from the ground site, as well as the frequency of the mosaic-creation process used by the service provider, NEXRAD data can age significantly by the time the mosaic image is created. The pilot elected to navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight based on the data displayed to him instead of the routing suggested by the controller, which resulted in the penetration of a rain shower updraft, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent inflight breakup.

On September 15, 2019, at 1146 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N218MW, lost engine power while maneuvering over the Gulf of Mexico, and the pilot was forced to ditch. The private pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Mailworks, Inc., Spring Valley, California, under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site at the time of the accident, and the flight was operated on a visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated at 0830 eastern daylight time from Space Coast Regional Airport (TIX), Titusville, Florida, and was en route to Ozona Municipal Airport (OZA), Ozona, Texas. His final destination was Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), El Cajon, California. According to the pilot's accident report, he departed TIX with 140 gallons of fuel. After crossing Gulfport (GPT), Mississippi's Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA) at 10,500 ft, he initiated a slow descent over Boothville, Louisiana, and proceeded southbound towards the mouth of the Mississippi River, descending to 1,500 ft. He then configured the airplane for climb. The engine did not respond to the application of power and the airplane began losing altitude. After going through the emergency checklist, he was unable to restore engine power, and declared an emergency to Houston air route traffic control center (ARTCC) and on frequency 121.5 mHz. He also activated the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) prior to ditching. After ditching, the pilot put on his life jacket, exited the airplane, and remained on its wing until it sank. About an hour later, a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter rescued the pilot and transported him to a hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was discharged a few hours later. The airplane has not been recovered.

The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.

The pilot departed on the cross-country flight with the airplane about 730 lbs over its maximum gross weight. While in cruise altitude at 27,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control that he observed weather on his radar along his route and ahead of his position. The areas of weather included thunderstorms with cloud tops up to 43,000 ft msl. The controller acknowledged the weather; however, she did not provide specifics to the pilot, including the size and strength of the area of precipitation or cloud tops information, nor did she solicit or disseminate any pilot reports related to the conditions, as required. The airplane entered an area of heavy to extreme precipitation, likely a thunderstorm updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions. Tracking information indicated that the airplane climbed about 300 ft, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight at high altitude. The recovered wreckage was found scattered along a path about 2.6 miles in length. Both wings separated, and most of the empennage was not located. The airplane was likely about 148 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The pilot, who owned the airplane, did not possess an instrument rating. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat was instrument-rated but did not meet resency of experience requirements to act as pilot-in-command. Toxicology testing detected a small amount of ethanol in the pilot’s liver but not in muscle. After absorption, ethanol is uniformly distributed throughout all tissues and body fluids; therefore, the finding in one tissue but not another is most consistent with post-mortem production. Hazardous weather avoidance is ultimately the pilot’s responsibility, and, in this case, the airplane was sufficiently equipped to provide a qualified pilot with the information necessary to navigate hazardous weather; however, the controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm and the resulting loss of airplane control and inflight breakup.