Country
Crash of a Britten Norman BN-2A-26 Islander in Eteringbang: 1 killed
Date & Time:
Jul 25, 2017 at 1755 LT
Operator:
Registration:
8R-GRA
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ekereku – Eteringbang
MSN:
3006
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
24716
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Ekereku on a cargo flight to Eteringbang, carrying fuel drums for local miners. On final approach to Eteringbang Airfield Runway 03, the aircraft was very low and the pilot initiated a right turn when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in a dense wooded area some 200 metres from the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. The pilot Collin Martin was the Chief Pilot of Roraima Airways since 2015.
Probable cause:
The pilot flew a non-standard traffic pattern very low and very close to the runway. The excessive and extreme fight manoeuvres to position the aircraft for the landing resulted in a loss of aircraft control.
Contributory Factors:
The pilot’s failure to operate in accordance with established standard operating procedures when approaching the runway to land.
Contributory Factors:
The pilot’s failure to operate in accordance with established standard operating procedures when approaching the runway to land.
Final Report:
Crash of a Britten Norman BN-2A-3 Islander near Mutare: 6 killed
Date & Time:
Mar 27, 2017 at 0815 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C9-AOV
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Beira - Mutare - Harare
MSN:
624
YOM:
1970
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was performing a charter flight from Beira to Harare with an intermediate stop in Mutare on behalf of the Mozambican company Cornelder. Ten minutes before its ETA in Mutare Airport, while descending to the altitude of 5,200 feet, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions when the aircraft hit obstacles and crashed on the slope of a mountain located in the Vumba Botanical Reserve. The wreckage was found 23 km southeast from the airport. It appears that a passenger survived but later died from his injuries. Among the passengers were Adelino Mesquita, brother of the Minister of Transport and Communications of the Republic of Mozambique.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain.
Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2T Islander in Kiunga: 12 killed
Date & Time:
Apr 13, 2016 at 1420 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P2-SBC
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Oksapmin – Kiunga
MSN:
3010
YOM:
1983
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
12
Captain / Total hours on type:
254.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2407
Aircraft flight cycles:
2886
Circumstances:
On the afternoon of 13 April 2016, a Pilatus Britten Norman Turbine Islander (BN-2T) aircraft, registered P2-SBC, operated by Sunbird Aviation Ltd, departed from Tekin, West Sepik Province for Kiunga, Western Province, as a charter flight under the visual flight rules. On board were the pilot-in-command (PIC) and 11 passengers (eight adults and three children). The aircraft was also carrying vegetables. The pilot reported departing Oksapmin at 13:56. The pilot had flight planned, Kiunga to Oksapmin to Kiunga. However, the evidence revealed that without advising Air Traffic Services, the pilot flew from Oksapmin to Tekin. On departure from Tekin the pilot transmitted departure details to ATS, stating departure from Oksapmin. The recorded High Frequency radio transmissions were significantly affected by static and hash. The weather at Kiunga was reported to be fine. As the aircraft entered the Kiunga circuit area, the pilot cancelled SARWATCH with Air Traffic Services (ATS). The pilot did not report an emergency to indicate a safety concern. Witnesses reported that during its final approach, the aircraft suddenly pitched up almost to the vertical, the right wing dropped, and the aircraft rolled inverted and rapidly “fell to the ground”. It impacted the terrain about 1,200 metres west of the threshold of runway 07. The impact was vertical, with almost no forward motion. The aircraft was destroyed, and all occupants were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
The aircraft’s centre of gravity was significantly aft of the aft limit. When landing flap was set, full nose-down elevator and elevator trim was likely to have had no effect in lowering the nose of the aircraft. Unless the flaps had been retracted immediately, the nose-up pitch may also have resulted in tail plane stall, exacerbating the pitch up. The wings stalled, followed immediately by the right wing dropping. Recovery from the stall at such a low height was not considered possible.
Other factors:
Other factors is used for safety deficiencies or concerns that are identified during the course of the investigation, that while not causal to the accident, nevertheless should be addressed with the
aim of accident and serious incident prevention, and the safety of the travelling public.
a) Following the reweighing of SBC, the operator did not make adjustments to account for the shift of the moment arm as a result of the reweighing. Specifically, a reduction of allowable maximum weight in the baggage compartment.
b) The pilot, although signing the flight manifest on previous flights attesting that the aircraft was loaded within c of g limits, had not computed the c of g. No documentation was available to confirm that the pilot had computed the c of g for the accident flight, or any recent flights.
c) All of the High Frequency radio transmissions between Air Traffic Services and SBC were significantly affected by static interference and a lot of hash, making reception difficult, and many transmissions unclear and unreadable. This is a safety concern to be addressed to ensure that vital operational radio transmissions are not missed for the safety of aircraft operations, and the travelling public.
Other factors:
Other factors is used for safety deficiencies or concerns that are identified during the course of the investigation, that while not causal to the accident, nevertheless should be addressed with the
aim of accident and serious incident prevention, and the safety of the travelling public.
a) Following the reweighing of SBC, the operator did not make adjustments to account for the shift of the moment arm as a result of the reweighing. Specifically, a reduction of allowable maximum weight in the baggage compartment.
b) The pilot, although signing the flight manifest on previous flights attesting that the aircraft was loaded within c of g limits, had not computed the c of g. No documentation was available to confirm that the pilot had computed the c of g for the accident flight, or any recent flights.
c) All of the High Frequency radio transmissions between Air Traffic Services and SBC were significantly affected by static interference and a lot of hash, making reception difficult, and many transmissions unclear and unreadable. This is a safety concern to be addressed to ensure that vital operational radio transmissions are not missed for the safety of aircraft operations, and the travelling public.
Final Report:
