BAe Jetstream 31

At 1700 MST, Alberta Citylink flight 933, C-FBIE, a British Aerospace Jetstream 31, serial number 815, took off from Calgary, on a scheduled flight to Lloydminster, Alberta. The aircraft carried a two-pilot crew, 13 passengers, and 250 pounds of freight and baggage. A non-precision automatic direction finder (ADF) approach was conducted to runway 25. The first officer was flying the approach, and when the runway environment became visual, the captain took control, requested 35 degrees of flap, and commenced the final descent to the runway. On touchdown, the left main landing gear collapsed and both propellers struck the runway surface. The aircraft slid along the runway on the belly pod for about 1 800 feet, and when the left wing contacted snow on the edge of the runway, the aircraft turned about 160 degrees. The passengers and crew evacuated through the over-wing exit. There was no fire and no injuries. The Board determined that an unstabilized approach resulted in a heavy landing because the captain changed the configuration of the aircraft, and the high rate of descent was not arrested before contact was made with the runway surface. Contributing to the high rate of descent were the reduction of engine power to flight idle, airframe ice, and the time available for the final descent. Contributing to the damage on landing was the left-to-right movement of the aircraft.

Flight 3379 departed Greensboro at 18:03 with a little delay due to baggage rearrangement. The aircraft climbed to a 9,000 feet cruising altitude and contacted Raleigh approach control at 18:14, receiving an instruction to reduce the speed to 180 knots and descend to 6,000 feet. Raleigh final radar control was contacted at 18:25 and instructions were received to reduce the speed to 170 knots and to descend to 3,000 feet. At 18:30 the flight was advised to turn left and join the localizer course at or above 2,100 feet for a runway 05L ILS approach. Shortly after receiving clearance to land, the n°1 engine ignition light illuminated in the cockpit as a result of a momentary negative torque condition when the propeller speed levers were advanced to 100% and the power levers were at flight idle. The captain suspected an engine flame out and eventually decided to execute a missed approach. The speed had decreased to 122 knots and two momentary stall warnings sounded as the pilot called for max power. The aircraft was in a left turn at 1,800 feet and the speed continued to decrease to 103 knots, followed by stall warnings. The rate of descent then increased rapidly to more than 10,000 feet/min. The aircraft eventually struck some trees and crashed about 4 nm southwest of the runway 05L threshold. Five passengers survived while 15 other occupants were killed.

While on a localizer back course approach the airplane collided with trees and the terrain approximately 3 miles from the runway threshold. The captain delayed the start of the descent that subsequently required an excessive descent rate to reach the FAF and MDH. The captain's actions led to distractions during critical phases of the approach. The flightcrew lost altitude awareness and allowed the airplane to descend below mandatory level off points. The captain's record raised questions about his airmanship and behavior that suggested a lack of crew coordination during flight operations, including intimidation of first officers. Company management did not address these matters adequately. The airline's flight operations management failed to implement provisions to adequately oversee the training of their flight crews and the operation of their aircraft. FAA guidance to their inspectors concerning implementation of ops bulletins is inadequate and has failed to transmit valuable safety information as intended to airlines. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 18 occupants were killed.

The company chief pilot/check pilot was giving a check flight to a company first officer (f/o). An FAA inspector was aboard to observe the check pilot's ability to give proficiency check flights. Soon after liftoff on the 2nd takeoff, the check pilot simulated an engine failure. The f/o, who was wearing a vision limiting device, allowed the airplane to drift to the left, but the FAA inspector noted that the f/o successfully regained directional control. The inspector then looked away from the cockpit, and when he looked back, the airplane was descending. Moments later, it collided with the ground. The FAA inspector reported that the check pilot was looking to the left, outside of the aircraft, and did not have his hand near the power quadrant. Review of the CVR tape revealed that, from the time the f/o was given the simulated left engine failure until impact, the check pilot did not say anything to the f/o. No maintenance discrepancy or material deficiency was noted during the investigation. The f/o had 3925 hours in this make/model of aircraft.

The crew departed Prestwick Airport on a training flight to East Midlands Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew simulated an engine failure. The aircraft nosed up and adopted a high angle of attack with the gear still down. Ten seconds after liftoff, the copilot was still attempting to determine which engine failed and the pilot/instructor reminded him that the gear were still down. When the stall warning sounded, the pilot took over control within 2 seconds and increased engine power but the aircraft rolled to the right and crashed inverted. Both occupants were killed.

After a series of instrument procedures, the flight returned to Knoxville and landed. On the next takeoff, the first officer dropped the airplane's checklist and the check airman elected to continue the flight without using the checklist. On the next visual approach, the check airman and first officer attempted a landing without lowering the landing gear. The airplane touched down and both propeller assemblies struck the concrete runway surface. The pilot reported the gearup touchdown to the control tower and elected to go around. During the climbout the check airman lowered the landing gear, established a teardrop pattern for the opposite runway and feathered the right propeller. Crash fire rescue (cfr) equipment was alerted and was in position for the second landing attempt. While on short final, the check airman called for max power, a reduction in the flap setting, and initiated a single engine go-around below 200 feet. There is no operational procedure for a single engine go-around below 200 feet. The airplane climbed briefly and crashed inverted about 7,500 feet from the approach end of the runway. Both pilots were killed.

Aircraft was dispatched with inoperative airframe deice system, tho an operational deice system was required for flight in known icing conditions. During descent to land, aircraft encountered light icing conditions. Capt believed aircraft could 'handle it' and continued descent. As he began ILS final approach, he noted significant increase of ice accumulation and used higher than normal approach speed. As full (50°) flaps were set, aircraft began buffet and pitched nose down. Capt corrected with full back pressure on control column, but aircraft landed hard, gear collapsed and aircraft slid about 3,600 feet to a stop. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found, except for inoperative deice system. Investigation revealed pilots had received printout of weather from company computer system with surface observation and terminal forecast, but no area forecast (FA). Pilots and ground personnel were not aware that FA was available at company weather terminal. FA forecasted light and occasional moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level. Weather deteriorated, but pilots did not require inflight weather info or pireps. Flight mnl noted tailplane ice may cause nose down trim change with flap extension. There was evidence of tail plane stall, lack of company training in cold weather operations, deficiencies in use of deicing systems, and lack of FAA surveillance.