Positioning

The descent to Allendorf-Eder Airport was completed in poor weather conditions. On approach, the captain cancelled the IFR flight plan and decided to initiate a go-around procedure for unknown reasons. The aircraft nosed down to 30° then rolled to the right to 60° and crashed in a wooded area. Both pilots were killed. It was reported that the copilot was the PIC at the time of the accident.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and took off at night on a flight from Hot Springs, Arkansas, to Pueblo, Colorado. About one minute later, he advised air traffic control that he needed to return to Hot Springs. He then contacted the airplane operator and said the heater was not working. The operator suggested that he return for repairs. The pilot was then heard to say, 'oh, shoot!' No further radio transmissions were received from the flight. The airplane cut a 400 foot swath through trees, and the wreckage path measured 940 feet. With exception of a heater problem, no pre impact mechanical failure was evident. Both occupants were killed.

The airplane was on a positioning flight at night, cruising at 6,000 feet. Also, the pilot was operating on an IFR flight plan and was on his 6th flight after reporting for duty at 1530 est. During a frequency change and radio check at 0207 est, the pilot's response was normal. Radar data revealed that about 16 minutes later, the airplane entered a right turn, then disappeared from radar at about 0222 est after about 255° of turn. It impacted the ground in a steep nose down descent; debris from the airplane was found down to 6 feet below the surface. During the final 15 minutes of flight, there were no radio transmissions on the assigned frequency. No preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found. The propeller blades had s-curves or were bent forward; they also had leading edge impact damage and Rotational scoring. The pilot had flown in excess of 120 hours (110 hrs at night) in the preceding 30 days. There was evidence that he may have lacked crew rest during the day(s) before the accident.

The Air Satellite Cessna 402B, flight 638, took off from Lourdes-de-Blanc-Sablon, Quebec, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight to Havre-Saint-Pierre, Quebec, with a load of mail. At 6,000 feet above sea level (asl), meteorological conditions were visual (VMC). About 35 nautical miles (nm) from Havre-Saint-Pierre, the pilot began his descent. At 25 nm from the airport and at an altitude of 5,000 feet asl, the pilot contacted the Flight Service Station (FSS) specialist at Sept-Îles, Quebec, via the remote communications outlet (RCO). He requested weather information for Havre-Saint-Pierre Airport. The specialist gave him the latest weather report available for the Havre-Saint-Pierre FSS. The report had been issued three hours previously by Environment Canada. The meteorological sequence indicated VMC. The pilot could see the town of Havre-Saint-Pierre when he commenced his back course approach for runway 27. During the descent, the aircraft flew into snow showers. The pilot contacted the company to check the weather at Havre-Saint-Pierre Airport, and he was told there was light snow. The pilot continued the approach to the MDA indicated on the Havre-Saint-Pierre approach chart, that is, 420 feet asl. There was moderate turbulence during the approach. The pilot tried to maintain control of the aircraft while operating the radio in an attempt to obtain more detailed weather information. One of the company pilots told him the snowfall was heavier. The aircraft then banked right. The pilot corrected, and, at the same time, the wheels touched the ground. The aircraft crashed and slid on its belly about 100 feet before coming to rest. The pilot sustained minor injuries; the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The accident occurred about 1.5 nm from the threshold of Havre-Saint-Pierre runway 27 on marshy ground. The pilot remained in radio contact with overflying aircraft and said he would stay on board the aircraft until rescuers arrived. Search and rescue crews walked toward the crash site, but they were unable to find the aircraft because of the rough terrain and reduced visibility. Five hours later, a Search and Rescue helicopter located the aircraft with the aid of the direction finder. The weak signal from the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was still readable and was received. The pilot was transported to hospital for first aid treatment.The accident occurred during the hours of darkness.

During the takeoff roll on runway 30R, the MD-82, N954U, collided with the Cessna 441, N441KM, which was positioned on the runway waiting for takeoff clearance. The pilot of the Cessna acted on an apparently preconceived idea that he would use his arrival runway, runway 30R, for departure. After receiving taxi clearance to back-taxi into position and hold on runway 31, the pilot taxied into a position at an intersection on runway 30R, which was the assigned departure runway for the MD-82. The ATIS current at the time the Cessna pilot was operating in the Lambert-St. Louis area listed runways 30R and 30L as the active runways for arrivals and departures; there was no mention of the occasional use of runway 31. Air traffic control personnel were not able to maintain visual contact with the Cessna after it taxied from the well lighted ramp area into the runway/taxiway environment of the northeast portion of the airport. An operational ASDE-3, particularly ASDE-3 enhanced with AMASS, could be used to supplement visual scan of the northeast portion of the airport.

While on approach to Paris-Le Bourget Airport in poor weather conditions, the crew realized he was not properly aligned and decided to initiate a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, a second attempt to land was also abandoned as the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway. During the third attempt to land, the aircraft landed hard, bounced and landed a second time few dozen metres further. The crew taxied to the ramp and to his assigned parking place. Analysis of the aircraft revealed serious structural damages and the aircraft was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

The airplane was on an ILS runway 15 approach and collided in-flight with static wires, approximately 2 miles north of the runway. The wires were located in the airplane's flight path, and in a direct line with the ILS final approach course. At the time of the accident the local control tower was closed. Three other aircraft made the approach prior to N402BK, and the pilots of those aircraft all agreed that at about 500 to 700 feet msl, on the final approach course, they encountered downdrafts and turbulence. All the pilots agreed, the downdrafts caused their airplanes to fall below the glide slope, and that in order to rejoin the glide slope, they had to increase power or change the airplane's pitch attitude. The Otis Air National Guard Base 2155 weather observation was; indefinite ceiling 100 sky obscured, visibility 3/4 miles, light rain and fog, temperature 59° F, dew point 58° F, wind 170°, 14 knots, gust to 19, altimeter 29.96 inches hg.

The airplane had undergone routine maintenance for slow acceleration on the right engine. Maintenance records revealed the fuel controls were changed from the right engine to the left engine. The airplane was released back to the pilot for service, and he departed for his home station. Several witnesses saw the airplane after takeoff at a low altitude, and at a slow speed. The airplane turned left, and the left wing struck the ground. Two witnesses saw the airplane pass by them at a low altitude, and wrote, '...at this point we could see the left (port) engine propeller was turning very slowly. You could actually see the individual blades of the propeller turning.' A complete disassembly of both engines, revealed no discrepancies other than impact, and post impact fire damage. Disassembly of the left propeller indicated that the propeller blades were at or near feather at impact. The pilot had a total of 106 flight hours in Beech A100 aircraft, all in the 90 days prior to the accident, and 56 hours in the 30 days prior to the accident.

After landing at Siwandu Airfield, the twin engine airplane collided with a giraffe. The animal was killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot escaped uninjured.

The corporate jet's sink rate increased during short final approach. The copilot applied elevator back pressure and nose up trim. The sink rate continued to increase. The captain observed the copilot's efforts and began applying back pressure on his control yoke. Through combined efforts of both pilots they were able to increase the pitch enough that the airplane touched down on the main gear first. However, the touchdown was hard. The on-scene investigation revealed that a trip manifest container was lodged between the copilot's control yoke column and seat frame. The pilots stated the container is required to be carried in the cockpit during lights. Both pilots said there is no designated space in the cockpit to retain the container.