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Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III in Catawba: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2017 at 0153 LT
Registration:
N2655B
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Waukegan – Winnipeg
MSN:
421C-0698
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
2335
Captain / Total hours on type:
70.00
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot of the multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument flight rules cross-country flight at night. The pilot checked in with air traffic control at a cruise altitude about 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 31 minutes later, the pilot reported that he saw lightning off the airplane's left wing. The controller advised the pilot that the weather appeared to be about 35 to 40 miles away and that the airplane should be well clear of it. The pilot responded to the controller that he had onboard weather radar and agreed that they would fly clear of the weather. There were no further communications from the pilot. About 4 minutes later, radar information showed the airplane at 10,400 ft msl. About 1 minute later, radar showed the airplane in a descending right turn at 9,400 ft. Radar contact was lost shortly thereafter. The distribution of the wreckage, which was scattered in an area with about a 1/4-mile radius, was consistent with an in-flight breakup. The left horizontal stabilizer and significant portions of both left and right elevators and their respective trim tabs were not found. Of the available components for examination, no pre-impact airframe structural anomalies were found. Examination of the engines and turbochargers did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies. Examination of the propellers showed evidence of rotation at impact and no pre-impact anomalies. Review of weather information indicated that no convection or thunderstorms were coincident with or near the airplane's route of flight, and the nearest convective activity was located about 25 miles west of the accident site. Autopsy and toxicology testing revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation. Given the lack of radar information after the airplane passed through 9,400 ft, it is likely that it entered a rapid descent during which it exceeded its design stress limitations, which resulted in the in-flight breakup; however, based on the available information, the event that precipitated the descent and loss of control could not be determined.
Probable cause:
A loss of control and subsequent in-flight breakup for reasons that could not be determined
based on the available information.
Final Report:

Crash of a Socata TBM-850 in Racine: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 5, 2011 at 1833 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N850SY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mosinee – Waukegan
MSN:
546
YOM:
2010
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
2075
Captain / Total hours on type:
165.00
Aircraft flight hours:
217
Circumstances:
During cruise flight, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that the airplane was having engine fuel pressure problems. The controller advised the pilot of available airports for landing if necessary and asked the pilot's intentions. The pilot chose to continue the flight. GPS data recorded by an onboard avionics system indicated that the engine had momentarily lost total power about 20 seconds before the pilot reported a problem to the controller. About 7 minutes later, when the airplane was about 7,000 feet above ground level, the engine lost total power again, and power was not restored for the remainder of the flight. The pilot attempted to glide to an airport about 10 miles away, but the airplane crashed in a field about 3 miles from the airport. GPS data showed a loss of fuel pressure before each of the engine power losses and prolonged lateral g forces consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The rudder trim tab was found displaced to the left about 3/8 inch. Flight testing and recorded flight data revealed that the rudder trim tab displacement was consistent with that required to achieve no side slip during a typical climb segment. The GPS and flight data indicated that the lateral g-forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was either not engaged or not operating. The recorded data indicated autopilot system engagement, which should have automatically engaged the yaw damper system. However, the data indicated the yaw damper was not engaged; the yaw damper could have subsequently been turned off by several means not recorded by the avionics system. Testing of the manual electric rudder (yaw) trim system revealed no anomalies, indicating that the pilot would have still been able to trim the airplane using the manual system. It is likely that the pilot's failure to properly trim the airplane's rudder led to a prolonged uncoordinated flight condition. Although the fuel tank system is designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it is not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of fuel pressure and engine power. The propeller and propeller controls were not in the feathered position, thus the windmilling propeller would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide portion of the flight. The glide airspeed used by the pilot was 20 knots below the airspeed recommended by the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and the reduced airspeed also would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide. The flight and GPS data indicated that the airplane had a gliding range of about 16 nautical miles from the altitude where the final loss of engine power occurred; however, the glide performance was dependent on several factors, including feathering the propeller and maintaining the proper airspeed, neither of which the pilot did. Although the POH did not contain maximum range glide performance data with a windmilling propeller, based on the available information, it is likely that the airplane could have glided to the alternate airport about 10 miles away if the pilot had followed the proper procedures.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to properly trim the airplane's rudder during cruise flight, which resulted in a prolonged uncoordinated flight condition, unporting of the fuel tank feed line, and subsequent fuel starvation and engine power loss. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to feather the engine's propeller and maintain a proper glide airspeed following the loss of engine power.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 125-3A in Waukegan

Date & Time: May 30, 1994 at 1842 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N900CD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wheeling - Waukegan
MSN:
25111
YOM:
1966
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10000
Captain / Total hours on type:
950.00
Circumstances:
The corporate jet's sink rate increased during short final approach. The copilot applied elevator back pressure and nose up trim. The sink rate continued to increase. The captain observed the copilot's efforts and began applying back pressure on his control yoke. Through combined efforts of both pilots they were able to increase the pitch enough that the airplane touched down on the main gear first. However, the touchdown was hard. The on-scene investigation revealed that a trip manifest container was lodged between the copilot's control yoke column and seat frame. The pilots stated the container is required to be carried in the cockpit during lights. Both pilots said there is no designated space in the cockpit to retain the container.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command disregarding the location of the flight manifest container in the cockpit. Factor's associated with the accident were a jammed control column and inadequate procedures for the use and storage of the flight manifest container on the part of company management.
Final Report: