Positioning

After takeoff from Libreville-Léon M'Ba Airport, while in initial climb, the crew reported an engine failure and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. On final approach, the aircraft stalled and crashed onto several houses located in a district few km short of runway threshold. The aircraft and several houses were destroyed but there were no casualties on the ground. Nevertheless, both pilots were killed.

While approaching Tegucigalpa-Toncontin Airport runway 01 in IMC conditions, the aircraft descended too low and crashed 10 km short of runway at an altitude of 5,325 feet. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed. The minimum altitude for the approach at the crash site is 6,700 feet. After crossing the 5 DME fix, a flight can descend to 5,200 feet.

After takeoff from Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, on a positioning flight to Antalya, the crew reported technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and eventually collided with containers stored by the apron, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

The airplane collided with the tops of trees during an ILS approach near the middle marke. Witnesses heard the airplane strike the trees and a '...whop, whop, whop sound...' it made as it continued its flight. Other witnesses observed the airplane flying a curved, descending, flight path until the aircraft impacted the ground. Visibility was reported as 1/2 mile at the airport. The on-scene examination revealed no airframe or engine anomalies that would prevent flight. A section of the right propeller and other pieces of airframe were found along the approach path after initial impact with trees. The trees along the flight path were about 30 to 60 feet high. The tops of the taller trees were broken or had fresh cut marks on their limbs. The pilot's blood alcohol level was 216 (mg/dL, mg/hg).

A witness observed the airplane circle to land at the completion of an NDB approach. The nighttime meteorological conditions were an 800 feet ceiling, 1 mile visibility in blowing snow, and 26 knot winds. The surrounding terrain was essentially flat, snow covered, and featureless. The witness saw the airplane on final approach misaligned for the runway, and then disappear below an 18 feet msl bluff. He transmitted on the radio to 'get out of there,' and heard no response. About 10 minutes later the accident pilot walked up to the witness' airplane. The pilot told the investigator-in-charge that he was 'beat around by the winds, ...it was snowing pretty hard, I always had the lights, and I was concentrating on the runway. The next thing I knew I was on the ground short of the runway.' The pilot's previous experience to this airport was during daytime, and during visual conditions. The airport, which was being transferred from the Air Force to the North Slope Borough, has medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), and runway end identifier lights (REILS). It does not have visual approach slope indicator (VASI) lights.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Kathmandu-Tribhuvan Airport on a positioning flight to Namche Bazar to pick up passengers. During the pre-flight briefing, he was informed about the good weather conditions along the route and at destination. But en route, these conditions deteriorated and upon arrival, clouds were present up to 3,600 metres. He made several circuits expecting weather improvement. Few minutes later, he saw a hole in the clouds and initiated a descent when the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Kongri Himal located 3 km north of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

The pilot said that during the ILS approach he reached a point where he thought he should be seeing the approach lights. He said that he checked the radio to determine if it was on the correct frequency. He said that he realized that the transmit switch was selected to the wrong radio and when he returned his attention to the instruments, he realized that he had allowed the airplane to descend low on the glide path. He said that before he could react, the airplane impacted the terrain.

The pilot departed on a night multiple-leg flight series with full tanks. On approach for the second landing, the green landing gear lights extinguished. The pilot discovered that if the landing gear was extended the circuit breaker would stay in and if the landing gear was retracted the circuit breaker would pop. The circuit breaker controlled the landing gear lights, the engine oil pressure, and both fuel quantity gauges. The pilot continued on four additional flights in that condition. The fourth flight terminated 5 miles from the runway with a double power loss. Examination revealed the fuel tanks were empty. The pilot had flown the airplane 4.3 hours including 6 takeoffs, one missed approach, and a 20 minute ground run prior to departure with both engines running on the final flight.

Two U.S. Customs Service airplanes collided in formation cruise flight while being evacuated from Borinquen, Puerto Rico, to Curacao, Dutch Antilles, due to an approaching hurricane. While in cruise flight at 6,500 ft. msl, N6305U maneuvered closer to the lead airplane, N6302W, to take some photographs. Several minutes later, N6305U's right side of the vertical stabilizer collided with the left side of the nose of N6302W. N6305U was ditched while on short final to an airstrip due to a lack of airplane controllability, while N6302W returned to Borinquen and landed without incident. Prior to departure, the crewmembers of both airplanes were directed to fly as a flight of two. Neither of the second-in-commands (SICs) of either airplane had any previous formation flying training, nor was it approved for the flight. Interviews with U.S. Customs personnel revealed that formation flight occurred, as did photographs taken from the SIC aboard N6305U during the accident flight. The U.S. Customs Service required two pilots to operate the airplane due to mission equipment installation.

The airplane departed at night after maintenance was performed on the left engine. The pilot attempted to return to the airport and while on base leg struck the ground inverted and nose down. The left engine propeller was found feathered. On the left engine, the # 5 cylinder was off the engine and the # 5 piston with the connecting rod still attached were found nearby. Interviews revealed that during maintenance, the # 1,3,5,and 6 cylinders had been removed and reinstalled; however, the # 5 cylinder had not been tightened. Several people had worked on the airplane at various stages of the work. The maintenance facility did not have a system to pass down what had been accomplished, and the FAA did not require the tracking of work accomplished in other than 14 CFR Part 121, or 14 CFR Part 145 facilities.