Positioning

The flight departed Anchorage, Alaska, and was en route to Saint George, Alaska, to pick up passengers for a return flight to Anchorage. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was seated in the right seat, and the copilot was seated in the left seat. This was the copilot's third flight in this make and model airplane, and he was not qualified as a crewman in it under 14 CFR Part 135. There was no record of when the copilot last performed a non directional beacon (NDB) approach. The NDB indicator in the cockpit was on the left side of the left control column, partially blocked from the view of the PIC. The minimum altitude for the segment of the approach prior to the final approach fix (FAF) was 1,700 feet. The Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) for the final segment of the approach was 880 feet. The reported ceiling was 100 feet overcast. The Air Route Traffic Control Center radar altitude readout for the airplane revealed that the airplane descended below 600 feet prior to reaching the FAF. The radar ground track revealed the airplane on course prior to the course reversal procedure turn on the published approach. The radar ground track showed that after the course reversal, the airplane continued through the published final approach course, and turned to parallel the inbound track three miles north of course. The radar plot terminates about the location of the 550 feet high cliffs where the airplane was located. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 100 foot overcast. This location was 5.5 miles (DME) from the airport. A review of radar tapes from the day prior to the accident, show the same airplane and PIC tracking the published course outbound and inbound, and descending below the published approach minima to below 500 feet. This flight successfully landed at the airport. An interview with the copilot from the successful flight revealed that the PIC intentionally descended to 300 feet on the approach until he acquired visual contact with the ocean, then flew to the airport to land. An aircraft flying on the published inbound final approach course at 5.5 DME is over water, approximately three miles from the nearest terrain.

The captain/operator, the first officer and one passenger, departed on a cross-country positioning flight. The airplane contained about 300 gallons of fuel. After 3.9 hours en route, the flight was cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. During the approach, both engines lost power about 2,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot stated the right fuel tank was empty. He estimated that 50 to 60 gallons of fuel remained in the left fuel tank. While the airplane was descending toward an area of open water, he attempted to restart the engines without success. He then lowered the landing gear, and made a right turn toward a small airstrip, located about 5 miles northwest of the destination airport. The airplane touched down in an area of soft, marsh covered, terrain. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed down and received damage to the forward, lower portion of the fuselage. An inspection of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the left fuel tank contained about 1 inch of fuel. The right fuel selector was positioned on the right auxiliary fuel tank. The left fuel selector was positioned between the left main, and the left auxiliary fuel tanks.

Shortly after takeoff from Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport, while climbing, the pilot reported engine problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. While completing a turn, he lost control of the airplane that crashed in Niendorf, near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane was on a VFR dusk cross-country flight when it collided with the 1,500-foot level of a hill. Radar data showed the aircraft in a descent from 2,000 feet until radar contact was lost about 1,500 feet msl, with a final ground speed of 194 knots. The route taken by the pilot was about 5 miles west of the route that the company pilots routinely flew, but while crossing higher terrain, it was a more direct route to the destination. A company pilot flying a few minutes ahead of the accident flight reported it was necessary to descend to between 1,200 and 1,500 feet msl in order to maintain VFR. A low-pressure system approaching the area from the west had resulted in low stratus, rain, and fog. At the time of the accident, a nearby weather reporting facility reported a 1,300-foot broken ceiling with 5- to 6-mile visibility in light rain and mist. On the evening of the accident, the pilot was scheduled to give a speech as her final examination in an evening college course. She had informed the instructor that she might be late, but had been told that he could not hold the class past its scheduled dismissal time to accommodate her late arrival.

The airplane was flown from Morgantown to Charleston to drop off passengers. Once there, the pilot called the mechanic who was scheduled to replace the right transfer pump, and told him the right boost pump was also inoperative. The mechanic told the pilot, he would replace both pumps the next morning in Charleston. Adding that de-fueling the airplane would take longer than changing the pumps. The mechanic recalled that the pilot was concerned about the amount of time necessary for the repair. The airplane was then repositioned back to Morgantown for another flight the next day to Charleston. The morning of the accident, the airplane departed Morgantown, and was being vectored for the ILS approach to Charleston when the copilot declared an emergency. He then announced that they had 'a dual engine failure, two souls onboard and zero fuel.' Examination of the wreckage and both engines revealed no pre-impact failures or malfunctions. With the right transfer pump inoperative. 28 gallons of fuel in the right wing would be unusable. In addition, the flight manual states that 'both boost pumps must be operable prior to take-off.'

The aircraft was transferred from Gomel to Kunovice for maintenance purposes. On approach to Kunovice, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and decided to divert to Brno-Tuřany Airport where the conditions were poor as well. Two approaches were abandoned. During the third attempt to land, in a gear up/flaps up configuration, the aircraft crashed 3,5 km from the runway threshold and was destroyed upon impact. Both pilots were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 50 metres due to thick fog.

The flight crew was positioning the airplane in preparation for a revenue flight when it crashed 2 nautical miles (nm) short of the runway during a second instrument landing system approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Except for the final 48 seconds of the 25- minute flight, the captain was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the nonflying pilot. When the airplane was about 0.5 nm inside the outer marker on the first approach, the compass warning flag on the captain's course deviation indicator appeared, indicating that the heading display was unreliable. The airplane deviated from the localizer centerline to the left but continued to descend. After about 1 minute, during which time the airplane's track continued to diverge from the localizer centerline, the flight crew executed a missed approach. The flight crew then unsuccessfully attempted to clear the compass flag by resetting circuit breakers. The captain directed the first officer to request a second approach. Contrary to company crew coordination procedures, the flight crew did not conduct an approach briefing or make altitude callouts for either approach. Although accurate heading information was available to the captain on his radio magnetic indicator, he experienced difficulty tracking the localizer course as the airplane proceeded past the outer marker on the second approach. The captain transferred control to the first officer when the airplane was 1.9 nm inside the outer marker. The airplane then began to deviate below the glideslope. The descent continued through the published decision height of 200 feet above ground level, and the airplane struck 80-foot-tall trees. Post accident testing revealed that the first officer's instruments were displaying a false full fly-down glideslope indication because of a failed amplifier in the navigation receiver. The glideslope deficiency was discovered 2 months before the accident by another flight crew. An FAA repair station attempted to resolve the problem and misdiagnosed it as "sticking" needles in the cockpit instruments. The operator was immediately advised of the problem. The operator's minimum equipment list for the airplane required that the problem be repaired within 10 days, but the operator improperly deferred maintenance on it for 60 days and allowed the unairworthy airplane to be flown by the accident flight crew. The airplane was not equipped with, nor was it required to be equipped with, a ground proximity warning system, which would have sounded 40 seconds before impact.

The four engine aircraft departed Elefsis AFB near Athens on a short flight to Tanagra AFB, carrying five crew members. The aircraft was dispatched at Tanagra AFB to pick up a contingent of 80 soldiers who should take part to the SAR operations following the crash of an Ukrainian Yak-42 on December 17 in the region of Katerini, Central Macedonia. While cruising in a limited visibility due to foggy conditions, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Pastra located about 24 km southwest of Tanagra Airbase. The wreckage was found few km southeast of the village of Erythres. All five crew members were killed.

The aircraft was f1ying from Entebbe (Uganda) to Mwanza (Tanzania) for the purpose of uplifting some cargo of fish fillet which was bound for Ostend, Belgium. It was carrying a crew of four including two pilot s and two engineers. The Commander said that the flight from Entebbe to Mwanza was normal except for the n°1 generator warning light which came on 10 minutes after takeoff from Entebbe. The relevant generator was subsequently switched off and the flight was continued. The aircraft flew IFR, cruising at FL250. Shortly before landing at Mwanza the commander obtained the weather information from the Mwanza Tower. The wind was calm. The controller who was handling the flight said that whilst approaching runway 12 of Mwanza airport the aircraft was swaying from side to side. When EL-WVD touched down on the runway a loud bang was heard and one engine was observed to separate and roll down the runway whilst it was on fire. Examination of the impact and tire marks showed that the right wing tip impacted the runway first followed by the n°4 engine. The right main landing gear subsequently contacted the grass surface off the left edge of the runway followed by the left main landing gear. The aircraft continued to roll in a direction almost parallel to the runway centreline for 250 metres before it crossed the runway at an angle. It was also evident from the tyre marks that as it reached the runway the aircraft made a 180° turn to point in the opposite direction whilst sliding sideways at an angle with the centreline under its own momentum. As it did so, the main landing gear collapsed and three wing pylons sheared causing the engines to separate. EL-WVD finally settled at the edge of the runway pointing 310° with the right wing projecting 2.5 metres inside the runway. There was fuel leakage but no fire. The four crew members disembarked with minor injuries.

The PIC stated he was established on an instrument approach when the left engine fuel pressure dropped to zero and the engine quit. He moved the fuel selector to the right rear fuel tank and the engine started. He continued the approach for about 2 miles when the right engine quit followed by the left engine. He made a forced landing to a sandbar. Examination of the airplane revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and the fuel tanks were empty.