Positioning

Following an uneventful flight from Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport, the crew started the descent to Ambato Airport in good weather conditions but was stressed by the presence of another aircraft in the approach area. On approach, the aircraft was too high on the glide and its speed was 100 knots, about 12 knots above the reference speed. This caused the aircraft to land too far down the runway 19, about 900 metres past the runway threshold (Ambato's runway 19 is 2,000 metres long). After touchdown, the crew decided to initiate a go-around procedure and increased engine power. The aircraft adopted a high angle of attack, causing the base of the empennage to struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft continued, overran and came to rest in a ravine located 60 metres past the runway end. All seven occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The float equipped airplane was observed taking off in light winds and calm water, and obtaining a steep climb and nose high attitude. Witnesses described hearing no reduction of engine noise from takeoff power to climb power. The airplane entered a steep left bank about 200 feet above the water, then rolled rapidly to the right and impacted at a steep angle into the water. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Test results also required the addition of both a ventral fin, and horizontal stabilizer finlets, to meet directional stability certification. These tests determined that the least stable condition was in the takeoff flap configuration, during climb. The Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the modification required the ventral fin, and an audible stall warning system be installed. The manufacturer provided a marketing video, produced prior to the STC approval, which stated the stall warning system was not required in the U.S. The company indicated this tape was used for training, and was a basis for pilots routinely disabling the stall warning horn by pulling the circuit breaker. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, a takeoff flaps setting was selected, and the audible stall warning circuit breaker was in the pulled (disabled) position. The local FAA Flight Standards Office had inspected the accident airplane 14 times in the previous 29 months, and made no mention of the ventral fin not being installed.

According to the pilot, the airplane was high and fast on final approach, because of restricted visibility in haze, and he executed a go-around. The pilot and copilot do not recall retracting the landing gear. During the second approach, the pilot stated he did not extended the gear because he was 'sure in his mind that the gear was already down'. The airplane landed with the gear retracted. The airplane slid approximately 3,000 feet. Following the landing, the airplane caught fire under the right wing root, and the fire could not be extinguished with hand held fire extinguishers. Both pilots safely evacuated the airplane.

The pilot was cleared for a localizer approach by Atlanta Center and told to maintain 5,000 feet until crossing the final approach fix (FAF). Normal altitude at the FAF was 2,700 feet. The pilot was unable to land from this approach and performed a missed approach. He was handed off to Chattanooga Approach, then was cleared to cross the FAF at 3,000 feet and perform another localizer approach. About one mile from the FAF, the pilot was told to change to the airport advisory frequency. The pilot acknowledged, then there was no further communication with the aircraft. A short time later, witnesses heard the aircraft crash near the approach end of the runway. Examination of the crash site showed the aircraft had touched down in a grass area about 1,100 feet from the end of the runway, while on the localizer. Propeller slash marks showed both engines were operating at approach power and the aircraft was at approach speed. No evidence of precrash mechanical failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, systems, engines, or propellers was found. The 0621 weather was in part: 300 feet overcast and 1/2 mile visibility with fog. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 1,180 feet msl; airport elevation was 710 feet. The pilot had flown 8 flight hours, was on duty for 13.6 hours the day before the accident, was off duty for about 6 hrs, and had about 4 hours of sleep before the accident flight.

Witnesses near the airport saw the flight approach on a left base to runway 4, touchdown on the runway, and takeoff again. One witness, a pilot, said the airplane turned onto final to the 'south' (right) of the runway centerline.' The airplane made a 'sharp' turn to the left to realign with the runway center, slightly overshot the runway to the left, turned to the right 'sharply,' and touched down on the runway. The witness further stated, '...by the time the pilot was on the runway he had wasted approximately 1,200 to 1,500 feet of runway 4, they hit reverse thrusters [sic] and were on full bore till they crossed runway 27 and 9.' The witness saw heat come out of both engine thrust reversers, the nose gear touched down and then came up again. He then saw the airplane come off the ground about 30 to 40 feet, wobble left and right at a 'slow airspeed,' crossover a highway at a low altitude, right wing low, strike some wires, go into a field, and catch fire. The pilot said, when he touched down on the runway, the airplane seemed to 'lurch' to the side. He said at this point his airspeed was 126 knots. He elected to abort the landing, and applied full power. He said the engines would not develop thrust and he elected to land in a field less than 1/4 mile in front of him. Examination of the left thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully open. Both the left and right pneumatic latches were found in the unlocked position. Examination of the right thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully closed. The left pneumatic latch was found in the locked position. The right pneumatic latch was found in the unlocked position. The inboard sequence latches were found about 2 inches forward of full aft travel. The thrust reverser switch was found in the 'NORMAL' position. According to Gates Lear Jet Airworthiness Directive (AD) 79-08-01, '...to preclude inadvertent thrust reverser deployment and possible loss of aircraft control....,' the following limitations apply to all gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A, aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust reversers. According to the AD, Section I-LIMITATION; '....Thrust Reversers must not be operated prior to takeoff...Thrust Reversers must not be used for touch and go landings...After Thrust Reversers have been deployed, a visual check of proper door stowing must be made prior to takeoff...Operational Procedures in this Thrust Reverser Supplement are mandatory.' According to Lear Jet and FlightSafety International, the procedures that are taught to Lear Jet pilots in the use of thrust reverse and spoilers during landings are; '...pilots [are] to use thrust reverse only on full stop Lear Jet landings. Pilot are trained not to deploy spoilers or thrust reverse during touch and go's or during balked landings.' The pilot-in-command of N19LH at the time of the accident, told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that he was 'aware' of the limitations on the Aeronca Thrust Reverser and he knew that once the Thrust Reverser was deployed that he was 'committed' to land. The pilot told the IIC that he knew of the limitations and that he was committed to land.

The air cargo flight had just off loaded its cargo at a remote site. Shortly after takeoff, the number two engine begin to run rough. The engine was shut down, and the propeller feathered. During the shutdown process, a fire warning light illuminated, and fire became visible near the number 2 engine. The crew activated both banks of engine fire extinguishers, but were unable to extinguish the fire. While on approach to an off-airport emergency landing site, the number two engine fell off and ignited a brush fire. The crew made a successful landing and ran away from the airplane. The airplane continued to burn and was destroyed by fire. The number 2 engine was not recovered or located.

Shortly after takeoff from Saskatoon, while in initial climb, the single engine aircraft nosed down and crashed, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured and the aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The captain reported: 'Shortly after V1...there was a loss of power to the left engine....' (FAR Part 1 defines V1 as takeoff decision speed.) However, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, stated the captain retarded power on the left engine as a training exercise. The first officer stated there was no preflight discussion of emergency procedure practice. The airplane became airborne about 3,500 feet down the runway; the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft, and it crashed to the left of the runway, and a fire erupted. The crew escaped with minor injuries. A teardown of the left engine was performed under FAA supervision at the engine manufacturer's facilities; the engine manufacturer reported that damage found during the teardown 'was indicative of engine rotation and operation at the time of impact....' Both airspeed indicator bugs were found set 9 to 11 knots below the V1 speed on the takeoff and landing data (TOLD) card. No evidence of an aircraft or engine malfunction, to include inflight fire, was found at the accident site.

The pilot-in-command stated he was cleared for an ILS approach. He had to use spoilers to intercept the glideslope. The landing was extended at the outer marker as the airspeed was slowed through 200 knots. As the airspeed decreased the spoilers were retracted and the flaps were extended to 20-degrees. The airplane was drifting to the right and flaps were lowered to 40-degrees as the drift was corrected. The airplane floated and touched down long. The spoilers, and brakes were applied as well as full reverse. There was no braking due to hydroplaning. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane went off the end of the runway, skidded through 200 feet of sod, vaulted off a 25 foot embankment, skidded across a road, and collided with a ditch.

Few minutes after takeoff from Cagayan de Oro Airport, while climbing to a height of 8,000 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Balatukan located about 57 km northeast of Cagayan de Oro Airport. Both pilots were killed.