Positioning

During the takeoff roll, at a speed of 290 km/h, the copilot started the rotation. The aircraft lifted off, reached a height of 7 metres then entered a left bank of 3,5°. Following a course of 665 metres, the aircraft entered a critical angle of attack, nosed up to 35° then landed back on the runway while the undercarriage have just been retracted. The aircraft slid on its belly and came to rest 270 metres further, about 120 metres to the left of the runway centerline. All 25 occupants were rescued, among them two were seriously injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During his weather briefing, the pilot was told that his destination weather was not available, and was provided weather for an airport about 10 miles north. He was briefed that low visibility due to fog prevailed. The flight departed earlier then usual because the company business manager was concerned that the weather at the destination airport was deteriorating, and if the airplane was not there earlier they might not get into the airport. At the time of the accident there was a power failure, and lights around the destination airport went out. The airplane had struck power lines and a support tower located on the approach end of runway 1 and runway 5, about 1/2 mile southwest of the airport. The airport had one NDB approach which was not authorized at night. The nearest recorded weather, about 10 miles north of the crash site, at the time of the accident was; '...ceiling 100, [visibility] 1/2 mile, fog, [temperature] 46 degrees F, dew point, 42 degrees F, winds 220 degrees at 5 [knots], altimeter 29.90 inches Hg. Witnesses reported that there was heavy fog at the airport and the visibility was below 1/4 mile.

The first officer was in the left seat, flying the airplane, and the captain was in the right seat, for the positioning flight. Approaching the destination, the crew briefed, then attempted an ILS RWY 18 approach. The captain reported not receiving the localizer, when, in fact, the airplane was actually about 5 nautical miles to the left of it. Winds at the airport, about that time, were from 190 degrees true, at 5 knots; however, area winds at 6,000 feet were from 220 degrees, in excess of 40 knots. The crew executed a missed approach, but did not follow the missed approach procedures. The captain later requested, and received clearance for, the VOR RWY 25 approach. The captain partially briefed the approach to the first officer as the airplane neared the VOR, then subsequently "talked through" remaining phases of the approach as they occurred. The outbound course for the VOR RWY 25 approach was 066 degrees, and the minimum altitude outbound was 4,300 feet. After passing the VOR, the captain directed the first officer to maintain 4,700 feet. The airplane's last radar contact occurred as the airplane was proceeding outbound, 7 nautical miles northeast of the VOR, at 4,800 feet. As the airplane approached the course reversal portion of the procedure turn, the captain initially directed the first officer to turn the airplane in the wrong direction. When the proper heading was finally given, the airplane had been outbound for about 2 minutes. During the outbound portion of the course reversal, the captain told the first officer to descend the airplane to 2,900 feet, although the procedure called for the airplane to maintain a minimum of 4,300 feet until joining the inbound course to the VOR. During the inbound portion of the course reversal, the captain amended the altitude to 3,000 feet. As the airplane neared the inbound course to the VOR, the captain called out the outer marker. The first officer agreed, and the captain stated that they could descend to 2,300 feet. The first officer then noted that the VOR indications were fluctuating. The captain pointed out the VOR's continued reception, and the first officer noted, "but it's all over the place." Shortly thereafter, the first officer stated that he was descending the airplane to 2,300 feet. Three seconds later, the airplane impacted trees, then terrain. The wreckage was located at the 2,300-foot level, on rising mountainous terrain, 061 degrees magnetic, 12.5 nautical miles from the VOR. It was also 10.3 nautical miles prior to where a descent to 2,300 feet was authorized. There was no evidence that the crew used available DME information. There was also no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunction.

Learjet L36A (serial number 033), N14TX, was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Grand Rapids, Michigan, to Stephenville, Newfoundland. At 0216 Newfoundland standard time (NST1), N14TX was cleared by Gander Area Control Centre (ACC) for an approach to the Stephenville airport. The co-pilot contacted the St. John=s Flight Service Station (FSS) and advised that they would be conducting an approach to runway 28. The FSS specialist relayed the latest Stephenville weather observation and runway surface condition report to the aircraft and requested that the crew advise St. John=s FSS when they had landed. When the crew of N14TX did not report after landing at Stephenville, the St. John=s FSS specialist advised Gander ACC that the aircraft was missing, and a search was begun. Initial information received by the agencies searching for the missing aircraft did not include the aircraft=s last recorded radar position. The wreckage was located approximately three hours and ten minutes after the aircraft was reported missing, within the airport perimeter, close to the last observed aircraft radar position. The aircraft struck a service road embankment in an inverted, wings-level attitude. The two crew members were fatally injured. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness at approximately 0238 NST.

After takeoff from runway 09, a climbing left turn was made. At about 1,000 feet, the #2 (right) engine backfired, emitted flames, and lost power. The captain instructed the copilot to feather the #2 propeller, which the copilot initiated with the feathering button. When the captain requested gear and flap extension, the copilot released the feathering button which did not remain engaged, contrary to system design. The airplane had arrived on a left downwind abeam the landing area at 500 feet and 95 to 100 knots. The captain turned toward the runway, then he ordered the gear and flaps to be retracted and initiated a go-around by increasing the left throttle without increasing propeller speed. A right turn was then made, and the airplane eventually crashed about 3 miles from the runway. During a postaccident examination, the propellers were found unfeathered, and the right engine fuel selector was in the main tank position. The emergency procedure listed the best single engine speed as 85 knots. The procedure for engine fire/failure was to feather the propeller and to move the respective fuel selector to 'OFF.' Examination revealed the number 11 cylinder on the right engine was cracked. There was evidence of fire, adjacent to the cylinder on the cowling, which consisted of scorching, sooting, and a burned through area of the underside of the right engine cowling. The copilot indicated a previous problem with the feathering system, but maintenance records did not contain any previous discrepancies regarding this anomaly.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a positioning flight from Watson Lake to Desolation Lake. While cruising at an altitude of 5,000 feet, the single engine aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located in hilly terrain, about 114 km southwest from Watson Lake. The wreckage was found a day later and the pilot was killed.

The airplane was being positioned to another airport at night. The flight was over mountainous terrain. The airplane collided with the top of a 4,600-foot bluff. The pilot had a history of transient global amnesia. Examination of the accident site revealed a 567-foot long wreckage path, oriented along the direct course line from the departure point to the destination. Damage to the engine and propeller indicated that the engine was developing power at impact.

Few minutes after takeoff from Cutral Có Airport, the crew continued under VFR mode over a hilly terrain and at an insufficient altitude. While trying to make an evasive manoeuvre to avoid ground contact, the aircraft struck the top of a hill with its right wing, stalled and crashed. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

After landing at Whale Cove Airport, the aircraft deviated to the left after a course of about 1,600 feet. It veered off runway, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During departure, the rubber connector for the fuel supply line to the right engine oil dilution valve split at the dilution valve on the aft side of the firewall. The engine would not operate unless the electric boost pump was turned on. While returning to the departure airport, a fire erupted in the right wheel after the landing gear was extended. The cockpit filled with smoke during the landing rollout, and the pilot lost directional control do to not being able to see. The aircraft rolled into a canal and came to rest. The split rubber fuel line connector was dry and brittle and did not have any fire damage. No other sources of fuel leakage was found.