Country
code
Leicestershire
Crash of a Cessna 340A in Sheepy Magna
Date & Time:
Sep 7, 1993 at 1318 LT
Registration:
G-XGBE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fradley - Bournemouth
MSN:
340A-0905
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total hours on type:
933.00
Circumstances:
At 1316LT, shortly after they had reached 2,000 feet and settled into the cruise, both engines lost power in union. The pilot attempted to identify and rectify the problem by checking the magneto and the fuel pumps switches and changing fuel tanks but, being unsuccessful, transmitted a 'mayday' message to Birmingham ATC. The pilot selected the landing gear down and then, despite some difficulty in finding a suitable field in which to make a forced landing and clearing some trees on the final approach, landed in a field of mature wheat. The aircraft came to rest with all three landing gear legs collapsed and the occupants left the aircraft through the normal passenger door.
Probable cause:
Loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion.
Final Report:
Crash of a Partenavia P.68B in East Midlands: 1 killed
Date & Time:
Oct 20, 1990 at 0332 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-BMCB
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
East Midlands – Manchester
MSN:
156
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed East Midlands runways 27 on a ferry flight to Manchester. During initial climb by night, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed at a speed of 160 knots and disintegrated in a field near the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control during initial climb by night after the pilot suffered a spatial disorientation due to the combination of a poor visibility (night and low clouds) and the possible malfunction of the horizontal stabilizer due to water in the vacuum system.
Final Report:
Crash of a Boeing 737-4Y0 in East Midlands: 47 killed
Date & Time:
Jan 8, 1989 at 2025 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-OBME
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
London - Belfast
MSN:
23867
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
BD092
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
118
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
47
Captain / Total hours on type:
763.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
192
Aircraft flight hours:
521
Circumstances:
British Midland Airways Flight BD092 took off from London-Heathrow Airport at 1952LT on a flight to Belfast, Northern Ireland. Some 13 minutes later, while climbing through FL283, moderate to severe vibration was felt, accompanied by a smell of fire in the cockpit. The outer panel of one of the n°1 engine fan blades detached, causing compressor stalls and airframe shuddering. Believing the n°2 engine had been damaged the crew throttled it back. The shuddering stopped and the n°2 engine was shut down. The crew then decided to divert to East Midlands Airport. The flight was cleared for an approach to runway 27. At 900 feet, 2.4 nm from the runway threshold, the n°1 engine power suddenly suffered a decrease in power. As the speed fell below 125 knots, the stick shaker activated and the aircraft struck trees at a speed of 115 knots. The aircraft continued and impacted the western carriageway of the M1 motorway 10 meters lower and came to rest against a wooded embankment, 1'023 meters short of runway threshold. 47 passengers were killed while all other occupants were injured, some of them seriously.
Probable cause:
The operating crew shut down the n°2 engine after a fan blade had fractured in the n°1 engine. This engine subsequently suffered a major thrust loss due to secondary fan damage after power had been increased during the final approach to land.
The following factors contributed to the incorrect response of the flight crew:
1. The combination of heavy engine vibration, noise, shuddering and an associated smell of fire were outside their training and experience;
2. They reacted to the initial engine problem prematurely and in a way that was contrary to their training;
3. They did not assimilate the indications on the engine instrument display before they throttled back the n°2 engine;
4. As the n°2 engine was throttled back, the noise and shuddering associated with the surging of the n°1 engine ceased, persuading them that they had correctly identified the defective engine;
5. They were not informed of the flames which had emanated from the n°1 engine and which had been observed by many on board, including 3 cabin attendants in the aft cabin.
The following factors contributed to the incorrect response of the flight crew:
1. The combination of heavy engine vibration, noise, shuddering and an associated smell of fire were outside their training and experience;
2. They reacted to the initial engine problem prematurely and in a way that was contrary to their training;
3. They did not assimilate the indications on the engine instrument display before they throttled back the n°2 engine;
4. As the n°2 engine was throttled back, the noise and shuddering associated with the surging of the n°1 engine ceased, persuading them that they had correctly identified the defective engine;
5. They were not informed of the flames which had emanated from the n°1 engine and which had been observed by many on board, including 3 cabin attendants in the aft cabin.
Final Report:
