Plainville-Robertson

The flight crew was conducting a personal flight with two passengers onboard. Before departure, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) captured the pilots verbalizing items from the before takeoff checklist, but there was no challenge response for the taxi, before takeoff, or takeoff checklists. Further, no crew briefing was performed and neither pilot mentioned releasing the parking brake. The left seat pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF) and pilot-in-command (PIC), initiated takeoff from the slightly upsloping 3,665-ft-long asphalt runway. According to takeoff performance data that day and takeoff performance models, the airplane had adequate performance capability to take off from that runway. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated each thrust lever angle was set and remained at 65° while the engines were set and remained at 91% N1. During the takeoff roll, the CVR recorded the copilot, who was the pilot monitoring (PM) and second-in-command (SIC), making callouts for “airspeed’s alive,” “eighty knots cross check,” “v one,” and “rotate.” A comparison of FDR data from the accident flight with the previous two takeoffs showed that the airplane did not become airborne at the usual location along the runway, and the longitudinal acceleration was about 33% less. At the time of the rotate callout, the airspeed was about 104 knots calibrated airspeed, and the elevator was about +9° airplane nose up (ANU). Three seconds after the rotate callout, the CVR recorded the sound of physical straining, suggesting the pilot was likely attempting to rotate the airplane by pulling the control yoke. The CVR also captured statements from both the copilot and pilot expressing surprise that the airplane was not rotating as they expected. CVR and FDR data indicated that between the time of the rotate callout and the airplane reaching the end of the airport terrain, the airspeed increased to about 120 knots, the weight-on-wheels (WOW) remained in an on-ground state, and the elevator position increased to a maximum value of about +16° ANU. However, the airplane’s pitch attitude minimally changed. After the airplane cleared the end of the airport terrain where the ground elevation decreased 20 to 25 ft, FDR data indicate that the WOW transitioned to air mode with near-full ANU elevator control input, and the airplane pitched up nearly 22° in less than 2 seconds. FDR data depicted forward elevator control input in response to the rapid pitch-up, and the CVR recorded a stall warning then stick shaker activation. An off airport witness reported seeing the front portion of the right engine impact a nearby pole past the departure end of the runway. The airplane then rolled right to an inverted attitude, impacted the ground, then impacted an off airport occupied building. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed. On ground, four other people were injured, one seriously.

The pilot/owner initiated a VFR approach and landing in a Cessna 525A, to a 3,009-foot long runway with a tailwind of about 7 knots. The touchdown was 642 feet past the approach end of the runway. Vref was calculated to be 108 kts; however, data from the EGPWS showed the ground speed was about 137 kts, 9 seconds before touchdown, and at touchdown, the speed was estimated to be about 130 kts. After touchdown, the pilot selected ground flaps, which moved the flaps from 35 degrees to 60 degrees, the spoilers auto-deployed, and the speed brakes were extended. The pilot said that after applying the brakes, he felt the brakes pedals pulsing, and did not think the airplane was slowing. He released the brakes for a few seconds and then reapplied them. Again, he felt the pulsing in the pedals, but the airplane was not slowing as he expected. He released the brakes, reset the flaps to takeoff, and applied power to abort the landing when he was about halfway down the runway. The airplane departed the end of the runway and traveled for about 300 feet. Skid marks revealed the initial touchdown was most like made with brakes applied, and no locked wheel crossover protection. Additional skid marks revealed the airplane became airborne after touchdown, and in the next 750 ft, touched down 3 more times, each subsequent touchdown occurring without the full weight of the airplane on the wheels. Tire marks on the last half of the runway were consistent with brakes applied and anti-skid operative. Using the approved flight manual standards, the airplane would have required 3,155 feet to stop. This was predicated on crossing the threshold at 50 feet, at Vref, and included a ground roll of 1,895 feet. However, the pilot touched down at 642 feet from the threshold, which left sufficient runway for stopping. Using the pilot's touchdown point of 642 feet, the airplane was capable of stopping on the runway with a Vref as high as 120 kts. The approach was unstabilized with 4 aural warnings, including 2 sink rate warnings on final approach, the last of which occurred with a descent rate of over 1,700 fpm down, 19 seconds prior to touchdown, and about 400 feet above the ground. The last airborne GPS position was about 2,000 ft from runway touchdown. This would have required a flight path angle of about 3.8 degrees to achieve the reported touchdown position.