New York-JFK

While rolling on a taxiway, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane sank on its belly and came to rest. All three technicians on board were uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Star of Chillon' was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Eastern Air Lines, Flight EA 663 was a scheduled passenger flight originating at Boston, MA (BOS), and terminating at Atlanta, GA (ATL) with intermediate stops at New York (JFK), Richmond, VA (RIC), Charlotte, NC (CLT), and Greenville-Spartanburg, SC (GSP). The DC-7B took off from runway 31L at New York-JFK at 18:20 on an IFR clearance to the Richmond Airport. The crew flew a Dutch 7 Standard Instrument Departure. About 18:24 EAL 663 was further cleared to 8,000 feet and instructed to turn right to a heading of 150 degrees. The flight acknowledged this clearance and reported leaving 3,000 feet. Shortly thereafter the crew reported leaving 3,500 feet at which time the flight was instructed to turn left to a heading of 090 degrees. At 18:25, while climbing through 3700 feet Departure Control instructed the flight to "... turn right now, heading one seven zero to Victor one thirty nine, traffic 2 o'clock five miles northeast bound below you." The flight responded, "OK we have the traffic, turning one seven zero..." The other traffic was Pan American flight 212 arriving from San Juan. The Boeing 707 was being vectored to intercept the final approach course to runway 31R. At approximately 18:24 Approach Control had instructed the PA212 to turn right to a heading of 020 degrees and inquired if the flight had as yet, reached 3,000 feet. Approach Control then instructed the flight to report leaving each 500-foot level down to 3,000 feet and advised the flight of " ...Traffic at 11 O'clock, six miles southeast bound just climbing out of three (3,000 feet)." As the Eastern DC-7 was turning from 090 to 170 degrees, the airplane was in a 35-degree banked nearly level turn. With PA212 approx. 700 feet lower and four miles away at 3 o'clock, PA212 would not be visible to the captain of EA663 until he was nearly around the turn and on the rollout. Upon completion of the turn, they were on a nearly head-on, converging course with PA212. At that moment, PA212 started a left turn to the assigned heading of 360 degrees. The results of this turn would be to produce an illusion of an apparent collision track. Also, EA663 was turning away from the background lights of the Long Island shore into a black area, so there was no horizon available to assist in the determination of the relative altitude of the target airplane. Under these circumstances, it is likely that the Eastern pilot started a descent, initially as a precautionary measure, which would give him a longer time to observe the other aircraft, and provide him with a measure of vertical separation. Afraid of a collision, PA212 rolled rapidly to the right and also initiated a descent. The Eastern pilot also made a rapid roll to the right and/or a pull up. In this circumstance the DC-7 was placed in an unusual attitude, resulting in spatial disorientation of the crew. They were not able to recover from the vertical bank. The DC-7 struck the sea and disintegrated.

Flight 282 was a scheduled domestic cargo flight from San Francisco International Airport, California, to John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York. It was originally scheduled to depart at 2100 hours, Pacific Standard Time, on 23 December, but the flight was delayed because of the non-availability of a flight engineer. An engineer obtained from Los Angeles arrived in San Francisco at 2315 hours and the flight departed at 0028 hours on 24 December. At 0015 hours, while taxiing to runway 28L, the flight advised Ground Control that because of a heavy load, they would like to proceed out past the GAP Radio Beacon to the Golden Gate Intersection, and thence via Victor 150 to Sacramento instead of direct to Sacramento as originally filed. The request was coordinated with Oakland Air Route Traffic Control Centre and approval obtained. The crew was then advised that for take-off on runway 28L there would be a 'heavy' left crosswind from 210° at 18 to 25 knots which they acknowledged. After having switched to clearance delivery frequency, the flight was cleared to Kennedy Airport via Victor one fifty Sacramento, Victor six north, and requested to climb out on the San Francisco two eight seven radial for a vector to Golden Gate Intersection to intercept Victor one fifty. This was acknowledged. The Clearance Delivery Controller then stated: " You can disregard the vector, climb outbound San Francisco 287° radial to Golden Gate Intersection, then Victor 150, and, depending on your altitude, they probably will give you a vector to intercept (Victor) 150 before you get to Golden Gate". This was also acknowledged. The Local Controller, who was also Tower Supervisor, noted the time of 0030 on his clock as the aircraft became airborne and passed the tower. An eyewitness observed the landing lights retracting as the aircraft crossed the end of the runway. However, several witnesses along the flight path, including some located at points just prior to the crash, saw both landing lights on. Landing lights of the L-1049H may be retracted flush with the lower wing surface and remain on until switched off. After take-off, witnesses stated the aircraft made a slight turn to the right, then a steeper turn to the left, and then was observed returning to a wings-level attitude as it entered the clouds. At 0030:22, the flight was advised to contact Departure Control and did so immediately. The Departure Controller advised the flight at 0030:57 that he had radar contact with it and requested it to report leaving thousand-foot altitudes. At 0031:05, the crew asked how they were tracking toward the GAP. The Departure Controller switched his radar scope from the 30 to the 10-mile setting and requested the flight's altitude. The crew!replied they were at 900 ft. At 0031:20, the Departure Controller advised that they were left of the San Francisco 287° radial. As he received no acknowledgement he repeated his message. The Departure Controller stated that within seconds after the second transmission, the target stopped, bloomed, and disappeared from the radar scope. Repeated attempts to communicate with the flight after its disappearance from the scope were unsuccessful. At this time, 0032:30, the controller placed a time hack on the communications tape. Ground impact was computed to have occurred at approximately 0031:30. Main impact occurred 860 ft above sea level on Sweeney's Ridge, at approximately 4.3 miles on the 257° radial of the SFO TVOR. The coordinates of the impact area were 122° 28' 00" W longitude and 37° 38' 28" N latitude. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three crew members were killed.

PAA 212 departed Dulles Airport at 2221 with the same crew of 9 and 136 passengers. The flight was conducted under instrument conditions and was routine until arrival in the New York area. At 2239 the New York Center controller transmitted the JFK weather to PAA 212. The runway visual range (RVR) on runway 4R at JFK was reported to be 1,600 feet. At 2250 JFK Approach Control established radar and radio contact with PAA 212 and advised: "Depart Colts Neck heading zero nine zero for vectors to the final approach course, Kennedy weather is three hundred thin broken, measured ceiling one thousand five hundred overcast, visibility one and one-half miles fog, and the runway visual range runway four right more than one thousand feet, standby." FAA 212 acknowledged the transmission. N779PA was restricted to landing Minimums of 300-foot ceiling and 3/4 mile visibility. The flight reported over the Colts Neck VOR at 2253 35 and was cleared to descend from 6,000 to 1,500 feet. Several vectors were given to position FAA 212 on the inbound heading to the Outer Marker (OM). At 2256.15 while on a heading of 040 degree, the crew reported reaching 1,500 feet, airspeed 180. Several delaying vectors were given to position the aircraft three and one-half miles behind a DC-8 which was landing ahead. At 2259.45 the JFK local controller transmitted to FAA 212: "Clipper two one two this is Kennedy Tower, report passing outer marker, straight in four right, wind calm, runway visual range, all aircraft copy, four right is more than six thousand." Prevailing visibility at the JFK Airport was less than three miles, therefore the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Controller was monitoring all ILS approaches to runway 4R as prescribed by procedures. At 2301.10 the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar on localizer one mile from outer marker course and glidepath OK." At 2301:40, PAA 212 reported passing the outer marker and the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve two miles from touchdown." The local controller transmitted at 2301 45 "Clipper two one two, Kennedy Tower cleared to land four right, traffic will be clear in five seconds." PAR at 2302-10 advised "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar, execute a missed approach if you do not have the runway in sight." Immediately following this transmission, PAA 212 acknowledged "Uh. . . Roger two one two." The next radio transmission was at 2303:10 when the local controller called the flight but was unable to establish radio contact. After touchdown the aircraft continued down and off the runway across the asphalt overrun and through a sandy area before coming to rest in the shallow water of Thurston Basin approximately 800 feet from the far end of runway 4R. When the aircraft came to rest the crew proceeded aft to assist the passengers. The main forward (left) cabin door was opened and the passengers in this section of the aircraft left through this door. The passengers in the aft section left through the overwing exits onto the wings; and others left through the two rear doors and got into two life rafts that had been launched. Evacuation of the aft section of the aircraft was completed in approximately five minutes. After seats and debris had been removed from the first-class compartment aisle, some of the persons who had been in the aft section of the aircraft reentered the aircraft and left through the main forward cabin door. The aircraft broke in two and was written off. Among the 145 occupants, 40 were injured, seven of them seriously, and 105 other occupants were unhurt.

Air France Flight 075 originated at Orly Field, Paris, August 2, 1954, with a crew consisting of Captain Jean Caboche, Copilot Jean Roussean, Navigator Jacques Geffard., First Flight Engineer Albert Grandvaux, Second Flight Engineer Jean-Baptiste *** Stewardess Francine Dono, First Steward Michael Gallet, and Second Steward Jean Capron. The dispatch office had prepared two flight plans - one for a stop at Gander, Newfoundland, the other with a stop at Shannon, Ireland. Owing to marginal weather at Gander with the forecast indicating no improvement, the captain chose the latter plan. The flight departed Paris at 2024 and arrived Shannon at 2247. Fuel tanks were filled and the pilots ware briefed on weather for the nonstop flight to New York. Flight 075 departed Shannon at 0003 the next morning (August 3), estimating 11 hours 49 minutes an route, with fuel for nearly 14 hours. The gross weight at takeoff, 126,100 pounds, was less than the maximum allowable 133,000, and the load was correctly distributed relative to the canter of gravity of the aircraft. The Atlantic crossing was uneventful. Routine position reports were made en route and the flight periodically received weather reports for points along the route and at the destination. Stronger headwinds than had been anticipated were encountered near the North American continent, resulting in lower ground speed and somewhat higher fuel consumption per mile. The flight had approximately 600 gallons of fuel left at 1230 when it reported over Scotland Intersection (15 statute miles southwest of New York International Airport) and received clearance for an ILS approach. It was then 38 minutes behind its original flight plan estimate made at Shannon and had approximately 100 gallons less fuel than anticipated. During the approach, which was being monitored by New York International Airport radar, the flight encountered unexpected heavy turbulence, heavy rain, and a low ceiling, and the captain discontinued the approach at 1237 (0737 e. s. t.) when near his minimum prescribed altitude of 200 feet. The heavy turbulence made control of the aircraft difficult and when the missed approach was made, the captain found himself left of the localizer and below of glide path. The tower, which was immediately advised of the missed approach, told the flight to turn right to 130 degrees (the missed approach course), proceed to Scotland Intersection, and climb to 2,500 feet. Approximately three minutes after the missed approach and while on the 130-degrees course, the flight requested clearance to Boston. Such clearance was issued nine minutes later, as soon as possible consistent with other traffic. Meanwhile, the flight had reported being low on fuel but when asked if an emergency as being declared replied, "Negative, negative, not yet." At the approximate time clearance to Boston was received the flight engineer advised the captain that they had fuel of one more hour of flight. Thirty-three minutes after being cleared to Boston, the flight, at that time in the vicinity of Providence, Rhode Island, called Providence Tower, declared an emergency, and requested weather information. Providence weather, which was marginal, was furnished and the flight was cleared for an approach. However, the pilots found that their navigation kit did not contain an approach plate for Providence Airport and they advised they were not landing there. The captain then descended through a break in the overcast, circled two or three times, and landed with the gear retracted in a field at Preston City, Connecticut. It came to rest in flames in a garden and was destroyed by a post crash fire. All 37 occupants were evacuated safely. Nevertheless, 12 occupants were injured, among them both pilots.