Miami-Executive (Kendall-Tamiami)

The pilot was landing at the destination airport with a gusting crosswind. Upon touchdown, he established the aileron controls for the crosswind and applied the brakes; however, no braking action was observed. The airplane subsequently drifted left and departed the runway pavement. It came to rest upright in the grass infield area adjacent to the runway. The outboard portion of the right wing separated which resulted in substantial damage. Data indicated that the airplane was 14 knots or more above the published landing reference speed when it crossed the runway threshold, and it touched down about 2,000 ft from the threshold. The left and right weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameters transitioned from air to ground consistent with initial touchdown; however, the left WOW parameter transitioned back to air about 2 seconds later. The right WOW parameter remained on ground until the airplane departed the runway pavement. A detailed review of the Central Maintenance Function (CMF) data files did not reveal any record of airplane system anomalies from the time the airplane lifted off until it touched down. Multiple system anomalies were recorded after the runway excursion consistent with airframe damage sustained during the accident sequence. The brake system touchdown protection is designed to prevent brake application until wheel spin-up occurs to avoid the possibility of inadvertently landing with a locked wheel due to brake application. After weight-on-wheels has been true for three seconds, power braking is enabled. It is likely that the lack of positive weight-on-wheel parameters inhibited brake application due to the touchdown protection function and resulted in the pilot not observing any braking action. The excess airspeed, extended touchdown, and transient weight-on-wheels parameters were consistent with the airplane floating during the landing flare and with the application of aileron controls for the crosswind conditions. The airplane was not equipped with wing-mounted speed brakes which would have assisted in maintaining weight-on-wheels during the initial portion of the landing. The most recent wind report, transmitted by the tower controller when the airplane was on a 3- mile final, presented a 70° crosswind at 15 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The corresponding crosswind gust component was about 24 knots. The airplane flight manual specified a crosswind limitation of 20 kts for takeoff and landing; therefore, the crosswind at the time of the accident exceeded the airframe crosswind limitation and would have made control during touchdown difficult. The pilot reported that he had made two requests with the approach controller to land on a different runway, but those requests were denied. The investigation was unable to make any determination regarding a pilot request for an alternate runway. Federal Aviation Regulations stated that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. The regulations also stated that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations. The pilot’s ultimate acceptance of the runway assignment which likely exceeded the crosswind limitation of the airplane was contrary to the regulations and to the safe operation of the airplane.

Before departing on the flight, the private pilot, who did not hold a current medical certificate, fueled the multiengine airplane and was seen shortly thereafter attempting to repair a fuel leak of unknown origin. The pilot did not hold a mechanic certificate and review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed 2 years before the accident. After performing undetermined maintenance to the airplane, the pilot reported to a witness that he had fixed the fuel leak. The pilot then taxied to the runway for takeoff. Witnesses reported that a large fuel stain was present on the ramp where the airplane had been parked; however, the amount of fuel that leaked from the airplane could not be determined. The pilot aborted the first takeoff shortly after becoming airborne. Although he did not state why he aborted the takeoff, he told the tower controller that he did not need assistance; shortly thereafter, he requested and was cleared for a second takeoff. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and was cleared to land on any runway. Witnesses reported that the airplane was between 400 ft and 800 ft above the ground in a left bank and appeared to be turning back to land on an intersecting runway. They thought the airplane was going to make it back to the runway, but the airplane's bank angle increased past 90° and the nose suddenly dropped; the airplane subsequently impacted terrain. One of the pilots likened the maneuver to a stall/spin, Vmc roll, or snap roll. Examination of the flight controls and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The position of the fuel valves was consistent with the fuel being shut off to the left engine. The fuel valves, with the exception of the left main valve, functioned when power was applied. The left main valve was intact, but the motor was found to operate intermittently. The amount of fuel found in the left engine injection servo was less than that in the right engine; however, the cylinder head temperatures and exhaust gas temperatures were consistent between both engines for the duration of the flight, and whether or to what extent the left engine may have experienced a loss of power could not be determined. The available evidence was insufficient to determine why the pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to the airport; however, the airplane's increased left bank and nose-down attitude just before impact is consistent with a loss of control.