Fort Lauderdale-Executive

The airline transport pilot of the multiengine airplane had fueled the main (inboard) fuel tanks to capacity before the cross-county flight. As the flight approached the destination airport, an air traffic controller instructed the pilot to turn right for a visual approach, and the pilot acknowledged. Subsequently, the pilot reported that he might have to land on a highway. The airplane impacted a marsh area about 15 miles from the destination airport. Review of data downloaded from an onboard engine monitor revealed that the right engine momentarily lost and regained power before experiencing a total loss of power. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the left propeller was feathered and that the right propeller was in the normal operating range. Sufficient fuel to complete the flight was drained from the left wing fuel tanks. Although the right wing fuel tanks were compromised during the impact, sufficient fuel was likely present in the right main fuel tanks to complete the flight before impact because both the left and right main fuel tanks were fueled to capacity concurrently before the flight, but it likely was in a low fuel state due to fuel used during the flight. The right wing main fuel tank was not equipped with a flapper valve, which should have been located on the baffle nearest the wing root where the fuel pickup was located. The flapper valve is used to trap fuel near the fuel pickup and prevent it from flowing outboard away from the pickup. The maintenance records did not indicate that the right main fuel tank bladder had been replaced; however, the manufacture year printed on the bladder was about 20 years before the accident and 16 years after the manufacture of the airplane, indicating that the bladder had been replaced at some point. When the right main fuel tank bladder was replaced, the flapper valve would have been removed. Based on the evidence, it is likely that maintenance personnel failed to reinstall the flapper valve after installing the new fuel bladder. This missing valve would not affect operation of the fuel system unless the right main fuel tank was in a low fuel state, when fuel could flow outboard away from the fuel pickup (such as in a right turn, which the pilot was making when the engine lost power), and result in fuel starvation to the engine.Toxicology testing of the pilot revealed that his blood alcohol level during the flight was likely between 0.077 gm/dl and 0.177 gm/dl, which is above the level generally considered impairing. Therefore, it is likely that, during the right turn, the fuel in the right main fuel tank moved outboard, which resulted in fuel starvation to the right engine. When the right engine lost power, the pilot should have secured the right engine by feathering the propeller to reduce drag and increase single-engine performance; however, given the position of the propellers at the accident site, the pilot likely incorrectly feathered the operating (left) engine, which rendered the airplane incapable of maintaining altitude. It is very likely that the pilot's impairment due to his ingestion of alcohol led to his errors and contributed to the accident.

Following an uneventful personal flight, the pilot contacted the air traffic control tower controller and was immediately cleared to land. About 36 seconds later, the pilot reported "smoke in the cockpit." When asked to repeat, the pilot repeated "smoke in the cockpit." The tower controller cleared the pilot to land on any runway. About 47 seconds after the initial call of smoke, the pilot reported "mayday mayday mayday mayday mayday (unintelligible)." The airplane then crashed about ¼ mile short of the airport in a wooded area and burned. Security video showed the airplane pitch nose-down suddenly just before impact. The video revealed no visible smoke or fire trailing the airplane before ground impact. The pilot reported about 1,221 hours of total flight time on his Federal Aviation Administration first class medical certificate, issued about two months prior to the accident. He completed an initial training course for the airplane make and model 1 week before the accident. The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection and extensive upgrades to its avionics. Both the left and right engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components characteristic of engines developing significant power at the time of impact, likely in the mid-to-high power range. The engines displayed no indications of any pre-impact anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal engine operation. Both propeller assemblies broke free from the engine during the crash sequence and the blades on both engines revealed signatures consistent with the development of power at impact. The center fuselage and cockpit areas were completely consumed in the postcrash fire. An examination of all remaining wires, wire bundles, switches, terminals, circuit breakers, electrical components, instruments, and avionics did not reveal evidence of precrash thermal distress. However, a small fire just before impact likely would not have had time to create thermal damage that would be discernable after an extensive postcrash fire.

The aircraft belly landed at Stella Maris-Estate Airport, Bahamas. No one was hurt but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Apparently, the approach checklist was interrupted by the crew for unknown reason and the landing procedure was performed with the landing gear still retracted. The aircraft was owned by the private Canadian company Kelly Panteluk Construction and the airplane was inbound from Fort Lauderdale-Executive.

The instrument-rated pilot was on a cross-country flight. According to air traffic control records, an air traffic controller provided the pilot vectors to an intersection to fly a GPS approach. Federal Aviation Administration radar data showed that the airplane tracked off course of the assigned intersection by 6 nautical miles and descended 800 ft below its assigned altitude before correcting toward the initial approach fix. The airplane then crossed the final approach fix 400 ft below the minimum crossing altitude and then continued to descend to the minimum descent altitude, at which point, the pilot performed a missed approach. The missed approach procedure would have required the airplane to make a climbing right turn to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl) while navigating southwest back to the intersection; however, radar data showed that the airplane flew southeast and ascended and descended several times before leveling off at 2,800 ft msl. The airplane then entered a right 360-degree turn and almost completed another circle before it descended into terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. During the altitude and heading deviations just before impact, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that adverse weather was causing the airplane to lose "tremendous" amounts of altitude; however, weather radar did not indicate any convective activity or heavy rain at the airplane's location. The recorded weather at the destination airport about the time of the accident included a cloud ceiling of 400 ft above ground level and visibility of 3 miles. Although the pilot reported over 4,000 total hours on his most recent medical application, the investigation could not corroborate those reported hours or document any recent or overall actual instrument experience. In addition, it could not be determined whether the pilot had experience using the onboard GPS system, which had been installed on the airplane about 6 months before the accident; however, the accident flight track is indicative of the pilot not using the GPS effectively, possibly due to a lack of proficiency or familiarity with the equipment. The restricted visibility and precipitation and maneuvering during the missed approach would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the variable flightpath off the intended course was consistent with the pilot losing airplane control due to spatial disorientation. Toxicological tests detected ethanol and other volatiles in the pilot's muscle indicative of postmortem production.

Four minutes after taking off on an instrument flight rules flight, during an assigned climb to 4,000 feet, the pilot advised the departure air traffic controller that the airplane was having "instrument problems" and that he wanted to "stay VFR" (visual flight rules), which the controller acknowledged. As directed, the pilot subsequently contacted the next sector departure controller, who instructed him to climb to 8,000 feet. The pilot stated that he would climb the airplane after clearing a cloud and reiterated that the airplane was having "instrument problems." The controller told the pilot to advise when he could climb the airplane. About 30 seconds later, the pilot told the controller that he was climbing the airplane to 8,000 feet, and, shortly thereafter, the controller cleared the airplane to 11,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. Per instruction, the pilot later contacted a center controller, who advised him of moderate-to-heavy precipitation along his (northbound) route for the next 10 miles and told him that he could deviate either left or right and, when able, proceed direct to an intersection near his destination. The pilot acknowledged the direct-to-intersection instruction, and the controller told the pilot to climb the airplane to 13,000 feet, which the pilot acknowledged. The pilot did not advise the center controller about the instrument problems. The airplane subsequently began turning east, eventually completing about an 80-degree turn toward heavier precipitation, and the controller told the pilot to climb to 15,000 feet, but the pilot did not respond. After two more queries, the pilot stated that he was trying to maintain "VFR" and that "I have an instrument failure here." The controller then stated that he was showing the airplane turning east, which "looks like a very bad idea." He subsequently advised the pilot to turn to the west but received no further transmissions from the airplane. Radar indicated that, while the airplane was turning east, it climbed to 9,500 feet but that, during the next 24 seconds, it descended to 7,500 feet and, within the following 5 seconds, it descended to just above ground level (the ground-based radar altitude readout was 0 feet). The pilot recovered the airplane and climbed it northeast-bound to 1,500 feet during the next 20 seconds. It then likely stalled and descended northwest-bound into shallow waters of a wildlife refuge. Weather radar returns indicated that the airplane's first descent occurred in an area of moderate-to-heavy rain but that the second descent occurred in light rain. The ceiling at the nearest recording airport, located about 20 nautical miles from the accident site, was 1,500 feet, indicating that the pilot likely climbed the airplane back into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)before finally losing control. The investigation could not determine the extent to which the pilot had planned the flight. Although a flight plan was on file, the pilot did not receive a formal weather briefing but could have self-briefed via alternative means. The investigation also could not determine when the pilot first lost situational awareness, although the excessive turn to the east toward heavier precipitation raises the possibility that the turn likely wasn't intentional and that the pilot had already lost situational awareness. Earlier in the flight, when the pilot reported an instrument problem, the two departure controllers coordinated between their sectors in accordance with air traffic control procedures, allowing him to remain low and out of IMC. Although the second controller told the pilot to advise when he was able to climb, the pilot commenced a climb without further comment. The controller was likely under the impression that the instrument problem had been corrected; therefore, he communicated no information about a potential instrument problem to the center controller. The center controller then complied with the level of service required by advising the pilot of the weather conditions ahead and by approving deviations. The extent and nature of the deviation was up to the pilot with controller assistance upon pilot request. The pilot did not request further weather information or assistance with deviations and only told the center controller that the airplane was having an instrument problem after the controller pointed out that the airplane was heading into worsening weather. Due to impact forces, only minimal autopsy results could be determined. Federal Aviation Administration medical records indicated that the 16,560-hour former military pilot did not have any significant health issues, and the pilot's wife was unaware of any preexisting significant medical conditions. The wreckage was extremely fractured, which precluded thorough examination. However, evidence indicated that all flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident scene and that the engines were under power at the time of impact. The airplane was equipped with redundant pilot and copilot flight instruments, redundant instrument air sources, onboard weather radar, and a storm scope. The pilot did not advise any of the air traffic controllers about the extent or type of instrument problem, and the investigation could not determine which instrument(s) might have failed or how redundant systems could have been failed at the same time. Although the pilot stated on several occasions that the airplane was having instrument problems, he opted to continue flight into IMC. By doing so, he eventually lost situational awareness and then control of airplane but regained both when he acquired visual ground contact. Then, for unknown reasons, he climbed the airplane back into IMC where he again lost situational awareness and airplane control but was then unable to regain them before the airplane impacted the water.