Anchorage-Lake Hood

According to the pilot, he was flying the second airplane in a flight of two about 1 mile behind the lead airplane. The lead airplane pilot reported to him, via the airplane's radio, that he had encountered decreasing visibility and that he was making a 180° left turn to exit the area. The pilot recalled that, after losing sight of the lead airplane, he made a shallow climbing right turn and noticed that the terrain was rising. He recalled that he entered the clouds for a few seconds and "at that moment I ran into the trees which I never saw coming." The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that the temperature was 60°F with 8 miles visibility and 1,500-eeft ceilings. The nearest METAR was about 1 mile away and reported that the temperature was 54°F, dew point was 52°F, visibility was 8 statute miles with light rain, and ceiling was broken at 500 feet and overcast at 1,500 feet.

The commercial pilot was conducting a cross-country flight to a family residence in the turbinepowered, single-engine airplane. The pilot was familiar with the route, which traversed a mountain pass and remote terrain. Before departing on the flight, the pilot communicated with a family member at the residence via text messages and was aware the weather was windy but that the mountain tops were clear. There was no record of the pilot obtaining a preflight weather briefing from an official, accesscontrolled source, and the pilot indicated to a friend before departure that he had not accessed weather cameras. Weather forecast products that were available to the pilot revealed possible turbulence at low altitudes and icing at altitudes above 12,000 ft along the route of flight, and weather cameras along the planned route and near the destination would have indicated deteriorating visibility in snow showers and mountain obscuration starting about 1.5 hours before departure. The airplane departed and proceeded toward the destination; radar data correlated to the accident flight indicated that the airplane climbed from 4,600 ft to 14,700 ft before turning west over the mountains. Text messages that the pilot sent during the initial climb revealed that the mountain pass he planned to fly through was obscured, and he intended to climb over the mountains and descend through holes in the clouds as he neared the destination. Radar data also indicated that the airplane operated above 12,500 ft mean sea level (msl) for about 30 minutes, and above 14,000 msl for an additional 14 minutes before entering a gradual descent during the last approximate 20 minutes of flight. Review of weather information indicated that cloud layers over the accident area increased during the 30 minutes before the accident, and it is likely that the airplane was operating in icing conditions, although it was not certified for flight in such conditions, which may have resulted in structural or induction icing and an uncontrolled loss of altitude. The airplane wreckage came to rest on the steep face of a snow-covered mountain in a slight nose-down, level attitude. The empennage was intact, the right wing was completely separated, and the forward fuselage and cockpit were partially separated and displaced from the airframe with significant crush damage, indicative of impact with terrain during forward flight. Page 2 of 10 ANC17FA004 There was no indication that the airplane was equipped with supplemental oxygen; pilots are required to use oxygen when operating at altitudes above 12,500 ft for more than 30 minutes, and anytime at altitudes above 14,000 ft. It could not be determined if, or to what extent, the pilot may have experienced symptoms of hypoxia that would have affected his decision-making. The airplane wreckage was not recovered or examined due to hazardous terrain and environmental conditions, and the reason for the impact with terrain could not be determined; however, it is likely that deteriorating enroute weather and icing conditions contributed to the outcome of the accident.

The private pilot was taking off in the float plane from the lake's west waterway. The airplane was on step, gaining airspeed, and the takeoff run seemed normal to the pilot. The airplane was nearing takeoff speed, and proceeding directly down the waterway, when it encountered a right quartering tailwind gust that lifted up the right wing and float. The airplane veered to the left toward a steep bank, and the pilot was unable to correct the deviation with the rudder. He did not feel that he could reduce power as he would slam into the bank. The airplane lifted off, but the float collided with the top of the bank. The airplane cartwheeled about 160 degrees to the left before coming to rest on its right side. It sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and floats. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures. Reported wind at the airport approximately 3 minutes after the accident was from 020 degrees magnetic at 3 knots, with no recorded gusts.

The private pilot and the sole passenger were in the first of two airplanes of a flight of two, operating as a personal flight under Title 14, CFR part 91. The pilot of the second airplane reported that both airplanes were in radio contact, and the accident airplane was about one mile ahead as they entered a mountain pass along the intended flight route. As the flight progressed, both airplanes descended due to deteriorating weather conditions as they neared the narrowest part of the pass. The second pilot said that visibility deteriorated to a point that it was difficult to discern topographical features, and he told the accident pilot that he was uncomfortable with the lack of visibility and was turning around. The second pilot stated that the accident pilot responded by saying, in part: "Turn around if you can... I am not able to." The second pilot indicated that the last time he saw the accident airplane was as it entered a cloudbank. During the accident pilot's final radio transmission, prompted by the second pilot's inquiry about how he was doing, he responded that he was just trying to get through the pass. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. There was no ELT signal, and the search for the airplane was unsuccessful until three days later. The wreckage was located at the 3,100-foot level of the mountain pass, in an area of steep terrain. Impact forces and a post crash fire had destroyed the airplane. During the IIC's on-site examination of the wreckage, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

The float-equipped airplane was in the traffic pattern to land at a seaplane base when the engine lost all power, and the pilot made an emergency landing in the backyard of a private residence. During the forced landing, the airplane struck trees and a railing on the deck of the residence, sustaining structural damage to the left wing. The pilot reported that he had the right wing fuel tank selected, and thought the tank was about 1/4 full. He indicated that when the engine lost power, he was too low and didn't have sufficient time or altitude to switch to the belly tank and restore power. Postaccident draining of the fuel tanks disclosed about 18 gallons of fuel in the belly tank, and about one quart in the right wing tank.

The commercial pilot of the float-equipped airplane was transporting passengers to a lodge at a remote lake. When the airplane did not arrive at the lake, a search was initiated, and two days later the wreckage of the airplane was located on the side of a box canyon about the 2,400 foot elevation level. The canyon is oriented approximately east-west, and the wreckage was distributed along a 100 foot debris field on the north flank of the canyon. Ground scars and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane impacting terrain in a steep left bank while executing a turn to reverse direction. No evidence of any preimpact mechanical anomalies was discovered.