Alpine-Casparis

The airplane impacted terrain shortly after takeoff. The wreckage distribution was consistent with a high airspeed, low angle-of-attack impact. Examination of the ground scars and wreckage indicated that the landing gear was down, the flaps were down, and the engines were operating at a high power setting at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe, engines, and related systems revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures. According to the owner’s manual for the airplane, the flaps should have been retracted and the landing gear should have been brought up as soon as a climb profile was established. Based upon the location of the wreckage, the direction of the impact, and the location of the airport, it is likely that the airplane crashed within one or two minutes after takeoff. The extended landing gear and flaps degraded the climb performance of the airplane. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate and had recent night flight experience. Toxicological results were positive for azacyclonol and ibuprofen but were not at levels that would have affected his performance. According to family members, the pilot normally slept from 2230 or 2300 to 0700; the accident occurred at 0015. Although the investigation was unable to determine how long the pilot had been awake before the accident or his sleep schedule in the three days prior to the accident, it is possible that the pilot was fatigued, as the accident occurred at a time when the pilot was normally asleep. The company did not have, and was not required to have guidance or a policy addressing fatigue management.

The pilot had the main and auxiliary fuel tanks filled and performed an abbreviated preflight prior to departing the Alpine Airport. The pilot did not perform an engine run-up prior to takeoff. The pilot stated that while the airplane was climbing through 100 feet agl, the left engine 'started to surge.' The pilot reported that he knew the airplane would not be able to climb at field elevation with one engine inoperative. The pilot switched the left engine's boost pump from low to high; however, the left engine continued to surge while the airplane lost altitude. The pilot initiated a forced landing with the landing gear and flaps retracted and the left propeller unfeathered. The airplane impacted the ground left wing tip first and a fire erupted, which damaged the left wing and left side of the fuselage. The left engine's spark plugs were found covered with thick black soot. The left engine's magnetos were rotated using an electric hand-held drill, and the left magneto did not produce any spark and the right magneto produced a spark in three of its six distributor cap posts. The left magneto's primary winding resistance and capacitor leakage were found to be beyond the manufacturer's specified limits. The internal components of both magnetos were covered in a dark oil and debris. The maximum takeoff weight for the accident airplane was 6,350 pounds; however, the takeoff weight at the time of the accident was calculated to be 6,509 pounds. The aircraft's single engine performance charts indicated that the airplane would obtain a 29 fpm climb at maximum gross weight with the inoperative engine feathered. The pilot operating handbook's supplement section indicated that the auxiliary fuel pump should only be used when the engine-driven fuel pump failed. A caution statement states in bold print, 'If the auxiliary fuel pump switches are placed in the HIGH position with the engine-driven fuel pump(s) operating normally, total loss of engine power may occur.'