Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain

The pilot departed his home airport for a 90 mile personal flight with eight passengers. The pilot stated he departed with 24 gallons of fuel in the outboard tanks, and 80 gallons of fuel in the main tanks. After landing, the airplane was refueled with 100 low-lead aviation gasoline; 12 gallons in each main fuel tank. Before departing for the return flight, the pilot performed a preflight inspection of the airplane, which did not include a visual check of the airplane's fuel tanks. After takeoff, the pilot experienced a "small surge in both engines," while climbing through 1,150 and 3,300 feet, respectively. He further described the surges as "minor but still noticeable." About 30 minutes later, after the airplane had descended, and was leveling at 1,500 feet, the pilot experienced an intermittent illumination of the "right aux fuel pump light," which was followed by a total loss of power on the right engine. Shortly thereafter, the left engine began "surging," and after about "three or four minutes, at most," he feathered the left engine propeller. The pilot ditched the airplane in Massachusetts Bay. The airplane was recovered about 1 month later. The fuel selectors were positioned to the outboard tanks, and the airplane's fuel tanks revealed fluid consistent with seawater with "some odor of fuel;" however, no visible evidence of fuel was observed. According to the airplane's information manual, the airplane's total fuel capacity was 192 gallons, of which, 182 gallons were usable. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. The pilot reported he had purchased the airplane and attended 5-day type specific training course in March 2001. He reported about 1,050 hours of total fight experience, which included 800 hours in multi-engine airplanes, of which 65 hours was in the make and model. Additionally, the pilot reported he had not experienced any prior mechanical problems. He believed he had flown the airplane the day prior to the accident as well. The last documented refueling of the airplane prior to the date of the accident occurred on May 3, 2001, when the airplane was refueled with 128 gallons of aviation gasoline. The last flight documented in the pilot's logbook was on May 4, 2001, when the pilot logged 1.9 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot said he normally flew a 65 percent power, an "a little rich," and experienced a fuel burn of about 20 to 21 gallons per hour, for each engine.

On 22 March 2001 at about 17h35, the PA-31-350 Chieftain registered PH-ABD, call sign Tulip 2B, began its takeoff from runway 23 at Orléans-Saint Denis de l’Hôtel for an IFR departure to Paris-Le Bourget. The flight was passenger charter flight TLP2B. The pilot flying, who was the co-pilot seated in the left seat, was unable to perform the rotation. He aborted the takeoff but braking failed to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway. The runway surface was wet. Marks were left by the tyres from one hundred metres before the end of the runway. The aircraft ran across grass soaked with water. The nose gear broke and the aircraft came to a stop about one hundred and eighty metres after the end of the runway. The crew had forgotten to remove the flight control locking device.

A Piper PA-31-350, registration C-GNIE, serial number 31-7552047, was on a scheduled (APO1023) instrument flight rules mail service flight between Rouyn Airport, Quebec, and Val-d'Or Airport, Quebec, at approximately 1845 . After checking for prevailing weather conditions at the destination airport, the pilot decided to make a visual approach on runway 36. The pilot reported by radio at two miles on final approach for runway 36 and then stated that he was going to begin his approach again after momentarily losing visual contact with the runway. This was the last radio contact with the aircraft. No emergency locator transmitter signal was received by the flight service station specialist. Emergency procedures were initiated, and searches were conducted. The aircraft was found by a search and rescue team about three hours after the crash. The aircraft was lying about two miles southeast of the end of runway 36; it was substantially damaged. The pilot suffered serious injuries.

The pilot ditched the twin engine airplane in the Pacific ocean after experiencing a loss of engine power and an in-flight engine fire while in cruise flight. The flight was operating at 1,000 feet msl, when the pilot noticed a loss of engine power in the right engine. At the same time the pilot was noticing the power loss, passengers noted a fire coming from the right engine cowling. The pilot secured the right engine and feathered the propeller. He attempted to land the airplane at a nearby airport; however, when he realized that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude he elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean. Prior to executing the forced landing, the pilot instructed the passengers to don their life jackets and assume the crash position. After touchdown, all but one passenger exited the airplane through the main cabin and pilot doors. It was reported that the remaining passenger was frightened, and could not swim. One survivor saw the remaining passenger sitting in the seat with the seat belt still secured and the life vest inflated. The pilot and passengers were then rescued from the ocean via rescue helicopter and boat. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the right engine's oil converter plate gasket had deteriorated and extruded from behind the converter plate, allowing oil to spray in the accessory section and resulting in the subsequent engine fire. The engine manufacturer had previously issued a mandatory service bulletin (MSB) requiring inspection of the gasket every 50 hours for evidence of gasket extrusion around the cover plate or oil leakage. Maintenance records revealed that the inspection had been conducted 18.3 hours prior to the accident. At the time of the accident, the right engine had accumulated 386.8 hours since its last overhaul, and gasket replacement. The MSB was issued one month prior to the accident, after the manufacturer received reports of certain oil filter converter plate gaskets extruding around the oil filter converter plate. The protruding or swelling of the gasket allowed oil to leak and spray from between the plate and the accessory housing. A series of tests were conducted on exemplar gaskets by submerging them in engine oil heated to 245 degrees F; after about 290 hours, the gasket material displayed signs of deterioration similar to that of the accident gasket. A subsequent investigation revealed that the engine manufacturer had recently changed gasket suppliers, which resulted in a shipment of gaskets getting into the supply chain that did not meet specifications. As a result of this accident, the engine manufacturer revised the MSB to require the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours. The FAA followed suit and issued an airworthiness directive to mandate the replacement of the gasket every 50 hours.

The flight was cleared for an NDB or GPS runway 14 instrument approach. The pilot was instructed to report procedure turn. Center radar reported the airplane's altitude was last observed at 200 feet. A witness observed the airplane as it collided with trees and the ground and, subsequently burst into flames. No mechanical problem with the airplane was reported by the pilot or discovered during the wreckage examination. Weather minimums for the approach are 800 feet an one mile. Low clouds were reported in the area at the time of the accident.

A Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, N27944, operated by Patuxent Airways, Inc., Hollywood, Maryland, and a Piper PA-44-180 Seminole, N2225G, operated by Hortman Aviation Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were destroyed when they collided in flight over Burlington Township, New Jersey. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and seven passengers aboard the Navajo Chieftain were killed, as were the flight instructor and the private pilot aboard the Seminole. Day visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident, and both airplanes were operating under visual flight rules when the collision occurred. The flight crews of both airplanes were properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations. None of these individuals was experiencing any personal problems or rest anomalies that would have affected their performance. The airplanes had undergone the required inspections. Examination of their maintenance documents revealed that both airplanes complied with all appropriate airworthiness directives. Evidence gathered from the wreckage indicated that neither airplane had experienced an in-flight fire, bird strike, or structural or mechanical failure. Tissue samples revealed that the pilot of the Seminole had taken doxylamine sometime before the accident. (Doxylamine is a sedating antihistamine that has substantial adverse effects on performance.) However, the amount of blood available for analysis was insufficient for determining exactly when the pilot may have ingested the medication or whether his performance was impaired by the effects of doxylamine. A partial cockpit visibility study revealed that the Seminole would have been visible to the pilots in the Chieftain for at least the 60 seconds before the collision. No stereo photographs from a Seminole cockpit were available to determine precise obstruction angles. However, because of the relative viewing angle, the Chieftain would have been visible to the pilots in the Seminole for most of the last 60 seconds. The study further revealed that about 4 seconds before impact, or about .11 nm separation, the angular width of each airplane in each pilot's field of vision would have been approximately 0.5 to 0.6 degrees or about 1/4 inch apparent size at the windscreen.

The aircraft, operated by an Air Operator's Certificate holder, was engaged on an air ambulance operation from Ronaldsway in the Isle of Man to Liverpool. Having flown under VFR on a direct track to the Seaforth dock area of Liverpool the pilot flew by visual reference along the northern coast of the Mersey Estuary to carry out a visual approach to Runway 09 at Liverpool. During the turn on to the final approach, when approximately 0.8 nm from the threshold and 0.38 nm south of the extended centreline, the aircraft flew into the sea and disappeared. All five occupants were killed.