Fletcher FU-24

On the morning of Friday 19 April 2002, the pilot was engaged in spreading superphosphate on a hill-country property to the south-east of Masterton. Operations had commenced at 0735 hours, after the pilot and loader driver had flown to the airstrip from Masterton. The topdressing proceeded normally for two hours, the pilot taking a refuel and “smoko” break from 0935 to 1000 hours. The left tank only was topped off, as the fuel system design permitted the fuel levels to equalise between the left and right tanks. As was his usual practice, the pilot carried out a full pre-flight inspection during the break. The loader driver noted the time of the first takeoff after the break as 1001 hours. This sortie was completed normally; but the aircraft became overdue on the second. Looking over towards the area being worked, the loader driver saw a column of black smoke; he immediately telephoned the company chief pilot, who was operating another aircraft on a property a short distance to the south-west. The chief pilot had already seen the smoke, and flew across to investigate. He saw the aircraft burning fiercely on the shoulder of a ridge and telephoned emergency services to report the accident. He briefly contemplated landing by the accident site, but decided against it and continued to the airstrip to pick up the loader driver. They flew back to the site, but could see no sign of the pilot, so returned to Masterton. They had seen that there was a person and a motorcycle on the ground by the wreckage: this was the farmer whose property was being topdressed, and who had been working on the eastern side of the valley being sown. While the aeroplane was on its last run, the farmer saw an object fall from it and “flutter” to the ground. He was unable to tell what the object was, but thought at first that it may have been a superphosphate bag by the way it fell. Two fencing contractors were working near the farmer’s position; they also saw an object fall from the aeroplane, and shortly afterwards one remarked to the other that the aeroplane “had no tail”. They watched the aeroplane climb and “veer to the left” before striking the ground near the top of the ridge at the southern end of the valley. It caught fire on impact. The farmer, although he did not see the impact because of intervening terrain, realised something was amiss and quickly moved to a position where he could see the accident site. He then drove his four-wheel motorcycle to the site; he estimated that this took about three minutes. On arrival, he found the centre section of the aircraft well ablaze; he could see no sign of the pilot at this stage, despite being able to get as close as the left wingtip. He reported that there were a number of explosions while the fire was burning, and that once the fire had subsided, he saw the pilot’s body in the wreckage. The impact (but not the falling object) was also witnessed by another farmer on the ridge to the western side of the valley. He estimated that some 10 seconds elapsed between impact and the first sign of fire, and had expected to see the pilot jump clear. The falling object was later found to be the tail fin (vertical stabiliser); it had landed in a clearing in a small patch of bush near where the fencers had been working, 870 m from the point where the aircraft struck the ground. The accident occurred in daylight, at 1013 hours NZST, 12 km south-south-east of Masterton, at an elevation of 1240 feet. Grid reference 260-T26-370116, latitude S 41° 04.36', longitude E 175° 42.05'.

On the morning of Sunday 23 December 2001, the pilot was engaged in spreading superphosphate on a property near Otonga. When this job was completed the operation moved to a property to the east of Whangarei where urea was sown on a maize crop. This job finished at about 1130 hours when the pilot and loader driver decided to have a cup of tea and determine which job they would do next. There were two options available; it was found that the wind was unsuitable for operations from one airstrip, so it was decided to complete the job at Paiaka, which involved spreading some 112 tonnes of lime. This particular job was to have commenced on 13 December 2001 but was delayed because of wind. The loader driver arrived at Paiaka at about 1300 hours to find that the pilot had already landed and was removing the cover from the fertiliser bin that held the lime. The loader driver noticed that water had come under the edges of the cover making the lime damp around the walls of the bin. The truck driver who had delivered lime earlier in the week had also noted the presence of moisture in the lime around the edges of the bin. The work commenced at about 1320 hours and the loader driver expected the pilot to stop for fuel between 1445 and 1500 hours. After approximately 13 loads the loader driver was using the lime that had been affected by moisture. As a result he took bucket loads from the sides of the bin and mixed it with the lime in the middle of the bin in an effort to make the lime flow more freely. At approximately 1425 the pilot gave the signal to the loader driver for a refuel on the next landing. As this was earlier than the expected refuel time the loader driver assumed this was also to check if any lime was building up around the bottom of the hopper. During the 10 weeks that they had been operating the aircraft they had to clean fertiliser away from the hopper door area. This had happened several times, especially if the fertiliser was damp, and on one occasion they had to clean out part of a previous fertiliser load that had “hung up” inside the hopper. As the loader driver was preparing for the refuel he could hear the aeroplane operating under what sounded like full power, and saw the pilot manoeuvre the aircraft in an apparent attempt to dislodge the load. He saw a small “puff” of lime discharge from the aircraft as it was “bunted”. The aircraft then disappeared behind intervening terrain into a valley, some 1,500 metres from the sowing area. The loader driver did not see the aeroplane again, but heard a muffled explosion and saw smoke on the skyline. He then phoned for emergency assistance. The accident occurred in daylight, at approximately 1430 hours NZDT, at Paiaka, at an elevation of 720 feet. Grid reference 260-Q06-142267, latitude S 35° 33 2', longitude E 174° 08.3'.

The aircraft was flown to a farm airstrip then loaded with a small load of agricultural product. A combination of extremely soft airstrip conditions, a quartering tailwind, and underslung spreader equipment, degraded performance to the extent that the aircraft was unable to become airborne within the available length of the strip. The load was jettisoned, but the aircraft struck a fence and scraped the ground with the left wing tip and aileron. The aircraft did become airborne, but was unable to be effectively controlled and subsequently struck the ground. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.

The pilot, sole on board, was engaged in a local crop spraying mission. During the takeoff roll, the aircraft encountered difficulties to gain speed. The pilot suspected problems with the parking brake and after liftoff, the aircraft lost height and crashed to the left of the departure area. The pilot escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was taking off on the final sowing sortie, after which the pilot was to return to home base. The pilot reported that, on the takeoff roll, the engine appeared to overspeed and that the aircraft failed to get airborne. It subsequently sank into a shallow gully off the end of the strip. After the accident, one propeller blade was found to be free to rotate about its feathering axis. Metallurgical analysis indicated that the pitch change knob on the subject blade failed as the result of ductile overload. A second pitch change knob was also bent and cracked but had not separated from the blade. The overload sustained by the pitch change knobs was determined to have occurred at impact, not in flight. No reason was established for the failure to become airborne.

After completing the first run at the heavier weight, the pilot of ZK-EMV indicated to the loader driver that the load be increased by an additional hundredweight after the next run. The pilot of the second aircraft remained at 22 hundredweight, though he had moved his loading point back a short distance to provide additional take-off distance. The second pilot was still encountering “some sink” after take off, coinciding with the raising of flap. On completion of the second run at 22 hundredweight, the pilot of ZK-EMV positioned the aircraft for loading about 25 m to the east of his previous loading point. ZK-EMV was regarded by some personnel in the company to have had slightly better performance than other similar model aircraft. Consequently the increase to 23 hundredweight, while of interest, did not raise any concerns by the loader driver. Despite being unable to observe the departure of ZK-EMV, the loader driver was still able to hear the aircraft’s engine noise and recalled nothing unusual as the aircraft departed after loading. On returning from his run, the pilot of the second aircraft saw ZK-EMV to his lower right, in a steep climb, estimated to be about 45 to 50°. As it continued to climb the aircraft rolled slowly to the left, peaking at a height equivalent to “3 times power pole height”. Objects were seen falling from the aircraft during this time. Once inverted the aircraft descended rapidly, striking the ground. The aircraft hit the ground approximately 350 m from the strip, near where the power lines crossed a bend in the road and a small intersection. The pilot of the second aircraft landed and informed the two loader drivers. Together the group headed for the accident site in the loader truck. While en route a member of the group alerted emergency services by the use of a cellular telephone. The accident was also observed by the driver of a truck who had recently deposited a load of fertiliser in the bin at the airstrip. The driver had stopped the truck on a narrow gravel road below the airstrip to check the tailgate of the trailer. He then heard an aircraft begin its take-off run and decided to stay and watch the departure as the aircraft would fly over the road close to where the truck was parked. The driver saw ZK-EMV leave the end of the strip and “sag down a long way”, appearing to “drop like a stone”. The aircraft was observed to be in a high nose or climbing attitude as it continued to descend in a slight left turn towards a fence next to the road. The aircraft was then seen to strike the fence and balloon up, dropping fertiliser as it climbed. The aircraft then rolled left and descended in the direction of the truck driver, who quickly sought cover underneath the trailer. The aircraft struck the ground in a paddock next to the road, stopping about 5 m from the truck. With 15 years of working near agricultural aircraft, the truck driver considered himself to be familiar with their operations. The driver observed no items falling from the aircraft before it struck the fence, or anything hit the aircraft. He considered the engine to be at “full song” or maximum power the whole time and heard no change in pitch or beat. After the accident the truck driver went quickly to the upturned aircraft and attempted unsuccessfully to locate the pilot. The driver then headed for the airstrip in the truck, meeting the loader drivers and second pilot on their way to the aircraft. On reaching ZK-EMV the bucket on the loader was used to lift the aircraft to gain access to the cockpit. However, no assistance could be given to the pilot who had died on impact.

While turning onto the sowing run, at about 300 feet agl, a significant downdraught was encountered, together with a loss of at least 5 knots airspeed. The pilot responded by pushing the control column aggressively forward and turning towards the lower ground. At the same time, he operated the jettison lever. The rate of dump and the recovery from the downdraught were far less than anticipated, and the pilot found himself about to collide with rocks in a paddock. He pulled hard back, but was unable to avoid hitting the ground with the left wing. The aircraft flipped and slid backwards to a halt. The pilot's instructor was operating a second Fletcher on the same job, saw that there had been a crash, and, after jettisoning his own load, landed nearby and went to the pilot's assistance. Meteorological conditions were favourable for topdressing, but katabatic winds were likely to have been present in the valley, after a clear, cool night. By the time of these flights, a light northwesterly was in place, which could have added to a katabatic flow. There was very light turbulence. Shortly after the accident, light wind gusts were noted; a steady, stronger wind down the valley was established by mid morning. The accident pilot's training had been completed only the day before, and foremost in his mind was the need to avoid a stall. The combination of pushing forward more than necessary, and a turning flight-path, made the jettison ineffective. In the pull-up to avoid hitting the ground the jettison rate increased, but about one third of the load remained aboard after the accident. It was recommended, and accepted, that the pilot receive more dual training on the stall characteristics of the aircraft, with an emphasis on the speed margins available when manoeuvring at low speed. The agricultural operators association was to be asked to remind members of the effect of manoeuvring on jettison characteristics.

The topdressing operation had resumed after a break caused by weather deterioration associated with a weakening frontal system in the immediate area. Mist and low cloud had cleared, and the wind had picked up. The pilot was sowing into a narrow, rising valley. It was the sixth run over the same terrain, after an increase in payload. The pilot initially encountered lift then heavy sink. Unable to reverse course within the confines of the narrow valley, and despite the application of full power, 20 degrees of flap and an attempt to dump the payload, he failed to establish a climb. The aircraft stalled in a lefthand turn and impacted the valley side. The aircraft struck left wing first, removing the outer wing section. It then hit the ground flat but turning anti-clockwise and skidded tail first to a halt. The hopper mouth was torn loose, and this and the nose leg disrupted the cockpit floor, trapping the pilot's legs within the cockpit area and inflicting serious injuries. The pilot was wearing full restraint harness and a protective helmet, which undoubtedly saved him from further injury. He suffered some post-impact disorientation, but fortunately there was no post-crash fire. The Police and Fire Services in attendance were unaware of the actions required to secure the aircraft fuel and electrical systems.

The pilot was conducting a topdressing operation in hilly terrain in fine weather. He had stopped sowing and commenced a right hand turn. Considerable height was lost in the turn for reasons undetermined. The aircraft impacted with terrain under power in a 60° banked, 30° nose down attitude. The aircraft was totally destroyed in the impact and post crash fire, the pilot receiving fatal injuries. No technical deficiencies were revealed.

The pilot had arrived at the property to commence spraying operations on the day before the accident, and had been provided with a map of the area by the property owner. In addition, the property owner briefed the pilot on the location of relevant powerlines and other obstructions. However, the pilot did not carry out any spraying on that day, but instead flew the aircraft to Scone, in order to have a minor engine problem rectified. He then flew to Mudgee where the aircraft remained overnight. The pilot returned to the area the next morning, arriving on site at about 0645 ESuT. After spraying approximately 175 acres on an adjoining farm, he commenced an aerial inspection of the next property to be treated, but declined an offer by the property owner to accompany him in the aircraft so the property boundaries and powerlines could be pointed out. The aircraft was seen to make three passes over the area before it descended in an easterly direction, toward a crop of barley. A gentle rise, which included a dam bank located at the corner of the crop, had to be negotiated in order for the pilot to position the aircraft at the correct operating height for the swath run. A spurline, suspended over the crop and running in a northerly direction, was located a further 40 m beyond the dam. A witness reported that the aircraft had appeared to be maintaining level flight, and had commenced spraying, when it struck the spurline, then impacted heavily with the ground and overturned, fatally injuring the pilot. The weather in the area at the time of the accident was reported as fine, with light winds. The aircraft struck a three-wire spurline which ran in a northerly direction over the crop, at right angles to its flight path. The line spanned 165 m from the main powerline to the first spurline pole, located about 100 m from a house and to the left of the flight path. A number of large trees nearer to the house provided a backdrop to the spurline pole. A strainer wire stemming from the main powerline was positioned some 92 m further on in the direction of the intended flight path. It was about 10 m in length and ran parallel to the spurline. The strainer wire passed over a road and was attached to a support pole located one metre from the edge of the barley crop. The pilot had commenced the first swathe run by flying in an easterly direction, towards distant rising ground which was cloaked in shadow, whilst the powerline in the foreground was set against this backdrop.