Cessna 550 Citation II

On a final approach to runway 26 the flight crew was advised by a flight instructor in the traffic pattern that a wind shear condition existed about one-quarter of the way down the approach end of the runway, which the flight crew acknowledged. On a three mile final approach the flight crew was advised by the instructor that the automated weather observation system (AWOS) was reporting the winds were 060 degrees at 8 knots, and that he was changing runways to runway 08. The flight crew did not acknowledge this transmission. The captain said that after landing smoothly in the touchdown zone on Runway 26, he applied normal braking without any response. He maintained brake pedal pressure and activated the engine thrust reversers without any response. The copilot said he considered the approach normal and that the captain did all he could to stop the airplane, first applying the brakes and then pulling up on the thrust reversers twice, with no sensation of slowing at all. Considering the double malfunction and the mountainous terrain surrounding the airport, the captain elected not to go around. The aircraft subsequently overran the end of the 5,860 foot runway (5,260 feet usable due to the 600 displaced threshold), went through the airport boundary fence, across the perimeter road, and came to rest upright in a dry lakebed approximately 400 feet from the departure end of the runway. With the aircraft on fire, the five passengers and two crew members safely egressed the aircraft without injuries before it was consumed. Witnesses to the landing reported the aircraft touched down at midfield, was too fast, porpoised, and was bouncing trying to get the gear on the runway. Passengers recalled a very hard landing, being thrown about the cabin, and that the speed was excessive. One passenger stated there was a hard bang and a series of smaller bangs during the landing. Federal Aviation Regulations allowed 3,150 feet of runway for a full stop landing. Under the weather conditions reported just after the mishap, and using the anticipated landing weight from the load manifest (12,172.5 pounds), the FAA approved Cessna Flight Manual does not provide landing distance information. Post-accident examination and testing of various wheel brake and antiskid/power brake components revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations.

The twin-tubofan airplane overran the runway during an aborted takeoff, impacting two fences before coming to rest. The pilot reported experiencing no anomalies with the airplane during the preflight inspection and taxi portion of the flight. During takeoff roll, at V1 (103 knots), the pilot began to pull aft on the control yoke. The pilot noticed the nose landing gear was not coming off of the runway and at 120 knots, with full aft control input, elected to abort the takeoff. He pulled the power to idle and applied maximum braking. Upon seeing the localizer antennas approaching the airplane at the departure end of the runway, the pilot veered the airplane to the right of centerline. The airplane departed the runway surface and impacted the fences. Post-accident examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks on the runway that led to the airplane's final resting place. The tire skid marks measured 1,765 feet in length. Examination of the wreckage revealed no pre-existing brake system anomalies that would have hindered the airplane's braking capability. Examination of the elevator trim system revealed it was 12 degrees out of trim in the nose down direction. The airplane underwent a Phase B and Phase 1 through 5 inspections approximately 5 months prior to the accident. The manufacturer's inspection manual indicates the elevator system should be examined every Phase 5 inspection. The aircraft's flight manual informs the pilot that the right elevator and trim tab should be inspected during the exterior inspection to ensure the elevator trim tab position matches its indicator.