Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III

Shortly after the airplane lifted off, the tower controller informed the pilot that a plume of smoke was visible behind the airplane. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that white smoke appeared to be trailing from the area of the left engine during takeoff. The witnesses subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn. As the airplane continued the turn, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a southerly heading, the nose dropped abruptly, and the airplane descended to the ground. Witnesses stated that they heard an increase in engine sound before impact. A postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located about 3/4 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination determined that the left engine fuel selector and fuel valve were in the OFF position, consistent with the pilot shutting down that engine after takeoff. However, the left engine propeller was not feathered. Extensive damage to the right engine propeller assembly was consistent with that engine producing power at the time of impact. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended at the time of impact. Teardown examinations of both engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power. The left engine oil cap was observed to be unsecured at the accident site; however, postaccident comparison of the left and right engine oil caps revealed disproportionate distortion of the left oil cap, likely due to the postimpact fire. As a result, no determination was made regarding the security of left engine oil cap before the accident. Emergency procedures outlined in the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that when securing an engine, the propeller should be feathered. Performance data provided in the POH for single-engine operations were predicated on the propeller of the inoperative engine being feathered, and the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Thus, the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures outlined in the POH for single-engine operation.

The multi-engine airplane was in cruise flight at flight level 210 when the pilot declared an emergency due to a rough-running right engine and diverted to a non-towered airport about 10 miles from the airplane’s position. About 4 minutes later, the pilot reported that he had shut down the right engine. The pilot orbited around the diversion airport during the descent and reported to an air traffic controller that he did not believe he would require any assistance after landing. The airplane initially approached the airport while descending through about 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl) and circled above the airport before entering a left traffic pattern approach for runway 22. About 7,000 feet msl, the airplane was about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport. The airplane descended through 2,300 feet msl when it was abeam the runway threshold on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. According to the airplane information manual, procedures for landing with an inoperative engine call for “excessive altitude;” however, the airplane's last radar return showed the airplane at an altitude of 700 feet msl (about 600 feet above ground level) and about 3 miles from the approach end of the runway. The airplane was configured for a single-engine landing and was likely on or turning to the final approach course when it rolled and impacted trees. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 0.8 miles north of the runway threshold, inverted, in a flat attitude with no longitudinal deformation. A majority of the airplane, including the cockpit, main cabin, and left wing, were consumed by a postcrash fire. Search operations located the airplane about 6 hours after its expected arrival time. Due to the severity of the postcrash fire, occupant survivability after the impact could not be determined. Examination of the airframe, the left engine, and both propellers did not reveal any preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation revealed that the right engine failed when the camshaft stopped rotating after the camshaft gear experienced a fatigue fracture on one of its gear teeth. The remaining gear teeth were fractured in overstress and/or were crushed due to interference contact with the crankshaft gear. Spalling observed on an intact gear tooth suggested abnormal loading of the camshaft gear; however, the origin of the abnormal loading could not be determined.

A witness reported that, despite the darkness, he was able to see the navigation lights on the airplane as it flew over the south end of the airport at an altitude of 150 to 200 feet above the ground. The airplane made a left turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and continued a descending turn until the airplane impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. Due to the airplane’s turn, the 10- to 20-knot quartering headwind became a quartering tailwind. The airplane was also turned toward a rural area with very little ground lighting. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

Prior to the accident flight, the pilot indicated that he was aware of the thunderstorm activity along his route of flight and that he anticipated deviating around the weather as necessary. While enroute to his destination, the pilot requested and was provided both weather information and pilot reports from other aircraft by air traffic control (ATC). Upon encountering an area of thunderstorm activity that extended east-to-west across the route of flight, the pilot reported encountering significant turbulence, and then downdrafts of 2,000 feet per minute. He then requested a course reversal to exit the weather before he declared an emergency and advised ATC that the airplane was upside down. There were no further transmissions from the pilot and radar contact with the airplane was lost. Review of radar data revealed that the pilot had deviated south and then southwest when the airplane entered a strong and intense echo of extreme intensity. Visible imaging revealed that the echo was located in an area of a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud with a defined overshooting top, indicating the storm was in the mature stage or at its maximum intensity. Two debris fields were later discovered near the area where the cumulonimbus cloud had been observed. This was indicative that the airplane had penetrated the main core of the cumulonimbus cloud, which resulted in an inflight breakup of the airplane. Near the heavier echoes the airplane's airborne weather radar may have been unable to provide an accurate representation of the radar echoes along the aircraft's flight path; therefore the final penetration of the intense portion of the storm was likely unintentional.

Shortly after take off from Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport, the pilot informed ATC that he lost all his navigational instruments and was cleared to divert to Hamburg-Finkenwerder Airport. On final, he encountered difficulties to lower the gears and eventually ditched the aircraft in the Elbe River. The aircraft came to rest upside down in 0,8 meter of water and was destroyed. The pilot escaped with minor injuries.

The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Torrejón AFB on a charter flight to Pamplona with 4 businessmen and a crew of two on board. While descending to Pamplona-Noain Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions. Unable to establish a visual contact with runway 15, the crew initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, while flying at an insufficient altitude, the aircraft impacted ground and crashed in a hilly terrain located in the Sierra de Tajonar, near the village of Labiano. The copilot and a passenger were killed while all other occupants were seriously injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.