Texas

The twin engine airplane had been cleared for a night instrument approach to Galveston, Texas, after flying non-stop from San Diego, California, when the pilot reported that he had lost the right engine and did not have much fuel left. The controller vectored the airplane toward the closest airport, and the airplane was approximately 1 mile northeast of that airport when radar contact was lost. A witness observed the airplane enter a spin, descend in a nose down attitude, and impact near the center of a lake. When the pilot filed his flight plan for the cross country flight, he indicated the airplane carried enough fuel to fly for 7 hours and 30 minutes. At the time radar contact was lost, 7 hours and 32 minutes had elapsed since the airplane departed San Diego. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical discrepancies. The landing gear was down, the flaps were extended to about 15 degrees, and neither propeller was feathered. The single engine approach procedure in the airplane owner's manual indicated that the landing gear should be extended when within gliding distance of the field and the flaps placed down only after landing is assured.

After landing on wet runway 35 at Houston-Sugar Land Airport, the crew encountered nil braking action. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in a ditch. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During initial takeoff climb the copilot who was manipulating the controls called for METO (maximum except takeoff) power. After the pilot-in-command set METO power, the left engine lost power. The PIC took the controls from the copilot and called for him to feather the left propeller. The copilot did not hear the call to feather the left propeller. Maintaining an indicated airspeed of 90 knots and wings level attitude, the airplane descended into trees and impacted a rural residential paved street. The cockpit area and main fuselage were consumed by a post crash fire. Examination of the throttle quadrant revealed the propeller control levers were forward, the mixture control levers were autorich, the throttle for the right engine was forward, and the throttle for the left engine was at idle. According to a FAA operations inspector maintaining 90 knots with the propeller not feathered would result in the aircraft descending. The pilot and copilot had not completed a proficiency check or flight check for the DC3 type aircraft within the previous 24 months. Examination of the left engine did not disclose any preexisting anomalies.

During departure climb, the airplane experienced a loss of engine power. Emergency procedures were executed and a forced approach/landing was initiated to a field. While on the approach, the pilot observed a ditch running across the proposed landing pathway. He turned the airplane right to parallel the ditch. During the landing roll, the pilot attempted to avoid a building by intentionally ground looping the airplane. During this avoidance maneuver, the left wing struck the building. Examination of the airplane revealed that the engine had seized due to an internal failure. The reason for the engine's internal failure was not determined.

The airplane landed wheels up and slid 6,850 feet before coming to rest in grass about 140 feet left of the runway centerline. The cabin began to fill with smoke, and the airplane was evacuated. Investigation showed that because the captain had omitted the 'Hydraulics' item on the in-range checklist and the first officer failed to detect the the error, hydraulic pressure was not available to lower the landing gear and deploy the flaps. Both the captain and the first officer recognized that the flaps had not extended after the flaps were selected to 15°. The pilots then failed to perform the landing checklist and to detect the numerous cues alerting them to the status of the landing gear because of their focus on coping with the flap extension problem and the high level of workload as a result of the rapid sequence of events in the final minute of flight. The first officer attempted to communicate his concern about the excessive speed of the approach to the captain. There were deficiencies in Continental Airlines' (COA) oversight of its pilots and the principal operations inspector's oversight of COA. COA was aware of inconsistencies in flightcrew adherence to standard operating procedures within the airline; however, corrective actions taken before the accident had not resolved this problem.

On December 18, 1995, at 1730 central standard time, a Beech B200, N231RL, was substantially damaged, during takeoff near Ingleside, Texas. The commercial pilot and his passenger were not injured. The airplane was owned by R.A. Beeler Leasing Company, of Carrizo Springs, Texas, and operated by Western Airways Inc., of Houston, Texas. The airplane was stolen from the West Houston Airport at 1600. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. According to U.S. Customs officials, the operator's chief mechanic reported the aircraft stolen as soon as the airplane was broken into by the two occupants. A U.S. Customs airplane was vectored to intercept the stolen airplane. The owner of the airplane reported there was approximately 800 pounds of fuel aboard at the time the airplane was stolen. The airplane was intercepted as it was landing at the T.P. McCampbell Airport, near Ingleside, Texas. The Customs aircraft landed and blocked the single 4,996 foot runway. While attempting to takeoff to evade law enforcement personnel, the airplane impacted a fence, crossed a ditch, and came to rest in a swamp. The two occupants of the airplane jumped out and ran. The pilot's son was captured, but the pilot was not apprehended. The following items were found in the airplane: bolt cutters, 2 masks, loaded weapons, the pilot's wallet, and charts and maps indicating that the planned destination of the flight was near Cartagena, Colombia. The nose landing gear collapsed, the left wing sustained structural damage, and the pressure bulkhead was punctured.

Witnesses observed the airplane contact the water while buzzing a lake, 'emerge from a cloud of water,' and enter a climb trailing white vapor. As the airplane approached the lake shore, the right propeller 'quit turning,' then the airplane entered a steep right bank and impacted the ground. The right propeller lever was found in the feather position. Propeller teardowns revealed signatures indicating the right propeller was feathered and the left propeller was operating in the low pitch range at impact. Disassembly of the engines revealed no evidence of any pre-impact mechanical anomalies, and, in the opinion of the manufacturer, 'both engines appeared capable of producing power prior to impact.' Toxicological tests showed 178.000 mg/dl (0.178%) ethanol in vitreous fluid, 90.000 mg/dl (0.09%) ethanol in blood, 114.000 mg/dl (0.114%) ethanol in brain fluid, 3.000 mg/dl acetaldehyde in brain fluid, 22.000 mg/dl acetaldehyde in blood, and 4.000 mg/dl 2-propanol in brain fluid. The levels of ethanol found indicate ingestion of alcohol, and the levels of acetaldehyde and 2-propanol (metabolites of ethanol) detected support ingestion of alcohol.

Witnesses observed the aircraft approximately 250 feet above the ground heading towards the southwest. As the aircraft passed overhead, the 'engines were sputtering.' Approximately 3/4 mile from the witnesses, the aircraft made a 'sharp' right turn, nosed down, and impacted the ground. The engines 'quit' prior to the aircraft turning right. According to the operator, the flight was in preparation for a flight evaluation for the pilot-in-command by an FAA inspector. The pilot reported to Departure Control that he would be 'working on stalls and steep turns,' and the pilot was instructed to 'maintain VFR at or above five thousand five hundred.' The pilot-in-command had accumulated approximately 500 hours in the B-26. Prior to the accident flight, he had flown the B-26 once since October 8, 1993. That flight was on September 26, 1995, for a duration of 30 minutes. Prior to the flight the fuel tanks were 'sticked' and the total fuel was approximately 720 gallons of 100 octane low lead avgas. Examination of the airplane and engines did not disclose any pre mishap discrepancies. Due to the extent of damage, flight control continuity could not be established.

The pilot was cleared for the VOR runway 17 approach. Field elevation and the minimum descent altitude were 590 and 980 feet respectively. The missed approach point was 10.4 miles outbound from the Waco VOR, which coincided with the runway threshold. The pilot stated that the passenger seated in the right front seat established visual contact with the airport. After confirming that the airport was in sight and the runway environment identified, the pilot continued his descent towards the runway to land on runway 17. The pilot further stated that 'I realized that there would not be adequate runway to safely land, and initiated a right turn to execute a missed approach.' The right wing of the airplane impacted the top of the trees. The FAA inspector at the scene reported that after impacting the trees, the airplane continued through the trees for approximately 400 feet on a track of 344 degrees prior to coming to rest on a heading of 230 degrees.

During the night before the accident, freezing rain followed later by snow, fell on the ramp where the airplane was parked. A witness reported that while assisting the pilot in removing snow from the airplane, he noted that 80% of the wing was covered with a coarse layer of ice, from 1/16 to 3/16 in thickness, that was not removed before flight. After the accident, a fireman from the city of lubbock fire department noted ice on the wing approximately 1/16th of an inch thick that had a rough texture that looked as if deposited by freezing rain. The pilot reported that shortly after take off she heard a power decrease and felt surges in the aircraft. The pilot then looked for a place to land. A detailed examination of the engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies.