Crash of a Douglas DC-6B near Union City: 50 killed

Date & Time: Aug 24, 1951 at 0428 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N37550
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Boston – Hartford – Cleveland – Chicago – Oakland – San Francisco
MSN:
43260
YOM:
1951
Flight number:
UA615
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
44
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
50
Captain / Total flying hours:
12032
Captain / Total hours on type:
417.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5842
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2848
Aircraft flight hours:
361
Circumstances:
Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC) cleared Flight 615 on an instrument flight plan from Chicago to Oakland, and from Oakland to San Francisco in accordance with Visual Flight Rules (VFB). Altitude was to be 18,000 feet man sea level (MSL) via Red Airway 4, Creen Airway 3, and Red Airway 6 from Chicago to Denver, direct to Milford, Utah, and thence direct to Oakland. Flight between Oakland and San Francisco was to have been via Green Airway 3 at 500 feet. Routine radio contacts were made en route. At 0354, August 24, while approaching the Oakland area, Flight 615 was cleared to the Newark, California fan marker, with instructions to descend to 6,000 feet, maintain that altitude, and contact Oakland Approach Control over Altamont, California. At 0411, the flight reported over Stockton, California, at 9,500 feet, descending. At this time the flight was given, and acknowledged, the Oakland altimeter setting of 29 88 inches. Flight 615 reported over the Altamont Intersection at 0416, and made initial contact with Oakland Approach Control one-half minute later. Clearance of the flight into Oakland was now vested in Approach Control, and no further radio contacts were made with company communications. The flight was cleared by Approach Control to the Oakland radio range station to maintain at least 500 feet above the tops of the clouds. The pilot followed this contact with a request for clearance direct to Newark and a straight-in range approach. The Newark fan marker and compass locator lie on the southeast leg of the Oakland radio range This request was granted, with instructions to maintain an altitude of 500 feet on top of the cloud layer between Altamont and Newark. At 0422, the flight reported approaching the Hayward, California, compass locator, which is between Newark and Altamont, and requested a second modification to clearance instructions by asking for a straight-in ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach 2. Approach Control advised it to stand by due to another aircraft in the area. Flight 615 shortly thereafter advised Approach Control that it was approaching Newark and to disregard the request for an ILS approach. At 0425 Flight 615 was cleared for a straight-in approach on the southeast course of the Oakland radio range from Newark. At 0427 the flight reported leaving Newark inbound to Oakland. This was the last radio contact. A minute later, the four engine aircraft struck the Tolman peak (985 feet high) located about 14,6 miles southeast of Oakland Airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 50 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the captain to adhere to instrument procedures in the Newark area during an approach to the Oakland Municipal Airport. The following findings were pointed out:
- The captain failed to follow the approved procedure for a straight-in range approach from Newark to Oakland by descending below the minimum altitudes for the Newark area,
- The flight had been cleared for a straight-in range approach, but neither receiver was tuned to the Oakland radio range station, as required,
- The aircraft struck a hill at an altitude of 983 feet MSL on a heading of about 296 degrees magnetic, and approximately three miles to the right of the southeast on-course signal of the Oakland radio range,
- Substantial power was being developed at the time of impact.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-6B near Fort Collins: 50 killed

Date & Time: Jun 30, 1951 at 0200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N37543
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
San Francisco – Oakland – Salt Lake City – Denver – Chicago
MSN:
43144
YOM:
1950
Flight number:
UA610
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
45
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
50
Captain / Total flying hours:
10565
Captain / Total hours on type:
106.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5848
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1526
Aircraft flight hours:
3784
Circumstances:
Flight 610 of June 29, 1951, originated in San Francisco, California, and was scheduled to Chicago, Illinois, with en route stops, among which were Oakland, California, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Denver, Colorado. The crew consisted of Captain J R Appleby, First Officer H G Tower, Flight Engineer A T Petrovitch, and Stewardesses C J Baymond and F M Smith. The flight departed San Francisco on schedule at 1915 and after stopping at Oakland proceeded to Salt Lake City, arriving there at 2324. It departed Salt Lake City at 0011, June 30, 1951, 26 minutes behind schedule due to the reloading of bulky cargo At the time of departure the aircraft weighed 78,597 pounds, which was within the certificated gross take-off weight of 79,380 pounds, the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity. There were five crew members, forty-four adult passengers and one infant on board. The approved flight clearance indicated an IFR flight, via Bed Airway 49, Green Airway 3, and Amber Airway 3, to Denver at a cruising altitude of 15,000 feet, with Omaha, Nebraska, designated as the alternate airport. The flight proceeded in a routine manner and at 0104 reported over Rock Springs, Wyoming, at 15,000 feet, estimating its arrival over Cheyeme, Wyoming, at 0147 and over Denver at 0207 2 Forty-three minutes later, at 0147, the flight reported having passed the Silver Crown fan marker (located 12 miles west of Cheyenne) and requested a lower altitude Accordingly, a new clearance was immediately issued-"ARTC clears United 610 to Dupont intersection, 3 descend to 8500 feet immediately after passing Cheyenne, maintain 8500 feet, no delay expected, contact approach control over Dacono "4 This clearance was acknowledged and the flight reported that it was over Cheyenne at 0147, at 15,000 feet and was now starting to descend. The Denver altimeter setting was then given the flight as being 30 19 inches. Nine minutes later, at 0156, the flight reported reaching its assigned altitude of 8,500 feet No further communication was received from the flight. At 0200, the Denver Control Tower requested the company radio operator to advise the flight to call approach control Repeated calls were made without an answer. It was later determined that Flight 610 had crashed on a mountain (Mt Crystal) 18 miles west-southwest of Fort Collins, Colorado. All 50 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that, after passing Cheyenne, the flight for reasons undetermined failed to follow the prescribed route to Denver and continued beyond the boundary of the airway on a course which resulted in the aircraft striking mountainous terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3A-197 in Fort Wayne: 11 killed

Date & Time: Apr 28, 1951 at 1932 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N16088
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cleveland – Fort Wayne – South Bend – Chicago
MSN:
1927
YOM:
1937
Flight number:
UA129
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
6827
Captain / Total hours on type:
5694.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1121
Copilot / Total hours on type:
121
Aircraft flight hours:
43550
Circumstances:
Flight 129 departed Cleveland, Chic, at 1807, April 28, 1951, for Chicago, Illinois, with stops scheduled at Fort Wayne and South Bend, Indiana The crew consisted of Captain E K Swallow, First Officer H R Miller, and Stewardess Beverly Fllis, there were eight passengers on board at the time of departure The aircraft weighed 24,180 pounds, which was within the certificated gross weight limit of 25,320 pounds, and the load was properly distributed A flight plan filed by the crew with ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) indicated an IFR (instrument flight rule) flight at a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet with South Bend and Toledo, Ohio, designated as the alternate airports The "Trip Weather Analysis" (a form prepared by the crew before departure) indicated that scattered cumulus and thunderstorms were expected south of the course to Fort Wayne Also, that a squall line extending in a north-south direction was moving eastward across Illinois and Indiana at an estimated speed of 35 miles per hour and was expected to be in the vicinity of South bend upon the flight's arrival there. After takeoff, Flight 129 was advised by company radio that it was cleared by ARTC via Green Airway No 3 over Sandusky, Ohio, to the Toledo range, to maintain 3,000 feet and to contact Toledo approach control upon arriving there Flight 129 advised they were going to Fort Wayne and not Toledo Accordingly, ARTC amended the flight's clearance to proceed to Fort Wayne via Green Airway No 3 and Blue Airway No 44 and to maintain 4,000 feet The flight proceeded and a routine company radio report was made when over Sandusky At 1847, the flight reported over Toledo and estimated its arrival Fort Wayne at 1932 At this time, the Fort Wayne 1830 weather sequence report was given the flight which was, "ceiling estimated 25,000 feet, thin Broken clouds, visibility 0 miles, wind southwest 5 miles per hours "Seventeen minutes later at 190', flight 129 called Toledo tower and requested, through APTC permission to cruise at 2,300 feet because of turbulent conditions This was not approved because of other traffic At 1920 the flight reported it was approaching Fort Wayne and was changing to tower frequency The flight reported again when nineteen in less northeast of Bauer Field and was advised at Runway 22 was the runway in use and that the wind was five to ten miles per hour from the southwest At the time this transmission was made there was a moderate amount of station and the flight reported "We are not recanting you very clearly but I think you said, `Straight 11 runway 22' We will call later, closer in ". Because of thunderstorm activity in the area, three other aircraft were requesting instructions to land at approximately the time Flight 129 was making its approach Two of these aircraft landed successfully and the pilot of one, upon request, advisee the tower that the thunderstorm was approximately ten miles west of the airport. At the time the four aircraft were approaching Baer Field, United *** 12 degrees was number four to land in the traffic pattern immediately behind *** World Airlines' Flight 240, a DC-3 aircraft then these latter aircraft were approximately one and two and one-half miles, respectively, from the approach end of Runway 22, the wind at the airport shifted to west-northwest and increased in velocity from 5-10 miles per hour to 40 miles per hour Both flights were advised by the tower of the sudden change of wind direction and increased velocity, and a landing on Runway 27 was suggested, it being more nearly into the wind Upon receiving this message the flights immediately turned to the left to align with this runway. When these aircraft were east of the airport the wind increased to 60-65 miles per hour with gusts to 85 miles per hour and a heavy rainfall began, accompanied by lightning and severe static The flights were quickly advised of the weather change but, due to the sudden decrease in visibility, neither flight was seen again by the tower Flight 129 immediately advised, "United 129 heading east" This was closely followed by a message from TWA's 240, "Pulling out" In order to avoid a possible collision the tower then requested separation altitudes for these aircraft from Chicago ARTC and was advised that Flight 129 was assigned an altitude of 4,000 feet and that Flight 240 was assigned 3,000 feet Both clearances were broadcast from the tower several times without acknowledgment. At 1932 m orange-colored flash was seen to the east-southeast from the tower It was later determined that United's Flight 129 had crashed in a field 2 6 miles east-southeast of the airport TWA's Flight 240 proceeded safely to Toledo. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 11 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the severe down draft encountered which caused the aircraft to strike the ground in a near level attitude. The following findings were reported:
- The squall line moved across northern Illinois and northern Indiana considerably faster than was forecast,
- A line of thunderstorms was known to be approaching Fort Wayne However, it was believed that aircraft in the area could effect safe landings prior to the storm's arrival there,
- When the subject flight and another were approaching Runway 27, they were advised of the surface wind's increased velocity to 65 miles per hour with gusts to 85 miles per hour,
- When the approach was abandoned the aircraft encountered the forward edge of the squall line and was subjected to a severe down draft from which recovery could not be made.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas C-47-DL in Alameda

Date & Time: Jan 27, 1949
Operator:
Registration:
NC17713
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oakland - Oakland
MSN:
4582
YOM:
1942
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training sortie in Oakland Airport. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the right engine suffered a loss of power. The captain informed ATC and elected to return for an emergency landing but the aircraft stalled, hit tree tops and crashed in a wooded area located in Alameda, north of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were injured.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the right engine suffered a loss of power during initial climb for unknown reason. Apparently following a misunderstanding and a wrong judgement of the situation, the crew feathered the propeller and shot down the left engine that was running correctly. With the left engine shut down and the right engine misfiring, the crew was unable to climb safely.

Crash of a Douglas DC-6 in Mount Carmel: 43 killed

Date & Time: Jun 17, 1948 at 1241 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NC37506
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Diego – Los Angeles – Chicago – New York
MSN:
42871
YOM:
1947
Flight number:
UA624
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
39
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
43
Captain / Total flying hours:
7310
Captain / Total hours on type:
30.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3289
Copilot / Total hours on type:
129
Aircraft flight hours:
1245
Circumstances:
The airplane arrived in Chicago at 0952LT, en route from Los Angeles to New York City. At Chicago, the airplane was given a routine station inspection, serviced, loaded, and the flight departed for New York with a new crew at 1044. Aboard were 39 passengers, a crew of four, 2,568 pounds of cargo and 1,800 gallons of fuel, all properly loaded. The resulting total airplane weight was within the certificated gross weight. The airplane climbed en route to its planned altitude of 17,000 feet, proceeding on course, and at 1155 the captain reported to the company radio at LaGuardia Field, that the airplane was mechanically "okay” for a return trip. A routine report was made over Phillipsburg, PA, approximately 500 miles east of Chicago, at 1223, and at 1227 the crew made a routine acknowledgment of a clearance to descend en route to an altitude between 13,000 and 11,000 feet. Four minutes later, at 1231, the company radio operator at LaGuardia Field heard a voice which did not identify itself calling loudly and urgently. Another United crew in a DC-3, flying over the same route behind Flight 624 and at a different altitude, heard what they termed “screaming voices” calling "New York." Then, after an unintelligible transmission, “This is an emergency descent." Inasmuch as all other air carrier flights in the vicinity at this time were accounted for, this transmission undoubtedly emanated from Flight 624. The airplane was first observed by ground witnesses 31 miles northwest of the scene of the accident flying a southeasterly heading toward Shamokin, PA. The airplane flew over the Sunbury Airport, at approximately 4,000 feet above the ground on a southeasterly heading. Immediately north of Shamokin the airplane, then only 500 to 1,000 feet above the ground, described a shallow left turn. The course was toward constantly rising terrain, the hills around Sunbury being 900 feet in elevation and the hills around Shamokin being approximately 1,600 feet in elevation. Five miles east or beyond Shamokin the airplane, flying only 200 feet above the ground, entered a right climbing turn. As it passed to the north of Mount Carmel, the climbing turning attitude increased sharply. The airplane then struck a hillside at an elevation of 1,649 feet. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 43 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the incapacitation of the crew by a concentration of CO2 gas in the cockpit.
The following factors were considered as contributing:
- A fire warning caused the crew to discharge at least one bank of the CO2 fire extinguisher bottles in the forward cargo pit (the forward underfloor baggage compartment),
- Six 15-pound CO2 bottles and six discharge valves were found in the wreckage, however, both the bottles and the valves (which had become separated from their respective bottles upon impact) were so damaged that no conclusions could be drawn as to how many of such bottles had been discharged prior to impact,
- At the time of impact, the emergency cabin pressure relief valves were closed, and the control mechanism for such valves was in the closed position,
- Except for the apparent failure of the fire detection instrument referred to in finding No. 5, supra, the investigation revealed no mechanical failure of the aircraft or fire in flight,
- The emergency procedure for the operation of the DC-6 fire extinguisher system was established after flight tests were conducted in a descent configuration of 300 miles per hour, with landing gear and flaps up, no flight tests were conducted prior to the accident in a descent configuration of 160 miles per hour with gear and flaps down, which configuration was also approved for DC-6 operations,
- At the time of impact the landing gear was in the “up" position, thus indicating that the aircraft had descended in the configuration of 300 miles per hour. The extensive breakage of the aircraft precluded any positive determination as to the position of the flaps,
- After the release of CO2 gas hazardous concentrations of the gas entered into the cockpit,
- Due to the physiological and toxic effects of high concentrations of CO2 gas in the cockpit, which would probably not have occurred had the cabin pressure relief valves been open, the members of the flight crew of the aircraft were rendered physically and mentally incapable of performing their duties.
The following comment was added to the conclusion:
A fire in flight permits little opportunity for the exercise of detached and thoughtful consideration of emergency procedure. Immediate action is required if a fire is to be controlled. Too little consideration has been given to the psychological and physical limitations of crew members in time of stress and danger as related to the complexity of emergency fire procedure. It is not safe to assume that the pilot and co-pilot, under emergency pressure, will always adhere rigidly to the sequence of steps outlined in the CAA Approved Airplane Operating Manual. The possibility of human error under great mental stress is well documented in air transport experience and the design of aircraft controls, especially those of an emergency character, should take into consideration the natural limitations of human nature. These limitations argue against involved procedures applicable in emergencies. In harmony with this objective, the Douglas Aircraft Company has designed and is testing a modified fire extinguishing system which will permit all necessary steps to be executed by the movement of one control. An additional vent is also being designed to reduce CO2 concentration in the cockpit. Seven days after the Mt Carmel accident, the Director of Aviation Safety of the CAA directed telegrams to all CAA regional administrators calling attention to his telegram of June 10, 1948, referred to above, and advising that further investigation had disclosed the existence of the CO2 concentration condition found in Constellation aircraft by the Chillicothe tests in other makes of aircraft. The telegram concluded "Hence, flight crews of all aircraft should be advised to wear oxygen masks and utilize emergency cockpit smoke clearance procedures when carbon dioxide is released into any fuselage compartment from other than portable extinguishers.” All scheduled U S air carriers operating DC-6s have equipped the airplanes with demand type full face oxygen masks for the use of the crew.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-6 in Bryce Canyon: 52 killed

Date & Time: Oct 24, 1947 at 1229 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NC37510
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Los Angeles – Denver – Chicago
MSN:
42875
YOM:
1947
Flight number:
UA608
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
47
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
52
Captain / Total flying hours:
15000
Captain / Total hours on type:
136.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3046
Copilot / Total hours on type:
66
Aircraft flight hours:
933
Circumstances:
Flight 608 departed Los Angeles, California, at 1023 with its destination Chicago, Illinois, to cruise at 19,000 feet according to visual flight rules. Routine position reports were made over Fontana, Daggett and Silver Lake, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Saint George, Utah. During the latter report, the flight indicated that it estimated passing over Bryce Canyon, Utah, at 1222. At 1221 Flight 608 reported that a fire had been detected in the baggage compartment which the crew was unable to extinguish. The report added that the cabin was filled with smoke and that the flight was attempting to make an emergency-landing at Bryce Canyon Airport. Shortly thereafter the flight again reported that the “tail is going out--we may get down and we may not.” At 1226 another transmission was received from the flight indicating that it was going into the “best place” available. One minute later the flight reported “we may make it--approaching a strip.” No further contact was had from the flight. Witnesses who observed the aircraft as it was approaching Bryce Canyon from approximately 20 miles southwest first observed what appeared to be white smoke streaming from the aircraft, followed later by dense black smoke. The first witnesses who observed fire in the bottom of the aircraft at approximately the center-section were located approximately 15 miles south of Bryce Canyon. Until shortly before the moment of impact, the aircraft appeared to be under normal control; however, no witnesses were located who observed the crash.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the combustion of gasoline which had entered the cabin heater air intake scoop from the No. 3 alternate tank vent due to inadvertent overflow during the transfer of fuel from the No. 4 alternate tank. Contributing factors were the improper location of the No. 3 alternate tank air vent outlet and the lack of instructions provided DC-6 flight crews concerning hazards associated with fuel transfer.
The failure of the manufacturer and the Civil Aeronautics Administration to exercise full caution in the analysis of the fuel system of the DC-6 relative to proper location of fuel tank vents to provide non-hazardous location for fuel drainage, as required by existing regulations, and the insufficient attentiveness on the part of the manufacturer, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and the air carriers to the procedures of fuel management employed by pilots operating DC-6 aircraft, were contributing factors.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-4 in La Guardia: 43 killed

Date & Time: May 29, 1947 at 1905 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NC30046
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York – Cleveland
MSN:
18324
YOM:
1944
Flight number:
UA521
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
44
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
43
Captain / Total flying hours:
8703
Captain / Total hours on type:
336.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2323
Copilot / Total hours on type:
256
Aircraft flight hours:
5950
Circumstances:
Flight 521 taxied from its parked position, rolled onto Runway 18, and without pause or hesitation accelerated for take-off. The throttles were advanced. Air speed increased to above 90 miles per hour. Captain Baldwin applied back pressure to the control column, but the "feel" of the controls was "heavy," and the aircraft did not respond. As the aircraft raced toward the boundary of the field, Captain Baldwin decided to discontinue his take-off. About 1,000 feet from the south and of the runway he applied brakes, ordering the co-pilot at the same time to cut the engines. A ground-loop was attempted by heavy application of left brake. The aircraft, however, proceeded to roll straight ahead. Then, in the both brakes locked it continued over the remainder of the runway, crashed through the fence at the airport boundary, and half-bounced, half-flew across the Grand Central Parkway. The aircraft finally came to rest immediately east of the Casey Jones School of Aeronautics, a distance of 800 feet from the end of Runway 18 and 1,700 feet from the point at which brakes were first applied. It was almost immediate enveloped in flames. The captain, another crew member and three passengers were rescued while 43 other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was either the failure of the pilot to release the gust lock before take-off, or his decision to discontinue the take-off because of apprehension resulting from rapid use of a short runway under a possible calm wind condition.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Douglas DC-3A-197E in Philadelphia

Date & Time: Feb 24, 1947
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
NC33646
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
4125
YOM:
1941
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Ground accident. Exact circumstances unknown. No casualties but aircraft written off.

Crash of a Douglas DC-4 in Los Angeles

Date & Time: Dec 24, 1946
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N30050
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
10450
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
41
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft landed on a wet runway. After touchdown, it was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest 200 feet further on. All 45 occupants were uninjured and quickly disembarked while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair due to severe damages to the fuselage.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew continued the approach well above the glide. At the time the aircraft passed over the runway threshold, its speed was 115 knots and his altitude was 75 feet. Due to a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft was too high and too fast, and then landed too far down the runway, well after the touchdown zone. In such a situation, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance available, especially on a wet runway. Considering that all safety conditions were not combined, the pilot should have taken the decision to initiate a go around.

Crash of a Douglas C-53D-DO in Cleveland: 2 killed

Date & Time: Nov 11, 1946 at 0330 LT
Operator:
Registration:
NC19947
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chicago – Cleveland
MSN:
4873
YOM:
1942
Flight number:
UA404
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
8340
Captain / Total hours on type:
967.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2268
Copilot / Total hours on type:
116
Aircraft flight hours:
11684
Circumstances:
The aircraft was heard southwest of the airport at 0327 and at this time Cleveland Tower cleared the flight to land on Runway 36-Left. At 0328 the air-craft was observed over the airport at an altitude of between 200 and 400 feet flying In a northeasterly direction. When approximately over the north boundary, the aircraft disappeared from view in what appeared to be a low cloud formation. At this time Cleveland Tower advised the flight that It was cleared to use Runway 36-Left, Runway 36-Right, or Runway 31, at the captain's discretion. The aircraft was next seen re-approaching the airport from the northeast in a right turn, during which turn the landing lights were switched on. In the latter part of the turn, a descent was established and this descent was continued in a northwesterly direction toward the dark, undeveloped area north of the airport. With the exception of the fact that the aircraft was heading toward an area not within the boundary of the airport, its appearance was that of an aircraft in a normal landing approach. When at an altitude of approximately 30 feet, the aircraft banked slightly to the left and, immediately thereafter it struck trees and high tension lines paralleling the north boundary of the airport. The aircraft veered sharply to the right and dived into the ground, coming to rest approximately 550 feet beyond the point of initial contact.
Probable cause:
On the basis of the foregoing, the Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the error of the pilot in establishing an approach toward an area not cleared for landing as a result of having mistaken the end markers of Runway 23 for those of Runway 31. A contributing factor was the failure of the pilot to abandon his attempt to land at Cleveland Airport when confronted with weather conditions below the minimums prescribed for that airport.
Final Report: