Private

Witnesses reported that the airplane appeared to be making a normal approach for landing when it suddenly rolled to the left, descended, and impacted the terrain about one-half mile from the runway. On arrival at the scene, the witnesses saw the airplane fully engulfed in flames. The flight was operating in night visual meteorological conditions and the runway lights were illuminated at the time of the accident. The pilot communicated no problems or difficulties while in contact with air traffic control (ATC) during the accident flight. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies associated with a pre-impact failure or malfunction. Radar track data and weather observations indicated that the pilot climbed through an overcast cloud layer without the required ATC clearance, en route to his intended destination. The pilot previously had been issued a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine airplane ratings upon successful completion of the prescribed practical tests. He was subsequently issued a commercial pilot certificate, which included the addition of an instrument airplane rating, based on military flight experience. However, a review of military records and statements from his family indicated that the pilot had never served in the military. The pilot's medical history and toxicology testing showed he had a history of back pain and was taking medication for that condition that commonly causes impairment. However, the time proximity for the pilot having taken the medication prior to the accident flight and any possible impairment, could not be determined.

On 7 November 2008, a Piper Aircraft Corp. PA-31-350 Chieftain, registered VH-OPC, was being operated on a private flight under the instrument flight rules (IFR) from Moorabbin Airport, Vic. to Port Macquarie via Bathurst, NSW. On board the aircraft were the owner-pilot and three passengers. The aircraft departed Moorabbin Airport at about 1725 Eastern Daylight-saving Time and arrived at Bathurst Airport at about 1930. The pilot added 355 L of aviation gasoline (Avgas) to the aircraft from a self-service bowser and spent some time with the passengers in the airport terminal. Recorded information at Bathurst Airport indicated that, at about 2012 (12 minutes after civil twilight), the engines were started and at 2016 the aircraft was taxied for the holding point of runway 35. The aircraft was at the holding point for about 3 minutes, reportedly at high engine power. At 2020, the pilot broadcast that he was entering and backtracking runway 35 and at 2022:08 the pilot broadcast on the common traffic advisory frequency that he was departing (airborne) runway 35. At 2023:30, the pilot transmitted to air traffic control that he was airborne at Bathurst and to standby for departure details. There was no record or reports of any further radio transmissions from the pilot. At about 2024, a number of residents of Forest Grove, a settlement to the north of Bathurst Airport, heard a sudden loud noise from an aircraft at a relatively low height overhead, followed shortly after by the sound of an explosion and the glow of a fire. A witness located about 550 m to the south-west of the accident site, reported seeing two bright lights that were shining in a constant direction and ‘wobbling’. There was engine noise that was described by one witness as getting very loud and ‘rattling’ or ‘grinding’ abnormally before the aircraft crashed. At 2024:51, the first 000 telephone call was received from witnesses and shortly after, emergency services were notified. The aircraft was seriously damaged by impact forces and fire, and the four occupants were fatally injured.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a flight from South Pacific to the US with an intermediate stop in Punta Chivato, Baja California Sur, where a passenger was dropped off. Shortly after takeoff from Punta Chivato Airfield, the aircraft lost speed and height, stalled and crashed near the Hotel Posada de la Flores. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and the pilot was killed.

Shortly after take off from Oaxaca Airport runway 19, while in initial climb, the pilot informed ATC about an engine fire and elected to return for an emergency. Following a turn to runway 02, the pilot was informed about the presence of a Mexicana Fokker 100 that lined up and was waiting for takeoff clearance. The Cessna pilot made a 360 turn when the aircraft stalled and crashed short of runway, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

The purpose of the flight was to spend a week in Mozambique during the school holidays following the 3rd term. The regular pilot of the aircraft was unable to undertake the journey due to an injured leg, so a replacement pilot was trained over a three-day period to fly two families to Mozambique. The pilot, together with four adults accompanied by four children, departed New Tempe aerodrome (FATP) on the 27th of September 2008. The first leg of the journey would see the aircraft fly from New Tempe aerodrome (FATP) to Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN). After a brief stop at Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN) for customs formalities, the aircraft then proceeded to Inhambane (FQIN) in Mozambique. On the 5th of October 2008, the aircraft was refuelled with 200 litres of fuel at Inhambane (FQIN) in Mozambique for the return leg of the journey. The return leg of the journey would see the aircraft fly from Inhambane (FQIN) in Mozambique to Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN) for customs formalities and refuelling. 326 litres of fuel was uplifted at Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN). The pilot filed a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan with the ATC at Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN) for the flight to New Tempe aerodrome (FATP) on the day of the accident. The aircraft departed Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN) at 1317Z for the final leg of the flight to New Tempe aerodrome (FATP). Approximately 20 minutes after take-off from FAKN, a witness observed the aircraft flying at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet AGL with the wings level in a southerly direction, overhead the farm, in the direction of the mountains. The witness noted that the aircraft was flying much lower than aircraft would normally fly when they flew over the farm. Thick mist covered approximately one third (1/3) of the top of the mountain at the time. The witness then lost sight of the aircraft and approximately two minutes later he heard an explosion. The witness immediately notified the Kruger Mpumalanga Airport authorities that an aircraft may have been involved in an accident. A search and rescue operation was initiated after the appropriate authorities had been informed. The search and rescue operation that consisted of air and ground searches were hampered by adverse weather conditions in the area from where the witness had heard the explosion emanating. The wreckage was located the following day during the air search operation, approximately 170 feet below the mountain top, where the aircraft had impacted with terrain. The aircraft had ploughed through a pine tree plantation, and was destroyed in the impact sequence and by the post-impact fire that had erupted. All the occupants on board the aircraft were fatally injured in the accident.

According to radar and Global Positioning System data, the pilot overflew the airport from the southwest and turned to the west to maneuver into position for landing on runway 9. Several witnesses observed the airplane to the west of the airport at a low altitude, appearing to enter a turn that was followed by a "rapid descent" and impact with the ground. The ground scars and
damage to the airplane were consistent with a near-vertical descent and impact. An examination of the airplane and its systems revealed no preaccident anomalies. The moon was obscured by an overcast sky and dark night conditions were prevalent.

The pilot reported that he was cleared for a GPS approach and broke out of the clouds at 1,800 feet. He entered a left hand traffic pattern and his last recollection was turning base. He woke up in the crashed airplane which was on fire. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of airplane systems revealed no anomalies.

During climb a few minutes after takeoff, a fire erupted in the airplane's right engine compartment. About 7 miles from the departure airport, the pilot reversed course and notified the air traffic controller that he was declaring an emergency. As the pilot was proceeding back toward the departure airport witnesses observed fire beneath, and smoke trailing from, the right engine and heard boom sounds or explosions as the airplane descended. Although the pilot feathered the right engine's propeller, the airplane's descent continued. The 12-minute flight ended about 1.25 miles from the runway when the airplane impacted trees and power lines before coming to rest upside down adjacent to a private residence. A fuel-fed fire consumed the airframe and damaged nearby private residences. The airplane was owned and operated by an airplane broker that intended to have it ferried to Korea. In preparation for the overseas ferry flight, the airplane's engines were overhauled. Maintenance was also performed on various components including the engine-driven fuel pumps, turbochargers, and propellers. Nacelle fuel tanks were installed and the airplane received an annual inspection. Thereafter, the broker had a ferry pilot fly the airplane from the maintenance facility in Ohio to the pilot's Nevada-based facility, where the ferry pilot had additional maintenance performed related to the air conditioner, gear door, vacuum pump, and idle adjustment. Upon completion of this maintenance, the right engine was test run for at least 20 minutes and the airplane was returned to the ferry pilot. During the following month, the ferry pilot modified the airplane's fuel system by installing four custom-made ferry fuel tanks in the fuselage, and associated plumbing in the wings, to supplement the existing six certificated fuel tanks. The ferry pilot held an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate with inspection authorization. He reinspected the airplane, purportedly in accordance with the Piper Aircraft Company's annual inspection protocol, signed the maintenance logbook, and requested Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval for his ferry flight. The FAA reported that it did not process the first ferry pilot's ferry permit application because of issues related to the applicant's forms and the FAA inspector's workload. The airplane broker discharged the pilot and contracted with a new ferry pilot (the accident pilot) to immediately pick up the airplane in Nevada and fly it to California, the second ferry pilot's base. The contract specified that the airplane be airworthy. In California, the accident pilot planned to complete any necessary modifications, acquire FAA approval, and then ferry the airplane overseas. The discharged ferry pilot stated to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator that none of his airplane modifications had involved maintenance in the right engine compartment. He also stated that when he presented the airplane to the replacement ferry pilot (at most 3 hours before takeoff) he told him that fuel lines and fittings in the wings related to the ferry tanks needed to be disconnected prior to flight. During the Safety Board's examination of the airplane, physical evidence was found indicating that the custom-made ferry tank plumbing in the wings had not been disconnected. The airplane wreckage was examined by the NTSB investigation team while on scene and following its recovery. Regarding both engines, no evidence was found of any internal engine component malfunction. Notably, the localized area surrounding and including the right engine-driven fuel pump and its outlet port had sustained significantly greater fire damage than was observed elsewhere. According to the Lycoming engine participant, the damage was consistent with a fuel-fed fire originating in this vicinity, which may have resulted from the engine's fuel supply line "B" nut being loose, a failed fuel line, or an engine-driven fuel pumprelated leak. The fuel supply line and its connecting components were not located. The engine-driven fuel pump was subsequently examined by staff from the NTSB's Materials Laboratory. Noted evidence consisted of globules of resolidified metal and areas of missing material consistent with the pump having been engulfed in fire. The staff also examined the airplane. Evidence was found indicating that the fire's area of origin was not within the wings or fuselage, but rather emanated from a localized area within the right engine compartment, where the engine-driven fuel pump and its fuel supply line and fittings were located. However, due to the extensive pre- and post-impact fires, the point of origin and the initiating event that precipitated the fuel leak could not be ascertained. The airplane's "Pilot Operator's Handbook" (POH), provides the procedures for responding to an in-flight fire and securing an engine. It also provides single-engine climb performance data. The POH indicates that the pilot should move the firewall fuel shutoff valve of the affected engine to the "off" position, feather the propeller, close the engine's cowl flaps to reduce drag, turn off the magneto switches, turn off the emergency fuel pump switch and the fuel selector, and pull out the fuel boost pump circuit breaker. It further notes that unless the boost pump's circuit breaker is pulled, the pump will continuously operate. During the wreckage examination, the Safety Board investigators found evidence indicating that the right engine's propeller was feathered. However, contrary to the POH's guidance, the right engine's firewall fuel shutoff valve was not in the "off" position, the cowl flaps were open, the magneto switches were on, the emergency fuel pump switches and the fuel selector were on, and the landing gear was down. Due to fire damage, the position of the fuel boost pump circuit breaker could not be ascertained. Calculations based upon POH data indicate that an undamaged and appropriately configured airplane flying on one engine should have had the capability to climb between 100 and 200 feet per minute and, at a minimum, maintain altitude. Recorded Mode C altitude data indicates that during the last 5 minutes of flight, the airplane descended while slowing about 16 knots below the speed required to maintain altitude.

The twin engine aircraft departed Riga on a flight to Tukums with eight people on board to take part to an airshow. Several others aircraft were also en route to Tukums but most of the pilots returned to their departure point due to the deterioration of the weather conditions. On approach to Tukums Airport runway 32, the pilot encountered poor visibility. Unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, he initiated a go-around procedure. After several circuits, he attempted a second approach under VFR mode. Too low, the aircraft struck a hill and eventually crashed in a private garden, coming to rest broken in two. All eight occupants were injured, some seriously. Few hours later, the pilot died from his injuries.

During landing at its home airport, the airplane overran the runway and traveled down a 40-foot embankment before coming to rest against trees and sustaining substantial damage. According to the pilot, his speed on approach was a little fast but he thought it was manageable. Recorded data from the accident airplane revealed that 20 seconds before touchdown, when the pilot selected flaps 30 (landing flaps) the airspeed was approximately 27 knots above the maximum flap extension speed, and as the airplane touched down its airspeed was approximately 14 knots higher than specified for landing. The runway had a displaced threshold with 3,097 feet of runway length available. Skid marks from the accident airplane began approximately 868 feet beyond the displaced threshold, and continued for about 2,229 feet until they left the paved portion of the runway.