Private

While on a straight-in global-positioning-system approach, the airplane broke out of the clouds directly over the end of the runway. The pilot then remained clear of the clouds and executed a no-flap circling approach to the opposite direction runway. The pilot said that his airspeed was high when he touched down. The landing was hard, and the right main landing gear tire blew out, the airplane departed the runway to the left, and the left main landing gear collapsed. No preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation.

Witnesses reported that the airplane’s takeoff ground roll appeared to be normal. Shortly after the airplane lifted off, it stopped climbing and yawed to the left. Several witnesses heard abnormal sounds, which they attributed to propeller blade angle changes. The airplane’s flight path deteriorated to a left skid and its airspeed began to slow. The airplane’s left bank angle increased to between 45 and 90 degrees, and its nose dropped to a nearly vertical attitude. Just before impact, the airplane’s bank angle and pitch began to flatten out. The airplane had turned left about 100 degrees when it impacted the ground about 1,500 feet from the midpoint of the 10,000-foot runway. A fire then erupted, which consumed the fuselage. Review of a security camera video of the takeoff revealed that the airplane was near the midpoint of the runway, about 140 feet above the ground, and at a ground speed of about 130 knots when it began to yaw left. The left yaw coincided with the appearance, behind the airplane, of a dark grayish area that appeared to be smoke. A witness, who was an aviation mechanic with extensive experience working on airplanes of the same make and model as the accident airplane, reported hearing two loud “pops” about the time the smoke appeared, which he believed were generated by one of the engines intermittently relighting and extinguishing. Post accident examination of the airframe, the engines, and the propellers did not identify any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Both engines and propellers sustained nearly symmetrical damage, indicating that the two engines were operating at similar low- to mid-range power settings at impact. The airplane’s fuel system was comprised of two separate fuel systems (one for each engine) that consisted of multiple wing fuel tanks feeding into a nacelle tank and then to the engine. The left and right nacelle tanks were breached during the impact sequence and no fuel was found in either tank. Samples taken from the fuel truck, which supplied the airplane's fuel, tested negative for contamination. However, a fuels research engineer with the United States Air Force Fuels Engineering Research Laboratory stated that water contamination can result from condensation in the air cavity above a partially full fuel tank. Both diurnal temperature variations and the atmospheric pressure variations experienced with normal flight cycles can contribute to this type of condensation. He stated that the simplest preventive action is to drain the airplane’s fuel tank sumps before every flight. There were six fuel drains on each wing that the Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) for the airplane dictated should be drained before every flight. The investigation revealed that the pilot’s previous employer, where he had acquired most of his King Air 200 flight experience, did not have its pilots drain the fuel tank sumps before every flight. Instead, maintenance personnel drained the sumps at some unknown interval. No witnesses were identified who observed the pilot conduct the preflight inspection of the airplane before the accident flight, and it could not be determined whether the pilot had drained the airplane’s fuel tank sumps. He had been the only pilot of the airplane for its previous 40 flights. Because the airplane was not on a Part 135 certificate or a continuous maintenance program, it is unlikely that a mechanic was routinely draining the airplane's fuel sumps. The witness observations, video evidence, and the postaccident examination indicated that the left engine experienced a momentary power interruption during the takeoff initial climb, which was consistent with a power interruption resulting from water contamination of the left engine's fuel supply. It is likely that, during the takeoff rotation and initial climb, water present in the bottom of the left nacelle tank was drawn into the left engine. When the water flowed through the engine's fuel nozzles into the burner can, it momentarily extinguished the engine’s fire. The engine then stopped producing power, and its propeller changed pitch, resulting in the propeller noises heard by witnesses. Subsequently, a mixture of water and fuel reached the nozzles and the engine intermittently relighted and extinguished, which produced the grayish smoke observed in the video and the “pop” noises heard by the mechanic witness. Finally, uncontaminated fuel flow was reestablished, and the engine resumed normal operation. About 5 months before the accident, the pilot successfully completed a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 pilot-in-command check flight in a King Air 90. However, no documentation was found indicating that he had ever received training in a full-motion King Air simulator. Although simulator training was not required, if the pilot had received this type of training, it is likely that he would have been better prepared to maintain directional control in response to the left yaw from asymmetrical power. Given that the airplane’s airspeed was more than 40 knots above the minimum control speed of 86 knots when the left yaw began, the pilot should have been able to maintain directional control during the momentary power interruption. Although the airplane’s estimated weight at the time of the accident was about 650 pounds over the maximum allowable gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds, the investigation determined that the additional weight would not have precluded the pilot from maintaining directional control of the airplane.

Few minutes after takeoff from Guadalajara-Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Airport, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and elected to make an emergency landing. While approaching a pasture, the twin engine airplane collided with a powerline and crashed, bursting into flames. Both pilots and two cows in the field were killed, and all four passengers were seriously injured (burns). Three days later, one of the survivor died from his injuries.

On 27 February 2011, at approximately 12:12:20 UTC, a mechanic working on McKinnon G-21G, registration mark N221AG, called the operational telephone line of Al Ain International Airport tower and informed the Aerodrome Controller (ADC) that the Aircraft would depart that evening. The Aerodrome Controller requested the estimated time of departure (ETD) and the mechanic stated that the departure would not be before 1400 outbound to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The ADC asked if the flight crew were still planning to perform a test flight before departure to the planned destination. The mechanic answered that they have not flown the Aircraft for a while and they want to stay in the pattern to make sure everything is “okay” prior to departure on the cleared route. The ADC advised that they could expect a clearance to operate in the circuit until they were ready to depart. The mechanic advised that there would be no need land, they only wished to stay in the circuit and to go straight from there towards the cleared route. The ADC asked the mechanic about the Aircraft type, the mechanic answered that it is Grumman Goose equipped with turbine engines and it would be heading back to the United States for an autopilot installation and annual inspection and “everything”. The mechanic commented to the ADC that the Aircraft was unique in the world with the modifications that it had. At 13:53:15, the ADC contacted the mechanic and requested an ETD update. The mechanic advised that there would be a further one-hour delay due to waiting for fuel. A witness, who is an instructor at the flight academy where the Aircraft was parked, stated that he had formed the impression that the maintenance personnel “…looked stressed out and they were obviously behind schedule and were trying to depart as soon as possible for the test flight so everything would go as planned and they could depart to Riyadh the same evening”. At approximately 14:10, the Aircraft was pushed out of the hangar, and the two mechanics moved luggage from inside the hangar and loaded it onboard the Aircraft. The mechanics also loaded a bladder extra fuel tank onboard and placed it in the cabin next to the main passenger door. At 14:17, the Aircraft was fueled with 1,898 liters of Jet-A1 which was 563 liters less than the 650 USG (2,461 liters) requested by the crew. At approximately 15:00, and after performing exterior checks, the male, 28 year old pilot in command (PIC), and another male, 61 years old pilot boarded the Aircraft and occupied the cockpit left and right seats, respectively. The two mechanics occupied the two first row passenger seats. The PIC and the other pilot were seen by hangar personnel using torchlights while following checklists and completing some paperwork. At 15:44:48, the PIC contacted the Airport Ground Movement Controller (GMC) on the 129.15 MHz radio frequency in order to check the functionality of the two Aircraft radios. Both checks were satisfactory as advised by the GMC. Thereafter, and while the Aircraft was still on the hangar ramp, the PIC informed the GMC that he was ready to copy the IFR clearance to Riyadh. The GMC queried if the Aircraft was going to perform local circuits and then pick up the IFR flight plan to the destination. The PIC replied that he would like to make one circuit in the pattern, if available, then to [perform] low approach and from there he (the PIC) would be able to accept the clearance to destination. The GMC acknowledged the PIC’s request and advised him to expect a left closed circuit not above two thousand feet and to standby for a clearance. The PIC read back this information correctly. At 15:48:58, the GMC gave engine start clearance and, at 15:50:46, the PIC reported engine start and requested taxi clearance at 15:52:16. The GMC cleared the Aircraft to taxi to the holding point of Runway (RWY) 19. The GMC advised, again, to expect a left hand (LH) closed circuit not above two thousand feet VFR and to request IFR clearance from the tower once airborne. The GMC instructed the squawk as 3776, which was also read back correctly. At 15:55:13, the PIC requested a three-minute delay on the ramp. The GMC acknowledged and instructed the crew to contact the tower once the Aircraft was ready to taxi. At 15:56:03, the PIC called the GMC and requested taxi clearance; he was recleared to the holding point of RWY 19. At 15:57:53, the GMC advised that, after completion of the closed circuit, route to the destination via the ROVOS flight planned route on departure RWY 19 and to make a right turn and maintain 6,000 ft. The PIC read back the instructions correctly. At 16:02:38, and while the Aircraft was at the holding point of RWY 19, the PIC contacted the ADC on 119.85 MHz to report ready-for-departure for a closed circuit. The ADC instructed to hold position then he asked the PIC if he was going to perform only one closed circuit. The PIC replied that it was “only one circuit, then [perform] a low approach and from there capture the IFR to Riyadh.” At 16:03:56, the ADC instructed the PIC “to line up and wait” RWY 19 which, at that time, was occupied by a landing aircraft that vacated the runway at 16:05:23. At 16:05:37, the Aircraft was cleared for takeoff. The ADC advised the surface wind as 180°/07 kts and requested the crew to report left downwind which was acknowledged by the PIC correctly. The Aircraft completed the takeoff acceleration roll, lifted off and continued initial climb normally. When the Aircraft reached 300 to 400 ft AGL at approximately the midpoint of RWY 19, it turned to the left while the calibrated airspeed (CAS) was approximately 130 kts. The Aircraft continued turning left with increasing rate and losing height. At approximately 16:07:11, the Aircraft impacted the ground of Taxiway ‘F’, between Taxiway ‘K’ and ‘L’ with a slight nose down attitude and a slight left roll. After the impact, the Aircraft continued until it came to rest after approximately 32 m (105 ft) from the initial impact point. There was no attempt by the PIC to declare an emergency. The Aircraft was destroyed due to the impact forces and subsequent fire. All the occupants were fatally injured.

A witness reported that, despite the darkness, he was able to see the navigation lights on the airplane as it flew over the south end of the airport at an altitude of 150 to 200 feet above the ground. The airplane made a left turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and continued a descending turn until the airplane impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. Due to the airplane’s turn, the 10- to 20-knot quartering headwind became a quartering tailwind. The airplane was also turned toward a rural area with very little ground lighting. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

After landing at Harrisburg Airport, the undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on its belly. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While taxiing at Papeete-Faaa Airport, the aircraft went out of control and collided with various ground handling equipment such as a catering truck, a belt loader and cargo containers. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot was issued a clearance to descend. As the airplane descended to the assigned altitude, radar plots depicted the airplane entering a right turn, climbing rapidly, and then descending rapidly in a spiral-like pattern. The airplane wreckage was found the following day in mountainous terrain. Several tall trees surrounded the perimeter of the wreckage. Many of the trees showed scuff marks down the trunks consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in a near-vertical descent. All airplane components were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airplane showed no preimpact failures of the airframe or the engine. A weather analysis revealed that the airplane was descending in the immediate vicinity of a stationary front. The weather conditions in the area were conducive to the production of moderate to severe turbulence, mountain wave activity with updraft/downdrafts in excess of 750 feet per minute, and moderate icing. The radar data confirmed that the airplane began its rapid descent shortly after entering cumuliform clouds. The radar information along with the wreckage at the accident site was consistent with the pilot losing control while trying to maneuver the airplane in an area of turbulent weather.

The twin engine aircraft departed Porlamar on a private flight to Charallave, carrying five passengers and one pilot, all from the same family. It is believed that the pilot changed his destination en route and elected to continue to the Cojedes Province. Due to fuel exhaustion, both engines lost power then failed, forcing the pilot to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crashed in a wooded area located near Macapo. A young girl aged 10 was seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Kumamoto Airport runway 07 at 1711LT on a private flight to Kitakyūshū, with two persons on board: a PIC in the left seat and a passenger in the right seat. At 17:12:11, the radar of the Kumamoto aerodrome station C captured the aircraft. The pilot made a position report at 6 nm north of the airport at 2,300 feet. While climbing to the altitude of 6,500 feet, the pilot was instructed to change the frequency. About three minutes after takeoff, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located on the southeast slope of Mt Yago, about 14 km northeast of Kumamoto Airport. The wreckage was found in the afternoon of the following day at an altitude of 850 metres. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed, Mr. & Mrs. Hiroshi and Hiromi Kanda.