Private

The pilot reported that, during the preflight, it was snowing, and he wiped the snow that had accumulated on the wings off "as best as [he] could." He added that, while taxiing to the runway, "snow was falling heavily," and he observed "light accumulation of wet snow" on the wings. During the takeoff roll, he observed the snow "sloughing off" the wings as the airspeed increased. Subsequently, during the climb to about 150 ft above the ground, the airplane yawed to the left, and he attempted to recover using right aileron. He reported that he "could see a stall forming," so he lowered the nose and reduced power to idle. The airplane impacted the general aviation ramp in a left-wing-down attitude and slid 500 to 600 ft. The pilot reported on the National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident/ Incident Report 6120.1 form that the airplane stalled, and he recommended "better deicing" before takeoff. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and left wing. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. A review of recorded data from the automated weather observation station located on the airport revealed that, about 27 minutes before the accident, the wind was 010° at 8 knots, 1/2-mile visibility, moderate snow, freezing fog, and sky condition broken at 500 ft above ground level (agl) and overcast at 1,500 ft agl. The airplane departed from runway 16. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aeronautical Information Manual stated, in part: "The presence of aircraft airframe icing during takeoff, typically caused by improper or no deicing of the aircraft being accomplished prior to flight has contributed to many recent accidents in turbine aircraft." The manual further stated, "Ensure that your aircraft's lift-generating surfaces are COMPLETELY free of contamination before flight through a tactile (hands on) check of the critical surfaces when feasible. Even when otherwise permitted, operators should avoid smooth or polished frost on lift-generating surfaces as an acceptable preflight condition." FAA Advisory Circular, AC 135-17, stated in part: "Test data indicate that ice, snow, or frost formations having thickness and surface roughness similar to medium or course sandpaper on the leading edge and upper surfaces of a wing can reduce wing lift by as much as 30 percent and increase drag by 40 percent." Included in the public docket for this report is a copy of a service bulletin from the airplane manufacturer, which describes deicing and anti-icing ground procedures. It stated, in part: During conditions conducive to aeroplane icing during ground operations, take-off shall not be attempted when ice, snow, slush or frost is present or adhering to the wings, propellers, control surfaces, engine inlets or other critical surfaces. This is known as the "Clean Aircraft Concept". Any deposit of ice, snow or frost on the external surfaces may drastically affect its performance due to reduced aerodynamic lift and increased drag resulting from the disturbed airflow.

While overflying the Yucatán Province, en route from Monterrey to Cancún, the pilot informed ATC that he was low of fuel and requested the permission to divert to Chichén Itzá Airport for an emergency landing. While approaching the airfield by night, the single engine aircraft descended into trees and crashed few km from the airport. The airplane was destroyed and there was no fire. All five occupants were injured.

The pilot and the passenger departed on a cross-country, personal flight in the airplane that the operator had purchased the day before the accident. Shortly after takeoff from runway 11L, after reaching an altitude of about 100 to 150 ft above the runway in a nose-high pitch attitude, the airplane rolled left to an inverted position as its nose dropped, and it descended to terrain impact on airport property, consistent with an aerodynamic stall. Post-accident examination of the accident site revealed propeller strike marks separated at distances consistent with both propellers rotating at the speed required for takeoff and in a normal blade angle range of operation at impact. Both engines exhibited rotational scoring signatures that indicated the engines were producing symmetrical power and were most likely operating in the mid-to upper-power range at impact. The engines did not display any pre-impact anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal engine operation before impact. No evidence was found of any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Toxicology testing revealed the pilot's use of multiple psychoactive substances including marijuana, venlafaxine, amphetamine, pseudoephedrine, clonazepam, and pheniramine. The wide variety of psychoactive effects of these medications precludes predicting the specific effects of their use in combination. However, it is likely that the pilot was impaired by the effects of the combination of psychoactive substances he was using and that those effects contributed to his loss of control. The investigation was unable to obtain medical records regarding any underlying neuropsychiatric disease(s); therefore, whether these may have contributed to the accident circumstances could not be determined.

After exiting the clouds during the landing approach at the uncontrolled airport, the private pilot of the small jet canceled his instrument flight plan with air traffic control. He stated that, although there was no precipitation when he exited the clouds, he suspected the runway may be icy due to the weather conditions. The pilot saw an airplane holding short on the taxiway at the end of the runway and assumed it was preparing to takeoff, which he stated led him to believe that the runway condition was good. Although the pilot announced his location and intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), he did not inquire about the runway condition via CTAF/UNICOM. Witnesses reported that the approach looked normal. After touchdown, the pilot applied brakes and realized he had no braking action. He subsequently retracted the speed brakes, spoilers, and flaps, and added takeoff power. The airplane yawed to the left and the pilot reduced engine power to idle while applying rudder to correct the airplane's track. The airplane continued off the runway, where it traveled through a fence and across a road before coming to rest inverted. The pilot and mechanic seated in the airplane that was holding short of the runway during the landing reported that they were only taxiing to a maintenance facility and did not intend to take off. They reported that the taxiways were icy. A witness who assisted the pilot following the accident reported that the roads at the time were covered in ice and "very slick." Recorded data from the airplane showed that the pilot flew a stabilized approach and that the airplane touched down near the approach end of the runway; however, given the icy runway conditions, the airplane's landing distance required exceeded the available runway by more than 8,000 ft. Airport personnel had not issued a NOTAM regarding the icy runway conditions. The airport manager stated he was not at the airport at the time of the accident, and that he was still trying to learn the new digital NOTAM manager system. The employee who was at the airport was authorized to issue NOTAMs, but had not yet been trained on the new system.

The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.

According to the pilot, during the landing roll, the airplane "began to drift sharply to the left." The pilot reported that, although there were no wind gusts reported, he felt as though a wind gust was pushing the airplane to the left. He attempted to maintain directional control with rudder pedal application, and he applied full right aileron. The airplane continued to drift to the left, and the pilot attempted to abort the landing by applying full throttle and 25° of flaps. He reported that the airplane continued to drift to the left and that he was not able to achieve sufficient airspeed to rotate. The airplane exited the runway, the pilot pulled the throttle to idle, and he applied the brakes to avoid obstacles. However, the airplane impacted the runway and taxiway signage and came to rest in a drainage culvert. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings. The published METAR for the accident airport reported that the wind was from 290° at 15 knots, and wind gusts exceeded 22 knots 1 hour before and 1 hour after the accident. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 20. The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for the airplane was 17 knots. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The private pilot obtained a full weather briefing before departing on a long cross-country flight. The destination airport was forecast to be under visual meteorological conditions, but there was an AIRMET and Center Weather Advisory (CWA) issued for low instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions later that day. The briefer told the pilot to check the weather again en route to see if the AIRMET and CWA had been updated. At the time the pilot stopped for fuel, another CWA was issued for low IFR conditions at his destination airport; however, there were no records to indicate that the pilot obtained this information during the fuel stop or after departing on the last leg of the flight. A review of air traffic control communications revealed that, about 10 minutes before arriving at the airport, the pilot reported that he had obtained the current weather conditions at his destination airport. The most recent observation, about 1 hour before the accident indicated good visibility; however, the weather reporting equipment did not provide ceiling heights. It is unknown if the pilot obtained weather information from nearby airports, which were reporting low instrument meteorological conditions (visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile and ceilings 200-300 ft above ground level [agl]). Additionally, three pilot reports (PIREPs) describing the poor weather conditions were filed within the hour before the accident. The controller did not relay the PIREPs or the CWA information to the pilot, so the pilot was likely unaware of the deteriorating conditions. Based on radar information and statements from witnesses, the pilot's approach to the airport was unstabilized. He descended below the minimum descent altitude of 440 ft, and, after breaking through the fog about 100 ft agl, the airplane reentered the fog and completed a 360° right turn near the approach end of the runway, during which its altitude varied from 100 ft to 300 ft. The airplane then climbed to an altitude about 800 ft before radar contact was lost near the accident site. The airplane came to rest inverted, consistent with one witness's statement that it descended through the clouds in a spin before impact; post accident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument experience could not be established. The circumstances of the accident, including the restricted visibility conditions and the pilot's maneuvering of the airplane before the impact, are consistent with a spatial disorientation event. It is likely that the pilot experienced a loss of control due to spatial disorientation, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin.

Shortly after takeoff from Lanseria Airport Runway 07, en route to Bazaruto Island in Mozambique, the pilot encountered engine problems. He contacted ATC and was cleared for an immediate return and landing on runway 25. On short final, the single engine airplane hit the perimeter fence and crashed near the runway threshold, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire. Built in 1975, this Cessna 402B was equipped with a new turbo engine and redesigned as a single engine Cessna (DMI) Falcon 402 (the C402 is usually a twin engine aircraft).

The commercial pilot of the jet reported that he initially requested that 100 lbs of fuel be added to both fuel tanks. During the subsequent preflight inspection, the pilot decided that more fuel was needed, so he requested that the airplane's fuel tanks be topped off with fuel. However, he did not confirm the fuel levels or check the fuel gauges before takeoff. He departed on the flight and did not check the fuel gauges until about 1 hour after takeoff. He stated that, at that time, the fuel gauges were showing about 900-1,000 lbs of fuel per side, and he realized that the fuel tanks had not been topped off as requested. He reduced engine power to conserve fuel and to increase the airplane's flight endurance while he continued to his destination. When the fuel gauges showed about 400-500 lbs of fuel per side, the low fuel lights for both wing fuel tanks illuminated. The pilot reported to air traffic control that the airplane was low on fuel and diverted the flight to the nearest airport. The pilot reported that the airplane was high and fast on the visual approach for landing. He misjudged the height above the ground and later stated that the airplane "landed very hard." The airplane's left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered off the runway, resulting in substantial damage to the left wing. The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The twin engine aircraft departed Madrid-Cuatro Vientos Airport on a private flight to Cascais, Portugal, carrying three passengers and one pilot. One of the reasons for the flight was to repair the weather radar at a Portuguese maintenance center that specialized in this equipment. The pilot had to delay the takeoff until 1557LT due to bad weather conditions. The aerodrome of Cuatros Vietnos was in instrument conditions (IMC), which forced its closing from 0900LT until 1444LT. At 1615LT, the aircraft was en route, climbing from flight level 190 to its authorized cruise level of 210. Moments later, according to a detailed analysis of the data taken from the radar, there was a yaw to the left, and the aircraft started to turn in this direction and suddenly lose altitude. After this event, the airspeed fell quickly and gradually until the aircraft stalled. The aircraft went into a spin, which after some time turned into a flat spin. As the airplane descended out of control, and with the spin fully developped, loads were placed on the horizontal tail that exceeded the design loads, causing the tail to break up in flight into five parts before the aircraft impacted the ground. The aircraft was completely destroyed by the impact and sibsequent fire, and its four occupants were killed in the accident.