Private

The pilot reported that, while conducting a night landing on a runway contaminated with ice and patchy packed snow, the airplane overshot the touchdown zone. The pilot tried to fly the airplane onto the runway to avoid floating. The airplane touched down firm and the pilot applied moderate braking, but the airplane did not decelerate normally. The airplane went off the end of the runway and collided with several Runway End Identifier Lights (REILs) and a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. The pilot reported that he did not feel modulation in the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and felt that might have contributed to the accident. An examination of fault codes from the airplane’s diagnostic storage unit indicated no ABS malfunctions or failures. An airport employee reported that he saw the airplane unusually high on the final approach and during the landing the airplane floated or stayed in ground effect before it touched down beyond the midpoint of the runway. The airplane’s long touchdown was captured by an airport surveillance video, which is included in the report docket.

The twin engine airplane departed Marseille-Provence Airport on a private flight to Annecy. En route, while cruising at FL110, the pilot was informed about the weather conditions at destination with a braking coefficient considered as medium due to a wet runway. After being cleared to land on runway 04, the pilot continued the approach but landed half way down the runway at a speed of 119 knots. After touchdown, he initiated the braking procedure but the airplane suffered an aquaplaning and was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, impacted an embankment, went trough a fence and came to rest on a road. While both passengers aged 26 and 28 were slightly injured, the pilot aged 70 was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

After takeoff from Rottweil-Zepfenhan Airport, while climbing, the crew encountered technical problems. The pilot reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located in Dauchingen, about 15 km southwest of Rottweil Airport. The aircraft landed gear down but and eventually came to rest on a path with its undercarriage and both wings partially torn off. Both occupants were slightly injured.

The copilot, who was seated in the right seat, reported that after an uneventful run-up and taxi, the pilot, who was seated in the left seat, initiated the takeoff. The airplane remained on the runway past the point at which takeoff should have occurred and the copilot observed the pilot attempting to pull back on the control yoke but it would not move. The copilot then also attempted to pull back on the control yoke but was also unsuccessful. Observing that the end of the runway was nearing, the copilot aborted the takeoff by reducing the throttle to idle and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the runway into rough and marshy terrain, where it came to rest partially submerged in water. Postaccident examination of the airplane and flight controls found no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Specifically, examination of the elevator flight control rigging, in addition to functional checks of the elevator, confirmed continuity and normal function. Additionally, the flight control lock was found on the floor near the rudder pedals on the left side of the cockpit. Due to a head injury sustained during the accident, the pilot was unable to recall most of the events that transpired during the accident. The pilot did state that he typically removed the control lock during the preflight inspection and that he would place it in his flight bag. He thought that a shoulder injury may have led to the control lock missing the flight bag, and why it was found behind the rudder pedals after the accident. Review and analysis of a video that captured the airplane during its taxi to the runway showed that the elevator control position was similar to what it would be with the control lock installed. While the pilot and copilot reported that they did not observe the control lock installed during the takeoff, the position of the elevator observed on the video, the successful postaccident functional test of elevator, and the unsecured flight control lock being located behind the pilot’s rudder pedals after the accident suggest that the control anomaly experienced by the pilots may have been a result of the control lock remaining inadvertently installed and overlooked by both pilots prior to the takeoff. According to the airframe manufacturer’s preflight and before takeoff checklists, the flight control lock must be removed during preflight, prior to engine start and taxi, and the flight controls must be checked prior to takeoff. Regardless of why the elevator control would not move during the takeoff, a positive flight control check prior to the takeoff should have detected any such anomaly. It is likely that the pilot failed to conduct a flight control check prior to takeoff. Further, the pilot failed to abort the takeoff at the first indication that there was a problem. Although delayed, the copilot’s decision to take control of the airplane and abort the takeoff likely mitigated the potential for more severe injury to the occupants and damage to the airplane.

On the morning of the day of the accident, the pilot, accompanied by a passenger, flew under IFR flight mode from La Môle (83) to Quiberon (56). The flight took 3 hours and 40 minutes and the return was scheduled in the afternoon. After landing in Quiberon, the pilot learned that there was no possibility to refuel with AVGAS, information that was not specified by NOTAM. The pilot then decided to refuel at Vannes-Meucon Airport before leaving to St Tropez-La Môle. He said he was upset by this situation and by the bad weather conditions in the area. During the pre-flight visit to Quiberon, the pilot added oil. He indicates that he also carried out a pre-flight inspection before takeoff from Vannes. During the takeoff roll from runway 22 at Vannes-Meucon Airport, the rotation took place in the first third of the runway. Just after liftoff, he saw the engine cowling open. He immediately thaught he forgot to tighten the dipstick and decided to abort the takeoff and landed on the remaining runway. The runway being long, he believed he can stop before the runway end. He put the power levers in the "full, reduced and choke" position and tried to land the plane quickly. As the aircraft already reached a high speed, it landed 200 metres short of runway end and deviated longitudinally and crossed the runway end safety area, known as RESA. It came to a stop a 100 metres further on an embankment. The left wing was partially torn off and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. There was no fire. Both occupants escaped uninjured.

On October 2, 2020, about 1512 central daylight time (CDT), a Piper PA-46-500TP, N62ZM, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lake Elmo, Minnesota. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff from runway 32 at the Lake Elmo airport (21D) and following landing gear retraction, he noticed a “hiccup” in the engine power and immediately started a turn back towards the airport. During the turn, all engine power was lost and the pilot executed a forced landing into a field of standing corn. The airplane impacted the terrain, bounced, and came to rest upright in the corn about ½ mile northwest of the departure end of runway 32. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing as a result of the impact and post-crash fire. The airplane was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney PT6A turboprop engine.

The airplane was in cruise flight at FL280 when the instrument-rated pilot failed to contact air traffic control (ATC) following a frequency change assignment. After about 25 minutes, and when 30 miles east of the destination airport, the pilot contacted ATC on a frequency other than the one that was assigned. He requested the instrument landing system (ILS) approach at his intended destination, and the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 8,000 ft and to expect vectors for the ILS approach at the destination airport. The controller asked the pilot if everything was “okay,” to which the pilot replied, “yes sir, everything is fine.” The controller then observed the airplane initiate a descent. About 2 minutes later, the controller asked the pilot where he was headed, and the pilot provided a garbled response. The controller instructed the pilot to stop his descent at 10,000 ft, followed by an instruction to stop the descent at any altitude. The pilot did not respond, and additional attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful. The airplane impacted terrain in a heavily wooded area 17 miles from the destination airport. Rhe aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were fatally injured.

After takeoff from Guaymaral-Flaminio Suárez Camacho Airport runway 29, while climbing to a height of 200 feet, the engine suffered and explosion and lost power. The airplane started to descend, impacted a brick wall and lost its undercarriage. It then crash landed in a prairie and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All five occupants escaped uninjured. The accident occurred three minutes after takeoff.

While in cruise flight at 19,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot declared an emergency to air traffic control and stated that the airplane had lost engine power and that he needed to divert. The pilot elected to divert to an airport that was about 5 miles south of his position. Archived automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data and commercially available flight track data showed that a descent was initiated from 19,000 ft and the airplane proceeded directly to, and circled around, the airport one time while descending. The last data point showed the airplane at 1,250 ft msl (about 750 ft above ground level) and about 1 mile north of the approach end of the runway. From the cruise altitude of 19,000ft until the last data point, about 12 minutes and 45 seconds had elapsed, which equated to an average descent rate of about 1,392ft per minute. Witnesses located about 1/4 mile south of the end of the runway on a miniature golf course noticed the propeller on the airplane was not turning. They stated that they saw the airplane in a “really hard” left bank; the nose of the airplane dropped, and it impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. The airplane came to rest along a road about 200 ft south of the airport property. The airplane impacted the terrain in a nose low, near vertical attitude and sustained substantial damage to fuselage and both wings. It is likely that, based on the location of the runway, relative to the miniature golf course, the pilot initiated the left bank to avoid bystanders on the ground and inadvertently exceeded the wing’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. The airplane was equipped with an engine trend monitor (ETM), which captured various events concerning the accident flight, including engine start, operating limit exceedances, and power checks. The ETM captured a power check while the airplane was at 19,100 ft. About 3 minutes 32 seconds later, an engine off event was recorded. The ETM further captured a logon message, which was consistent with the power being cycled, at an altitude of 3,542 ft, 9 minutes, 52 seconds later. The ETM did not record any start attempts between the logged engine off event and when power was lost to the unit. A postaccident examination of the airframe, engine, and accessories did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although it cannot be determined whether a restart attempt would have been successful, the data were consistent with a restart not being attempted. Both the engine failure and power off landing checklists contained instructions for the pilot to establish the airspeed at 90 knots; however, when the winds aloft were applied to the reported groundspeeds, it was evident this did not occur. Furthermore, the power off landing checklist instructed the pilot to be about 1,500 ft above the airport on the downwind leg; however, data indicate that the airplane was about 5,000 ft above the airport on the downwind leg. The rapid descent from 5,000 ft on the downwind leg to about 750 ft above ground level on the final leg resulted in an unstabilized approach.

While the airplane was in cruise flight and being flown by the copilot, the left engine fuel pressure fluctuated, which was followed by a brief loss of engine power. Concerned that the airplane might have a failed engine-driven fuel pump, the pilot turned the boost pumps to high and asked the passenger (the airplane’s mechanic) to open the fuel cross-feed valve. As the airplane approached its intended destination, both fuel pressure needles began to fluctuate. The pilot assumed that fuel starvation to the engines was occurring and decided to make an off-airport landing to a field behind their airplane’s position due to residential areas located between the airplane’s location and the airport. The pilot stated that he took control of the airplane from the copilot and initiated a right turn toward the field, and that, shortly afterward, both engines lost total power. During the landing roll, the pilot observed a ditch in front of the airplane and was able to get the airplane airborne briefly to avoid the first ditch; however, he was not able to avoid a second, larger ditch. Subsequently, the airplane struck the second ditch, became airborne, and impacted the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage. Recovery company personnel reported that, during recovery of the wreckage, about 1 gallon of fuel was removed from the two forward and the two aft wing fuel tanks. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any pre-existing anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of either engine except that all four main fuel tank fuel gauges displayed erroneous indications after each tank was filled with water. No leaks were observed throughout the fuel system. The airplane was last refueled on the day before the accident with 497.7 gallons. When the airplane was last refueled, the fuel tanks were reportedly filled to about 3 inches below the fuel filler neck. The investigation could not determine, based on the available evidence for this accident, how much of the airplane’s fuel load (maximum capacity was 670 gallons) the airplane had onboard after it was refueled. Additionally, the pilot reported that he commonly used a fuel burn rate of 150 gallons per hour for flight planning purposes; that figure included takeoff fuel burn. Recorded automatic dependent surveillance broadcast data showed that the airplane had flown for 4 hours 1 minute since refueling and included six takeoffs and five landings (but did not include taxi times). As part of the investigation, the pilot estimated that 485.9 gallons of fuel had been used since the last refueling. However, on the basis of the pilot’s initial planned fuel load and recorded flight times, the airplane would have used about 600 gallons of fuel. The pilot later submitted an estimated fuel burn for the flights since refueling of 485.9 gallons. The flight manual did not have fuel burn references for the exact power settings and altitudes flown; thus, the hourly fuel burn could not be determined. The pilot, copilot, and passenger did not visually verify the fuel levels in all four main fuel tanks before the accident flight. The pilot also underestimated the amount of fuel that would be used for the planned flights. As a result, fuel exhaustion occurred, which led to a total loss of engine power.