Private

According to the pilot, during the takeoff roll from the 5,000-ft-long runway, after reaching an airspeed of 90 knots, the airplane’s acceleration slowed. The airplane reached a maximum airspeed of about 92 knots, which was below the planned rotation speed of 100 knots. The pilot elected to abort the takeoff with about 1,500 ft of remaining runway. He reduced the power to idle and initiated maximum braking. The pilot stated that he did not sense the airplane slowing down but observed tire marks on the runway postaccident that were consistent with braking. The airplane continued off the end of the runway and collided with a fence before coming to a stop. All of the occupants exited the airplane safely, and a post-crash fire ensued. Examination of the runway revealed tire skid marks that began 1,200 ft from the runway end and continued into the grass leading to the airplane. An examination of the airplane revealed that the entire cockpit and cabin areas were destroyed by fire. The engines did not display evidence of a catastrophic failure but were otherwise unable to be examined in more detail due to the degree of fire damage. The parking brake control was found in the off position. All hydraulic brake lines were destroyed by fire, and the main landing gear sustained fire and impact damage. Although the tire marks on the runway indicated that some braking action took place, the extensive fire damage precluded a detailed examination of the braking system, and there was insufficient evidence to determine the reason for the runway excursion.

The non-instrument-rated pilot departed on a cross-country flight. Radar track data revealed the airplane traveled on a relatively straight course to the northeast for about 32 minutes. Near the end of the flight track data, the track showed an increasingly tight left spiraling turn near the accident site. The airplane impacted steep sloping terrain, and a postimpact fire ensued. As a result of the impact, the airplane was segmented into several sections. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The attitude indicator instrument was disassembled, and the vacuum-powered rotor and housing revealed rotational scoring damage, indicating the instrument vacuum system was operational at the time of the accident. The investigation found no evidence indicating the pilot checked the weather or received weather information before departure. The surrounding weather reporting stations near the accident site reported wind conditions with peak gusts up to 47 knots around the time of the accident. The pilot likely encountered mountain wave activity with severe turbulence, which resulted in loss of control of the airplane and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to obtain a preflight weather briefing, which would have alerted him to the presence of hazardous strong winds and turbulent conditions. Postmortem toxicology testing of the pilot’s lung and muscle tissue samples detected several substances that are mentally and physically impairing individually and even more so in combination for performing hazardous and complex tasks. However, blood concentrations are needed to determine the level of impairment, and no blood samples for the pilot were available. While the pilot was taking potentially impairing medications and likely had conditions that would influence decision making and reduce performance, without blood concentrations, it was not possible to determine whether the potentially impairing combination of medications degraded his ability to safely operate the airplane.

The flight crew was conducting a flight with two passengers and one flight attendant onboard the multiengine jet airplane. The flight crew later stated that at rotation speed, the captain applied back pressure to the control yoke; however, the nose did not rotate to a takeoff attitude. The captain attempted to rotate the airplane once more by relaxing the yoke then pulling it back again, and, with no change in the airplane’s attitude, he made the decision to reject the takeoff by retarding the thrust levers and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway onto a gravel pad where the landing gear collapsed. Continuity was confirmed from the flight controls to the control surfaces. No mechanical anomalies with the engines or airplane systems were noted during the investigation that would have precluded normal operation. A review of performance data indicated that the flight crew attempted to takeoff with the airplane 2,975 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), a center of gravity (CG) close to the most forward limit, and an incorrect stabilizer trim setting. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data indicated that the captain attempted takeoff at a rotation speed 23 knots (kts) slower than the calculated rotation speed for the airplane at maximum weight. Takeoff performance showed the departure runway was 575 ft shorter than the distance required for takeoff at the airplane’s weight. The captain, who was the pilot flying, did not hold any valid pilot certificates at the time of the accident because they had been revoked 2 years prior due to his falsification of logbook entries and records. Additionally, he had never held a type rating for the accident airplane and had started, but not completed, training in the accident airplane model before the accident. The first officer had accumulated about 16 hours of flight experience in the make and model of the airplane and was not authorized to operate as pilot-in-command. The airplane’s flight management system (FMS) data were not recovered; therefore, it could not be determined what data the flight crew entered into the FMS that allowed the airspeed numbers to be generated. The investigation revealed that had the actual performance numbers been entered, a “FIELD LIMITED” amber message would have illuminated warning the crew that the MTOW was exceeded, and airspeed numbers would not have been generated. Therefore, it is likely that the crew entered incorrect data into the FMS either by manually entering a longer runway length and/or decreased the weight of the fuel, passengers, and/or cargo.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight and was beginning an instrument flight rules approach from the south. Weather conditions at the destination airport included a ceiling between 800 and 1,000 ft and light rime icing conditions in clouds; the pilot was aware of these conditions. Elevated, wooded terrain existed along the final approach course. Radar and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data revealed that the airplane crossed the intermediate approach fix at the correct altitude; however, the pilot descended the airplane below the final approach fix altitude about 4 miles before the fix. The airplane continued in a gradual descent until radar contact was lost. No distress calls were received from the airplane before the accident. The airplane crashed on a north-northwesterly heading about 5 miles south of the runway threshold. The elevation at the accident site was about 1,880 ft, which was about 900 ft higher than the airport elevation. Postaccident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of a pre-existing mechanical failure or anomaly that would have precluded normal operation. Because of the weather conditions at the time of the final approach, the pilot likely attempted to fly the airplane under the weather to visually acquire the runway. The terrain along the final approach course would have been obscured in low clouds at the time, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.

The pilot reported that, while descending through clouds and beginning the instrument approach, some ice accumulated on the wings and he actuated the deice boots twice. The pilot saw the deice boots functioning normally on the wings and could not see the tail; however, the elevator began to shake, and he lost elevator control. The pilot applied forward pressure on the yoke and had to trim nose-down to avoid a stall. There were no cockpit caution indications and the pilot had disengaged the autopilot before descent. The airplane descended through the clouds and impacted a tree before coming to rest upright in a grass area. Postaccident examination of the wreckage, including component testing of the deice system, did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The flap jackscrew position suggested that the flaps were likely in transit between 0° and 10° flap extension at the time of impact. Review of radar data revealed that, during the 2 minutes before the accident, the airplane’s groundspeed averaged about 82 knots; or an approximate average airspeed of 94 knots when accounting for the winds aloft. Current weather observations and forecast weather products indicated that the airplane was likely operating in an area where moderate and potentially greater structural icing conditions prevailed, and where there was the potential for the presence of supercooled liquid droplets. Review of the pilot operating handbook for the airplane revealed that the minimum speed for flight in icing conditions was 130 knots indicated airspeed. It is likely that the pilot’s failure to maintain an appropriate speed for flight in icing conditions resulted in insufficient airflow over the ice contaminated elevator and the subsequent loss of elevator control.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Tapachula Airport in the early morning. In unknown circumstances, the twin engine aircraft crashed in a prairie located near an agricultural sector in Comitán de Domínguez. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was injured.

The pilot reported that, during the initial climbout, about 1,000 ft above ground level, one of the engines stopped producing power. He confirmed that all engine controls were full forward and the main fuel tanks were selected. Immediately thereafter, the remaining engine began to surge, then stopped producing power. He established best glide speed and looked for an area to perform a forced landing. The airplane crashed into a solid waste disposal facility, about 2.3 nautical miles northwest of the departure airport. First responders arrived immediately after the accident and found only a trace amount of fuel within the confines of the accident site or in the fuel tanks. The only postaccident fire was centered on a small, localized area near the right engine turbocharger. Both main fuel tanks were empty, and the auxiliary bladder tanks were ruptured by impact forces. Examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or anomaly. A surveillance video showed no evidence of smoke or mist training the airplane seconds prior to impact. The pilot reported that he departed the airport with 112 gallons of fuel on board. The pilot did not provide evidence of the latest refueling when requested by investigators. The available evidence is consistent with a total loss of engine power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion.

During the first 15 minutes of the flight, the pilot of the complex, high performance, jet airplane appeared to have difficulty maintaining the headings and altitudes assigned by air traffic controllers, and throughout the flight, responded intermittently to controller instructions. After reaching an altitude of 27,000 ft, the airplane began to deviate about 30° right of course while continuing to climb. The controller alerted the pilot, who did not respond, and the airplane continued to climb. Two minutes later, the airplane entered a tight, spiraling descent that lasted 8 minutes until the airplane impacted the ground at high speed in a rightwing-low attitude. The airplane was highly fragmented on impact; however, examination did not reveal any evidence of structural failure, in-flight fire, a bird strike, or a cabin depressurization event, and both engines appeared to be producing power at impact. Although the 72-year-old private pilot had extensive flight experience in multiple types of aircraft, including jets, he did not hold a type rating in the accident airplane, and the accident flight was likely the first time he had flown it solo. He had received training in the airplane about two months before the accident but was not issued a type rating and left before the training was complete. During the training, he struggled significantly in high workload environments and had difficulty operating the airplane’s avionics suite, which had recently been installed. He revealed to a fellow pilot that he preferred to “hand fly” the airplane rather than use the autopilot. The airplane’s heading and flight path before the spiraling descent were consistent with the pilot not using the autopilot; however, review of the flight path during the spiraling descent indicated that the speed variations appeared to closely match the airplane’s open loop phugoid response as documented during manufacturer flight tests; therefore, it is likely that the pilot was not manipulating the controls during that time.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Flandes-Santiago Vila Airport runway 02 at 1257LT on a flight to Guaymaral in Bogotá. En route, weather conditions worsened and the visibility was poor. While cruising at an altitude of 9,260 feet, the twin engine airplane impacted trees and crashed in a wooded and hilly terrain located near Bojacá. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and the pilot was killed.

After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.