Positioning

The aircraft, a Gates Learjet 24B, modified by a Howard/Raisebach Mark II conversion, was cleared for takeoff on runway 28L. Tower personnel estimated that the aircraft rotated for takeoff at 3,200 feet down the runway and was at approximately 200 feet agl when the pilot was instructed to contact departure control. Witnesses observed the aircraft climbing in a wings level attitude when it entered the broken cloud layer at about 600 feet agl. Moments later, the aircraft was observed descending out of the clouds at a steep angle and in a left wing low/nose down attitude. The aircraft impacted between runway 28L and 28R, approximately 10,000 feet from the approach ends. Witnesses reported that the engines sounded like they were operating at a high power setting. An exam of the engines revealed evidence that both were at or above 92% power at impact. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found. Records revealed two autopilot discrepancies on 10/4/84; one induced the roll mode was sensitive; the other induced the autopilot intermittently rolled the aircraft into a standard rate left bank when engaged. Reportedly, the autopilot would not have been used for takeoff. All three occupants were killed.

During arrival, the flight was cleared for an ILS/DME approach to runway 27. While on the approach, the aircraft crashed in the ocean about 2.7 miles east of the runway threshold. The pilot reported that he was making the approach, using instruments, and landed short for unknown reasons. He received a serious head injury, but was rescued by fishermen who heard the aircraft crash and went to where they heard the voices of the victims in the fog. The 0835 weather at Boston was in part: partial obscuration, 25,000 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility with fog and haze, wind from 140° at 7 knots. Other pilots reported low ceilings and a fog bank in the vicinity of the crash site. The captain survived while the copilot died.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard and bounced three times. On the third impact, the aircraft recorded a positive aerodynamic force of 5,8 g that caused the fuselage to break in two between sections 737 and 756. All five crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.

This aircraft disappeared on a flight from Fort Lauderdale, FL to Bimini, Bahamas. After departure, the aircraft flight plan was activated by radio. This was the last communication with the aircraft. An itap radar readout revealed an aircraft flight that departed at the appropriate time. This target headed for Bimini, and after about 10 minutes, slowed to 90 knots airspeed. About 4 minutes later the target entered a 5,400 fpm rate of descent and disappeared off radar. Two witnesses saw an aircraft crash into the water near Bimini between 0830 and 0900 on 3/31. The missing aircraft departed Fort Lauderdale at 0823 on 3/31/84. Th aircraft and all six occupants were not recovered. The injury index and acft damage are presumed.

On final approach to Copenhagen-Kastrup following a positioning flight from Luton, both engines failed. The aircraft stalled and crashed into the sea about 4 km offshore. The pilot, sole on board, was rescued while the aircraft sank and was lost.

The aircraft was on a flight from the El Paso Intl Airport to the West Texas Airport. A hard landing was made causing all three landing gear to collapse, folded the left wing aft just inboard of the engine and twisted the entire right wing about 30° leading edge down. According to the pilot the aircraft was flown with 30° of flaps on downwind and 47° of flaps on base. He also reported that both airspeed indicators were stuck at 110 knots. According to photographs taken by an unidentified party, the flaps were in the up position in the pattern and during touchdown. Touchdown was made with the right main gear off the right side of the rwy. The aircraft wheel track is only 4 feet less than the width of the runway. The pilot did not have a type rating nor authorization in lieu of a type rating for the 15 minutes ferry flight. The pilot had 4,140 hours copilot time in the aircraft, during which he had never landed the aircraft.

After transporting passengers from Longview, TX to Oklahoma City, OK and return to Longview, the aircraft was refueled for a flight back to Nacogdoches, TX, where the aircraft was based. About 12 min after takeoff, the pilot was cleared for an NDB approach to Nacogdoches and instructed to contact the Lufkin FSS for weather and current altimeter setting. During the NDB approach, the aircraft collided with trees, crashed and burned. An investigation revealed no evidence of either an engine or airframe failure or malfunction. Initial impact occurred with trees about 700 yards east of the NDB site. Initially, trees were cut in an upsloping manner where the terrain sloped upwards. Elevation of the crash site was 530 feet msl. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 900 feet msl. About 28 miles north, the 1955 cdt weather at Lufkin was, in part: 3,500 feet broken, visibility 5 miles. However, witnesses at Nacogdoches reported considerably lower ceilings, reduced visibility and some hilltops obscured by clouds. A pilot witness reported light rain, fog in the treetops. Reportedly, the airport was below minimums. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot was completing a positioning flight from Mora to Gävle. En route, while flying in marginal weather conditions over the Borlänge area, the pilot misinterpreted instruments settings and started a descent to the Borlänge-Dala Airport while he was supposed to land at Gävle-Sandviken Airport located about 85 km east of its actual position. Due to poor visibility, he was unable to locate the airport. Following two missed approaches, the twin engine airplane struck a hill and crashed about 4 km south of Borlänge. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft crashed into the side of a mountain ridge during a VFR attempt to land at an airport with no instrument approach. The mountain ridge was obscured by broken clouds. The pilot had cancelled his IFR clearance, and during the descent to the airport, he had descended below clouds near the airport with clouds still obscuring some of the terrain. One mile visibility was a requirement for the VFR approach. According to witness statements, the aircraft continued to remain below the clouds and the pilot continued the approach even though he was not properly positioned to make a successful landing. The pilot had a partial occlusion of a coronary artery, but its relationship to the accident was not determined. The aircraft impacted at about 6,250 feet msl. The field elevation is 5,315 feet msl. The accident site was about 2 1/2 mi from the airport. The airport was located in a mountain valley about 1 to 1.25 mi wide. Also, the airport and surrounding terrain were covered with snow. Both pilots were killed.

At 2015 the flight contacted ARTCC and requested Dubuque weather. They were advised that Dubuque was 500 feet indefinite ceiling, sky obscured, visibility 1/2 mi fog and they would be vectored for a back course runway 13 approach. The flight then requested the front course approach to runway 31 and the controller advised the flight that it would be vectored to the ILS front course approach to runway 31. Approximately 40 seconds later the flight advised the controller that it would take the back course approach to runway 13. The landing minima for a straight-in ILS runway 31 is 1/2 mile visibility and for a straight-in LOC/DME back course approach to runway 13 3/4 mile visibility. The aircraft's wreckage was found in a valley about 3/4 mile short of runway 13 and approximately 100 feet below the runway elevation about two days after the crash. Both occupants were killed.