Executive/Corporate/Business

The flight was climbing from 5,000 to 10,000 feet and the pilot obtained a maximum altitude of 6,300 feet. The airplane then began to lose altitude and deviate off course. The pilot declared a mayday and reported the airplane was in a spin. Several witnesses near the accident site reported hearing airplane engine noises and seeing the airplane descend from the clouds in a nose-down spiral to the ground. Two AIRMETs were valid at the time of the accident and included the accident location: "AIRMET TANGO update 3 for turbulence ... . Occasional moderate turbulence below a flight level of 18,000 feet due to wind shear ... ." "AIRMET ZULU update 2 for ice and freezing level ... . Occasional moderate rime and/or mixed icing in clouds and precipitation below 8,000 feet." Two pilots who departed in separate Beech 200 airplanes about the time of the accident airplane stated they encountered "moderate rime" icing between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, and one pilot reported instrument meteorological conditions and light turbulence between 1,800 to 6,000 feet. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of airframe or engine malfunction. The de-ice ejector flow control valves for the left wing, right wing, and empennage pneumatic boots were removed for examination, and all valves functioned when power was supplied.

While on descent, the pilot reported that the airplane's left engine had lost power. He secured the left engine, and when he added power to the right engine, he believed it was not developing full power. He could not maintain altitude and elected to perform a forced landing in an open field. The airplane touched down long and with excessive speed on to the field striking trees, power lines and collided with the ground. A maintenance action entry in the aircraft's maintenance logbook indicate that the wing tip fuel tanks had the drain valve o-rings removed and replaced on the day before the accident. The maintenance entry states wing tip tanks were empty. The pilot stated he elected not to fuel either one of the wing tip tanks, due to the fact that maintenance was performed on them and did not select fuel from the wing tip tanks on the day of the accident. Excerpts from Airworthiness Directive (AD) 83-23-1, which is applicable to the accident airplane, states "This is a tip-tanked aircraft. Tip-tanks are to be filled first-used last. Before take-off check both main and tip-tank contents". AD 83-23-1 instructs to place a placard in clear view of the pilot on the instrument panel referring to the protocol of fueling and takeoff processors with regards to fuel tank contents. The mechanic who perform the maintenance to the wing tip tanks stated the placard was installed and in plain view of the pilot. The pilot stated he fueled the airplane with 50 gallons of aviation gasoline for a total of 90 gallons in both main tanks for the flight to Culebra from Ponce. The pilot went on to state prior to the return flight to Ponce from Culebra he checked his fuel quantity, which indicated he had 35 gallons in each main fuel tank for a total of 70 gallons aboard the airplane before departure. Fuel samples from both the FAA and the port authorities from the facility where the airplane was fueled for the flight showed no contamination as per the FAA Inspector statement.

The airplane was en route to an air show and was making a refueling stop. The tower controller cleared the pilot to land. The airplane was observed on a 3-mile straight-in final approach when it began a left turn. The controller asked the pilot what his intentions were. The pilot replied, "We just lost our left engine." The pilot then reported that he wasn't going to make it to the airport. Witnesses observed the airplane flying "low to the ground and under-speed for [a] good 4 minutes." The right propeller was turning, but the left propeller was not turning. There was no fire or smoke coming from the left engine. The pilot was "obviously trying to pull up." The airplane "dipped hard left," then struck the ground left wing first. It slid through a chain link fence, struck a parked automobile, and collided with a school bus wash barn. The ensuing fire destroyed the airplane, parked car, and wash barn. Disassembly and examination of both engines disclosed no anomalies that would have been causal or contributory to the accident. According to the Airplane Flight Manual, "Maximum power will probably be required to maintain flight with one engine inoperative. Maximum power at slow air speed may cause loss of directional control."

A review of communications between Mobile Downtown Control Tower, and the pilot revealed that while on approach the pilot reported having a problem. The Ground Controller reported that he had the airplane in sight and cleared the flight to land on runway 18. The pilot stated that he had a "run away engine", and elected to shut down the engine and continued the approach. The Controller then cleared the pilot again to runway 18. The pilot then stated that he did not think that he was going to "make it." The airplane collided with a utility pole and the ground and burst into flames short of the runway. The post-accident examination of the engine found that the fuel control unit arm to the fuel control unit interconnect rod end connection was separated from the rod end swivel ball assembly. The swivel ball assembly was found improperly attached to the inboard side of the arm, with the bolt head facing inboard, instead of outboard, and the washer and nut attached to the arm's outboard side instead of the inboard side. The rod separation would resulted in a loss of power lever control. The published emergency procedures for "Power Lever Control Lose," states; If minimum power obtained is excessive: 1) reduce airspeed by setting airplane in nose-up attitude at IAS < 178 KIAS. 2) "inert Sep" switch--On. 3) if ITT >800 C "Inert Sep"--Off. 4) Landing Gear Control--Down. 5) Flaps--Takeoff. 6) Establish a long final or an ILS approach respecting IAS < 178 KIAS. 7) When runway is assured: Condition Lever to --Cut Off. 8) Propeller Governor Lever to-- Feather. 9) Flaps --Landing as required (at IAS <122 KIAS). 10) Land Normally without reverse. 11) Braking as required. The pilot stated to Mobile Downtown Control Tower, Ground Control that he had a "run away engine" and that he "had to shut down the engine". As a result of the pilot not following the published emergency procedures, the airplane was unable to reach the runway during the emergency.

During a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight from North Bend, Oregon, to Grants Pass, Oregon, the airplane collided with mountainous terrain approximately seven miles northwest of the pilot's planned destination. Weather data and witness reports outlined areas of low ceilings and low visibility throughout the area during the approximate time of the accident. Post-accident inspection of the aircraft and engine revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure.

The pilot first reported that the engine oil temperature had dropped below what he normally observed while en route. When he tired to exercise the left propeller control, and then later tried to feather the left engine, he was unable to change the engine rpm. He then heard a pop from the right engine, and advised air traffic control (ATC), he needed to perform a landing at Bradford. He also reported a double power loss. While being radar vectored for the ILS runway 32 approach, he told ATC he was getting some power back. He was radar vectored inside of the outer marker, and broke out mid-field and high. At the departure end of the runway, he executed a right turn and during the turn, the airplane descended into trees, and a post crash fire destroyed it. A witness reported he heard backfiring when the airplane over flew the runway. When the airplane was examined, the landing gear was found down, and the wing flaps were extended 15 degrees. Neither propeller was feathered. Both engines were test run and performed satisfactorily. The left engine fuel servo was used on the right engine due to impact damage on the right engine fuel servo. The right fuel servo was examined and found to run rich. However, no problems were found that would explain a power loss, prevent the engine from running, or explain the backfiring heard by a witness. Both propellers were examined and found to be satisfactory, with an indication of more power on the left propeller than on the right propeller. The weather observation taken at 1253 included a ceiling of 1,100 feet broken, visibility 1 mile, light snow and mist. The weather observation taken at 1310 included a ceiling of 900 feet broken, visibility 3/4 mile, and light snow and mist. According to the pilot's handbook, the airplane could maintain altitude or climb on one engine, but it required the propeller to be feathered, and the landing gear and wing flaps retracted.

The aircraft departed Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport on a flight to Santos, carrying one passenger and two pilots. Following an approach via the local NDB, the crew started the descent to Santos Airport but was forced to initiate a go-around procedure because he was not properly aligned. A second attempt to land was started to runway 35 with a tailwind component. Following an unstabilized approach, the aircraft landed 450 metres past the runway threshold (runway 35 is 1,390 metres long). Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in the Bertioga Canal. All three occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The private pilot, who sat in the left seat, was executing the LOC RWY 17 instrument approach in actual instrument meteorological conditions, when the airplane decelerated, lost altitude, and began a left turn about 2 miles from the airport. Subsequently, the airplane collided with terrain and came to rest on residential property. The radar data also indicated that the airplane was never stabilized on the approach. A witness, a private pilot, said the airplane "appeared" out of the fog about 300-400 feet above the ground. It was in a left bank, with the nose pointed down, and was traveling fast. The airplane then "simultaneously and suddenly level[ed] out," pitched up, and the engine power increased. The witness thought that the pilot realized he was low and was trying to "get out of there." The airplane descended in a nose-high attitude, about 65 degrees, toward the trees. Radar data indicates that the airplane slowed to 80 knots about 3 miles from the airplane, and then to 68 knots 18 seconds later as the airplane began to turn to the left. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies. Weather reported at the airport 25 minutes before the accident included wind from 140 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 1 statute mile, and ceiling 500 foot overcast. Weather 5 minutes before the accident included wind from 140 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 1 statute miles, and ceiling 300 foot overcast.

The airplane joined the inbound course for the GPS instrument approach between the intermediate approach fix and the final approach fix, and maintained an altitude about 200 feet below the sector minimum. The last radar return revealed the airplane to be about 3/4 nautical miles beyond the final approach fix, approximately 1,000 feet left of course centerline. An initial tree strike was found about 1 nautical mile before the missed approach point, about 700 feet left of course centerline, at an elevation about 480 feet below the minimum descent altitude. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying at a "very low altitude" just prior to its impact with hilly terrain, and also described the sound of the airplane's engines as "really loud" and "a constant roar." Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction.

The Co-Pilot was the flying pilot with the Captain giving directions throughout the approach phase. The Captain stated that he extended the flaps and the landing gear. When the aircraft touched down, the landing gear was not extended. The Co-Pilot reported that she did look down at the landing gear lever and at "three green lights" on the approach. The CVR was read out which indicated that the Co-Pilot directed the Captain to call inbound. The Captain acknowledged this and stated "fifteen flaps." The Co-Pilot then stated "fifteen flaps, before landing." The Captain did not respond to the Co-Pilot but instead made a radio transmission. The Captain shortly thereafter, stated that he was extending the flaps to 25 degrees. The Captain made another radio transmission to the tower when the Co-Pilot stated "final, sync, ignitions." The Captain responded "ignitions on." Full flaps were then extended. The Captain gave the Co-Pilot continued directions while on the approach for heading, speed and altitude. At approximately 300 feet, the Captain stated, "yaw damper's off, air valves are off, ready to land." The Captain reported that it was obvious that touchdown was on the flaps and keel. The Captain stated that he raised the flaps, shutdown the engines, and confirmed that the landing gear handle was down. During the gear swing test the landing gear cycled several times with no difficulties. All red and green lights illuminated at the proper positions. During the test, it was found that the gear not extended horn did not function with the gear retracted, the flaps fully extended and the power levers at idle. Later a bad set of contacts to the relay was found. When the relay was jumped, the horn sounded. Inspection of the damage to the aircraft revealed that the outer rims of both outer tires displayed scrape marks around the circumference of the rim. The outer surface of the gear door fairings were scraped and the flap hinge fairings was ground down.