Executive/Corporate/Business

The 2,100-hour instrument-rated private pilot stated that prior to departure for a 507 nautical mile cross-country flight, the fuel gauges indicated approximately 800 pounds of fuel on each side for a total of 1600 pounds; however, he did not visually check the amount of fuel that the tanks contained. During his approach to the destination airport, the right engine started to "sputter" before it finally quit. The pilot then "looked over at the fuel gauges and both tanks were showing empty." The left engine quit just a few moments later. The auto ignition installed in the airplane attempted to restart the engines. The engines restarted momentarily and then shut-off once more. The pilot declared an emergency and executed a forced landing onto a street below. After a hard landing onto the street, the right wing hit a telephone pole, and the left wing then hit several tree limbs before the airplane impacted a hill and came to a stop. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, who responded to the accident site, found the fuel transfer switch in the "right-crossfeed" position. The fuel system was examined and no leaks or anomalies were found. Approximately three-quarters of a gallon of unusable fuel was found in the right engine nacelle. Approximately four gallons (28 pounds) of usable fuel was found in the left engine nacelle.

The airline transport pilot (ATP) stated the airplane was between 200 to 300 feet on initial takeoff climb when the right engine lost power and the airplane yawed to the right. The pilot lowered the nose of the airplane to gain airspeed, pulled the right power lever rearward and nothing happened. The pilot did not feather the right propeller and started moving switches in the vicinity of the boost pump switches. The ATP passenger stated, he did not think the left engine was producing full power. He scanned the instruments with his eyes looking at the manifold pressure gauges. "One needle was at zero and the other was at 25-inches. The manifold pressure should have been 39-inches of manifold pressure. The ATP passenger observed trees to their front and thought the pilot was trying to make a forced landing in an open field to their left. The ATP passenger realized the airplane was going to collide with the trees. Just before the airplane collided with the trees, the pilot feathered the right engine. The ATP passenger observed the right propeller going into the feather position, and the propeller came to a complete stop. Examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies. Examination of the left engine revealed the starter adapter gear teeth had failed due to overload.

At about the 3,000-foot marker on the 8,000-foot long runway witnesses saw the airplane at about 100 to 150-feet above the ground with the landing gear retracted when they heard a loud "bang". They said the airplane made no attempt to land on the remaining 5,000 feet of runway after the noise. The airplane continued climbing and seemed to gain a little altitude before passing the end of the runway. At that point the airplane began a right descending turn and was in a 60 to 80 degree right bank, nose low attitude when they lost sight of it. The airplane collided with the ground about 8/10 of a mile from the departure end of runway 34 in a residential area. Examination of the critical left engine found no pre-impact mechanical malfunction. Examination of the right engine found galling on all of the connecting rods. Dirt and particular contaminants were found embedded on all of the bearings, and spalling was observed on all of the cam followers. The oil suction screen was found clean, The oil filter was found contaminated with ferrous and non-ferrous small particles. The number 3 cylinder connecting rod yoke was broken on one side of the rod cap and separated into two pieces. Heavy secondary damage was noted with no signs of heat distress. Examination of the engine logbooks revealed that both engine's had been overhauled in 1986. In 1992, the airplane was registered in the Dominican Republic and the last maintenance entry indicated that the left and right engines underwent an inspection 754.3 hours since major overhaul. There were no other maintenance entries in the logbooks until the airplane was sold and moved to the United States in 2002. All three blades of the right propeller were found in the low pitch position, confirming that the pilot did not feather the right propeller as outlined in the pilot's operating handbook, under emergency procedures following a loss of engine power during takeoff.

On October 24, 2004, about 1235 eastern daylight time (all times in this brief are eastern daylight time based on a 24-hour clock), a Beech King Air 200, N501RH, operated by Hendrick Motorsports, Inc., crashed into mountainous terrain in Stuart, Virginia, during a missed approach to Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport (MTV), Martinsville, Virginia. The flight was transporting Hendrick Motorsports employees and others to an automobile race in Martinsville, Virginia. The two flight crewmembers and eight passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that he was proceeding to a nearby airport to refuel, and during the takeoff from his departure airport, about 3 to 4 seconds after rotating, the right engine ceased operating due to fuel exhaustion. He said that the airplane drifted to the right, and he feathered the right propeller and turned to the right in order to return to the runway. After leveling, he said the airplane started to climb so he reduced power, and as he did so the airspeed dropped to 80 knots, and the stall warning light was activated. He said he added full power to recover, and the aircraft veered radically to the right in the direction of the hangars. Keeping the landing gear in the up position, he said he performed a belly landing and the airplane incurred damage.

The commercial pilot, who managed the airplane and jointly owned it with one of the passengers, departed from a 3,930-foot-long, asphalt runway on a warm day. Weight and balance calculations, which investigators derived from estimated weights for total fuel, passengers, and cargo loads, determined that the airplane was likely within center of gravity limitations and about 208 pounds below its maximum gross weight. One witness stated that the airplane became airborne near the end of the runway before it began a shallow climb and clipped small branches on the tops of trees that were about 30 feet tall. That witness and others observed that the airplane continued past the trees, made a steep bank to the left, rolled inverted, and nose-dived to the ground. The witnesses' descriptions of the airplane's flightpath and the examination of the debris path and wreckage at the accident site are consistent with an impact following an aerodynamic stall. According to calculations performed using the airplane's published performance data chart, for the airplane's configuration and estimated weight and the density altitude conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane would have required about 3,800 feet on a paved, level runway to clear a 50-foot obstacle with the pilot using the short-field takeoff technique. Although the chart does not make any allowances for an upsloping runway or provide data for a 30-foot obstacle, the runway slope is slight (a 27-foot rise over the entire length) and likely did not significantly increase the airplane's takeoff roll, and interpolation of the data revealed no significant distance differences for the shorter obstacle. However, according to the chart, the 3,800-foot distance is contingent upon the pilot holding the airplane's brakes, applying full engine power with the brakes set, and then releasing the brakes to initiate the takeoff roll. In addition, the airplane's ability to achieve its published performance parameters (which are derived from test flights in new airplanes) can be degraded by a number of factors, such as pilot deviations from the published procedures, reduced engine performance, or increased aerodynamic drag associated with minor damage and wear of the airframe. It could not be determined where on the runway the pilot initiated the takeoff roll or at what point full engine power was applied. However, because the runway was only 130 feet longer than the airplane required (according to its published performance data), there was little margin for any deviations from the published takeoff procedure. Although examination of the engines, propellers, and related systems revealed no evidence of precrash anomalies, postaccident damage precluded engine performance testing to determine whether the engines were capable of producing their full-rated power. Therefore, the significance of maintenance issues with the airplane (in particular, a mechanic's assessment that the turbochargers needed to be replaced and that the airplane's required annual inspection was not completed) could not be determined with respect to any possible effect on the airplane's ability to perform as published. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and insurance records revealed evidence that the pilot may have been deficient with regard to his ability to safely operate a PA 60-601P. For example, according to FAA records, as a result of an April 2004 incident in which the pilot landed the accident airplane on a wet grassy runway with a tailwind, resulting in the airplane going off the runway and striking a fence, the FAA issued the pilot a letter of reexamination to reexamine his airman competency. However, the pilot initially refused delivery of the letter; he subsequently accepted delivery of a second letter (which gave the pilot 10 days to respond before the FAA would suspend his certificate pending compliance) and contacted the FAA regarding the matter on Monday, August 2, 2004 (the day before the accident), telling an FAA inspector to "talk to his lawyer." In addition, as a result of the same April 2004 incident, the pilot's insurance company placed a limitation on his policy that required him to either attend a certified PA-60-601P flight-training program before he could act as pilot-in-command of the accident airplane or have a current and properly certificated pilot in the airplane with him during all flights until he completed such training. There was no evidence that the pilot adhered to either of the insurance policy requirements. In addition, the FAA had a previous open enforcement action (a proposed 240-day suspension of the pilot's commercial certificate) pending against the pilot for allegedly operating an airplane in an unsafe manner in September 2003; that case was pending a hearing with an NTSB aviation law judge at the time of the accident. Although the FAA's final rule for Part 91, Subpart K, "Fractional Ownership Operations," became effective on November 17, 2003, the regulations apply to fractional ownership programs that include two or more airworthy aircraft. There was no evidence that the pilot had a management agreement involving any other airplane; therefore, the rules of Part 91, Subpart K, which provide a level of safety for fractional ownership programs that are equivalent to certain regulations that apply to on-demand operators, did not apply to the accident flight. In the year before the accident, the FAA had conducted a ramp check of the pilot and the accident airplane and also conducted an investigation that determined there was not sufficient evidence that the pilot was conducting any illegal for-hire operations.

At 0906 Eastern Standard Time on 28 July 2004, a Piper Aircraft Corporation PA31T Cheyenne aircraft, registered VH-TNP, with one pilot and five passengers, departed Bankstown, New South Wales on a private, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight to Benalla, Victoria. Instrument meteorological conditions at the destination necessitated an instrument approach and the pilot reported commencing a Global Positioning System (GPS) non-precision approach (NPA) to Benalla. When the pilot had not reported landing at Benalla as expected, a search for the aircraft was commenced. Late that afternoon the crew of a search helicopter located the burning wreckage on the eastern slope of a tree covered ridge, approximately 34 km southeast of Benalla. All occupants were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire.

Following an uneventful flight from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, the crew started the approach to Carepa-Los Cedros Airport, the copilot was the pilot-in-command. On final approach, the captain took over controls and continued the descent when the GPWS alarm sounded seven times. For unknown reasons, the captain failed to respond to this situation and did not proceed with any corrective actions. On short final, at a height of about 200 feet, one of the engine failed. The crew failed to follow the published procedures, causing the aircraft to stall and to crash about 100 metres short of runway 33. Two passengers were seriously injured while five other occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed controlled flight and crashed near Helendale, California. The captain and the first officer were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 912 from San Bernardino County Airport (CNO), Chino, California, to Friedman Memorial Airport, Hailey, Idaho. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. A review of radar data and air traffic control (ATC) transcripts revealed that the flight departed CNO about 0858 and was cleared to climb to an altitude of 29,000 feet mean sea level (msl). About 0909:55, as the airplane was climbing through an altitude of 26,000 feet, the first officer requested a return to CNO. About 0910:01, the controller asked the first officer if he needed to declare an emergency, and the first officer replied that he did not. The controller then directed the flight crew to maintain an altitude of 24,000 feet. Mode C information for the flight showed that, from about 0910:12 to about 0910:59, the airplane descended from 26,500 to 24,000 feet at a rate of about 2,000 feet per minute (fpm). About 0911:08, the controller cleared the flight directly to HECTOR (a navigation fix) and asked the first officer to confirm that the airplane was in level flight at an altitude of 24,000 feet. The first officer did not respond. Radar data showed the airplane descending through 23,000 feet at a rate of about 6,500 fpm about that time. About 0911:24, while the airplane was descending at a rate of about 10,000 fpm, the first officer stated, “we’re declaring an emergency now.” No further transmissions were received from the airplane. No radar data were available after about 0911:35. Starting about 0911:47, mode C information was invalid. The airplane impacted high desert terrain (an elevation of 3,350 feet) about 3 miles southeast of Helendale. The accident site was located about 46 nautical miles (nm) north of CNO. A witness to the accident, who was located about 4.5 miles northwest of the accident site, stated that, after hearing the sound of a jet flying high overhead, he looked up and observed the accident airplane flying straight and level below a high, overcast cloud layer. He stated that the airplane then pitched “nose down a little” and “straightened again.” He also stated that, shortly thereafter, he observed the airplane’s nose pitch “straight down” until it impacted terrain. The witness reported that he did not notice whether the airplane was rotating about its longitudinal axis during the descent, but he did indicate that the airplane appeared to be intact without any components separating from the airplane during the descent. The witness added that he did not observe any smoke or fire before the airplane impacted terrain and that the airplane exploded into a “mushroom cloud” when it impacted terrain. San Bernardino County firefighters, who were performing controlled burns near the accident site, reported hearing an explosion about the time of the accident. The firefighters reported that they looked toward the direction of the explosion and saw a rising smoke cloud. None of the firefighters observed the airplane before the sound of the explosion. The firefighters drove to the accident site and were the first to arrive there. The firefighters extinguished small fires that had erupted as a result of the crash.

The pilot was on a circling approach for landing in instrument icing conditions. The landing gear were extended and the flaps were lowered to 15°. The alternate air induction system was not activated. The surviving passenger stated when the airplane came out of the clouds and the airplane started to buffet and shake. The pilot was heard to state on the UNICOM frequency by the fixed base operator and a lineman, "Emergency engine ice." The airplane was observed to make a 60-degree angle of bank and collided with trees and terrain. The Pilot's Operating Handbook states the airplane will stall at 129 miles per hour with the landing gear and flaps down at 15-degrees. The maximum landing weight for the Cessna 414 is 6,430 pounds. The total aircraft weight at the crash site was 6,568.52 pounds. Witnesses who knew the pilot stated the pilot had flown one other known flight in icing conditions before the accident flight.