Las Vegas

The flight was on a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approach with 1/2 mile visibility in snow showers. Three successive fixes on the localizer are defined by distance measuring equipment (DME) paired with the ILS; prior to the ILS DME commissioning 6 months before the accident, the DME fixes were defined by a VORTAC 4.7 nautical miles past the ILS DME. The aircraft was 800 feet high at the first fix and 1,500 feet high at the second, but approximately on altitude 4.7 nautical miles past the first and second fixes, respectively. It passed the outer marker 900 feet high and captured the glide slope from above about 1.8 nautical miles from the threshold, 500 feet above decision height (DH) and 700 feet above touchdown. The aircraft was on glide slope for 28 seconds, during which time its speed decayed to stall speed; it then dropped below glide slope and crashed 1.3 nautical miles short of the threshold. The pilot's FLT DIR DME-1/ DME-2 switch, which control the DME display on the pilot's horizontal situation indicator (HSI), was found set to DME-2; the NAV-2 radio was set to the VORTAC frequency. Up to 800 feet may be required for stall recovery.

No record could be found showing the pilot received a weather briefing prior to takeoff. Unfavorable weather was in the vicinity. Several times the pilot had difficulties understanding and complying with instructions from clearance delivery, ground control, and departure control. After takeoff the pilot requested and received an IFR clearance. During the last five minutes of flight radar returns showed the airplane changing heading from 45° to as much as 180° about 10 times and descending or ascending several times from altitudes ranging from 4,500 feet msl to 11,500 feet msl. The altitude and heading changes were not directed by controllers. About 3 minutes before the accident departure control asked the pilot if he had a problem. The pilot indicated that he did and 'we're trying to get straight.' One minute later, the pilot said 'we're all right.' Shortly afterwards, radar data showed a loss of control. Radar and communications were lost and an on ground explosion was observed as the accident occurred. An FAA flight surgeon reviewed the pilot's medical records. Within one year of the accident the pilot had 3 physical conditions and was taking 3 separate prescriptions which would have prevented him from being medically qualified to pilot an aircraft. All seven occupants were killed.

The pilot was carrying illegal cargo (marijuana) in N4001Q. During a low high speed pass at night over an intended landing area, the aircraft struck rising terrain. There was approximately 800 lbs of marijuana on the aircraft. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on IFR departure in minimal weather conditions. On takeoff roll, a power loss occurred on the right engine and the aircraft veered to the right. The pilot-in-command (owner) in left seat initiated aborted takeoff, but right seat pilot took control, continued takeoff and feathered the right propeller. Both pilots observed smoke from the engines on their respective sides, both thought landing gear was retracted. (Investigation revealed landing gear was down.) Aircraft could not maintain altitude, pilots elected to ditch in ocean. Investigation revealed aircraft had been serviced with 147 gallons of Jet fuel instead of Avgas at 0445 hrs by a fbo lineman. The lineman had 3 weeks total experience, 1 1/2 hrs video tape training and was working 2 jobs 7 days per week. All three occupants escaped uninjured.