Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

Witnesses reported hearing an airplane engine at night, at high power for about 5 seconds followed by impact. They went to the scene and found the airplane on the left side of the approach end of runway 03, on fire. The pilot was removed and the fire was extinguished. The airplane had struck a runway threshold light located about 25 feet to the left side of the runway, and slid about 100 feet into trees, angling away from the runway on a heading of 360 degrees. The outboard 5 feet of the left wing was bent up about 20 degrees. Ground scars were found corresponding to the positions of the left, right, and nose landing gears, all of which had collapsed. The inboard section of the left wing came to rest on the nose of the airplane. The propeller blades were deformed with "S" bending and leading edge gouges. Flight control continuity was verified to the rudder and elevator. The aileron control cables had separated with puffed ends. All separations occurred at other than attach points. The pilot had received head injuries and has no memory of the accident.

During a forced landing the left wing struck a light standard pole, and the airplane came to rest inverted after colliding with a fence. The purpose of the flight was to conduct recurrent training to include emergency procedures. On the accident flight the certified flight instructor (CFI) initiated a simulated engine failure after takeoff during the initial climb out. The student advised the tower, and turned crosswind at 700 feet agl. The student set up for landing, which included lowering the landing gear and adding 10 degrees of flaps. On short final, descending through 400 feet agl, both the CFI and student realized they would not make the runway. Both pilot's advanced the throttle, to arrest the descent and perform a go-around. There was no corresponding response from the engine. During the final stages of the emergency descent, the pilot maneuvered the airplane to avoid a work crew at the airport boundary fence and the airplane collided with the light standard pole and a fence. An airframe and engine examination discovered no discrepancies with any system. Following documentation of the engine and related systems it was removed and installed in an instrumented engine test cell for a functional test. The engine started without hesitation and was operated for 44 minutes at various factory new engine acceptance test points. During acceleration response tests, technicians rapidly advanced the throttle to the full open position, and the engine accelerated with no hesitation. A second acceleration response test produced the same results. According to Textron Lycoming, there were no discrepancies that would have precluded the engine from being capable of producing power.

Witnesses observed N262MM taxi to runway 29 left and the pilot perform what appeared to be a normal engine runup. The airplane then taxied onto runway 29 left for takeoff. The wind was from the east, making the takeoff with a tail wind. During the takeoff, the engine seemed to operate at a steady level, but appeared to be low on power. The flight lifted off about halfway down the runway and the landing gear was retracted. The airplane climbed slowly and turned slowly to the left. The airplane then entered a 60-80 degree left bank followed by the airplane rolling level and the wings rocking back and forth. The airplane was now on a southerly heading and the nose dropped. The airplane then collided with trees about 15-20 feet above the ground, fell to the ground, and burst into flames. Witnesses stated they saw no smoke or flames coming from the airplane prior to impact with the trees. At the time of the accident the landing gear was retracted and the engine was running. Transcripts of recorded communications show that at 1205:40, the local controller instructed the flight to taxi into position and hold on runway 29 left. At 1206:43, N262MM was cleared for takeoff and a north bound departure was approved. At 1208:03, the passenger transmitted "we need to land we have to turn around". The local controller cleared the flight to return to the airport when able. At 1208:20, the passenger transmitted "two mike mike we're going down we're going down", followed by "over the golf (unintelligible)". The local controller responded "copy over the golf course". No further transmissions were received from the flight. Analysis of background noise contained on the ATC recordings show that at the time the passenger on N262MM transmitted to controllers that they were ready for takeoff and when he acknowledged the takeoff clearance, the propeller was rotating at 1,261 and 1,255 respectively. When the passenger transmitted to controllers after takeoff, that they needed to land, the propeller was rotating at 1,980 rpm. When the passenger transmitted we have to turn around, shortly after the above transmission, the propeller was rotating at 2,017 rpm. When the passenger made his last transmission stating they were going down, the propeller rpm was 1,965. The maximum propeller speed at takeoff is 2,000 rpm. Additional evidence was found indicating electrical arcing and progressive fatigue cracking in the engine’s P3 line, which could result in a rapid rollback of engine power. Simulator testing showed that a P3 line failure would result in the engine decelerating from full takeoff power (2,000 propeller rpm) and stabilizing at an idle power setting in less than 9 seconds. However, the sound spectrum analysis of the first radio transmission indicated the propeller rpm was 1,980, and two subsequent radio transmissions, the last of which was made 17 seconds after the initial transmission, detected the propeller rpm at near takeoff speed. Thus, there was no evidence of dramatic rpm loss, making the P3 line failure an unlikely cause of the accident. Postcrash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, engine, and propeller, showed no evidence of failure or malfunction. Witnesses indicated the flight used about 3,650 feet of runway for takeoff or about half of the 7,296 foot long runway. Charts contained in the Piper PA-46-500TP, Pilot's Operating Handbook, indicated that for the conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane should have used about 2,000 feet of runway for the ground roll during the takeoff with no wing flaps extended. The charts also show that the airplane indicated stall speed at 60 degrees of bank angle with the landing gear and wing flaps retracted is 111 knots.

The accident occurred during a dark night departure from a private unlighted airstrip. The pilot had landed, assisted by the headlights of a car, on the landing strip/road about 1830. After dropping off a passenger, he departed about 1900. The departure direction was towards a sparsely populated area of rolling hills. Local area residents reported hearing a plane depart, followed by a loss of engine sound, and an impact in a grape vineyard. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. According to maintenance records, the last recorded annual inspection occurred 12 months and about 299.5 flight hours prior to the accident. Approximately 5 months before the accident, the FAA Certified Repair Station (CRS) that performed the maintenance on the airplane had given the pilot/owner a 15-item list of "grounding discrepancies." The discrepancies were: Cracked nose cowling; fraying seat belts; LH mag switch broken; LH window cracked; LH windshield crazed; stall warning inoperative; turbine inlet temperature inoperative; door latch safety inoperative; several hydraulic components leaking; main gear trunion pins worn; several cracks in wing lower skins; fuel leaks; loose rivets on RH flap; wing spar bolts loose; and elevator trim cable frayed. According to the CRS manager, the only item that had been repaired prior to the accident was the cracked nose cowling. However, an engine log entry indicated the TIT gage had also been replaced. Additionally, several witnesses reported that the pilot had been flying the airplane with an inoperative landing gear retract system for about 4 months. During post accident examination of the wreckage, investigators were able to verify that many of the listed discrepancies still existed; however, none of these discrepancies could be directly linked to the accident.

The airplane took off from the airport on a left downwind departure and after reaching an altitude of approximately 300 feet, banked steeply and dove into the ground. Witness statements indicated that the takeoff ground roll extended to midfield of the runway, a distance of 4,850 feet before the airplane lifted off. According to the Airplane Flight Manual performance charts, the normal ground roll should have been about 2,100 feet. While turning crosswind, the airplane steepened its bank and continued toward the downwind. As the angle of bank approached 90 degrees, the nose dropped and the airplane descended to impact with trees and the ground. Several trees were struck before the airplane came to rest on the underlying terrain in the backyard of a residence. The airplane was thermally destroyed in the impact sequence and post crash fire. Calculations of the airplane weight and balance data put it at least 251 pounds over maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. Remaining wreckage not consumed in the ground fire was examined and the engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No discrepancies were found. Cockpit instrumentation and all autopilot components were thermally destroyed. Flaps and landing gear were found in the retracted position and the elevator trim surface was slightly nose up from the takeoff setting. The autopilot had a reported history of malfunction and the electric elevator trim system was scheduled for repair a week before the accident, but the owner took the airplane prior to the work being performed. The airplane had been modified with the addition of several Supplemental Type Certificates, one of which was a wing spoiler system. The controls and
many of the actuating linkages for the spoiler system were destroyed in the fire.

Witness's reported that the airplane took off from runway 05, which has an up slope of 1.2 degrees. The airplane was observed at approximately 10 feet above ground level, in a nose high attitude traveling parallel to the ground and not climbing. The airplane narrowly cleared a 6- foot fence off the departure end of runway 05. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted a utility pole, the roof of a bus stop, which was followed by a brick wall. At the time of the accident runway 23, which has a 1.2-degree down slope and has a clear-cut area on the departure end, was available for use. The basic empty weight for this airplane is 3,097 pounds; the useful load is 1,201.7 pounds. The actual load at the time of the accident was in excess of the useful load. There is no record of the pilot completing a weight and balance computation prior to take-off. The toxicology examinations were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol. The toxicology examination revealed that 1175(mg/dl) glucose was detected in the urine. Examination of the airplane and subsystems failed to disclose any mechanical or component failures.

The aircraft was undergoing a shakedown flight after having completed a 100 hr maintenance inspection and other engineering work at Bournemouth Airport. The pilot was not the owner of the aircraft, but had been requested to carry out the shakedown flight. There was no technical log available prior to the flight which could have indicated the quantity of fuel remaining on board, or when the aircraft was previously refuelled and the subsequent flight times. The pilot recalled that the fuel tank gauges showed the aircraft had 22 gall US in the left wing and 40 gall US in the right wing, a total fuel contents of 62 gall US. The Aircraft Flight Manual indicates that the maximum allowable lateral fuel imbalance is 10 gall US. The aircraft started up at 1448 hrs and taxied for departure from Runway 26. The right tank was selected for take off and the first part of the flight. The aircraft climbed to FL180 and the required engine checks were carried out satisfactorily. As the aircraft was being turned around in order to return to Bournemouth, the pilot recalled that the right fuel quantity indicator steadily dropped to zero. This caused him little concern at the time as the left fuel tank had only been selected for part of the taxi out. The aircraft was also fitted with a digital 'fuel endurance remaining' indicator, which apparently indicated 'one hour' fuel endurance. Descent was commenced and the aircraft was transferred to Bournemouth Approach control in order to position it on radar for an ILS approach to Runway 08. At this time, the pilot recalled that the fuel flow and rpm indicators began to fluctuate, so he selected the left fuel tank to feed to the engine. The aircraft was given radar vectoring and the pilot requested a turn to avoid a cloud build up before becoming established on the ILS. The radar controller indicated that the aircraft had become established on the localiser at a range of 25 nm, in the descent to 3,000 feet amsl. At about ten miles from touchdown the engine fuel flow and RPM again fluctuated. The pilot reselected the right fuel tank but the engine did not recover. Reselecting the left tank restored power briefly but then the engine failed again. The pilot turned the aircraft to the left off the ILS and attempted to identify suitable sites for a forced landing. An open field with an uphill gradient was selected, the landing gear and full flap were selected. However, the aircraft touched down further into the field than the pilot would have wished. The touchdown was smooth but the pilot could not stop the aircraft before it ran into the far boundary hedge. The left wing was severely damaged during the impact sequence. There was no fire and the three occupants vacated the aircraft by the normal means, having sustained only minor injuries.

The single engine airplane, owned by a German company based in Allendorf, departed Jersey Island on a flight to Allendorf-Eder Airport. While in cruising altitude over the east part of Paris in poor weather conditions, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a colza field located in Thury-en-Valois. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces but did not catch fire. All six occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the airplane was flying in very poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity.

The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep nose down descent angle while maneuvering to return to the runway during the takeoff initial climb from the airport. Pilot and mechanic witnesses on the airport described the engine sounds during the takeoff as abnormal. The takeoff ground roll was over 3,000 feet in length, and the airplane's climb out angle was much shallower than usual. Two other witnesses said the engine sounded "like a radial engine," and both believed that the power output was lower than normal. One mechanic witness said the engine was surging and not developing full power; he believed the symptoms could be associated with a fuel feed problem, a turbocharger surge, or an excessively lean running condition. The ground witnesses located near the impact site said the airplane began a steep left turn between 1/4- and 1/2-mile from the runway's end at a lower than normal altitude. The bank angle was estimated by the witnesses as 45 degrees or greater. The turn continued until the nose suddenly dropped and the airplane entered a spiraling descent to ground impact. The majority of these witnesses stated that they heard "sputtering" or "popping" noises coming from the airplane. Engineering personnel from the manufacturer developed a performance profile for a normal takeoff and climb under the ambient conditions of the accident and at gross weight. The profile was compared to the actual aircraft performance derived from recorded radar data and the witness observations. The ground roll was 1,300 feet longer than it should have been, and the speed/acceleration and climb performance were consistently well below the profile's predictions. Based on the radar data and factoring in the winds, the airplane's estimated indicated airspeed during the final turn was 82 knots; the stall speed at 45 degrees of bank is 82 knots and it increases linearly to 96 knots at 60 degrees of bank. No evidence was found that the pilot flew the airplane from December until the date of the accident. The airplane sat outside during the rainy season with only 10 gallons of fuel in each tank. Comparison of the time the fueling began and the communications transcripts disclosed that the pilot had 17 minutes 41 seconds to refuel the airplane with 120 gallons, reboard the airplane, and start the engine for taxi; the maximum nozzle discharge flow rate of the pump he used is 24 gallons per minute. Review of the communications transcripts found that a time interval of 3 minutes 35 seconds elapsed from the time the pilot asked for a taxi clearance from the fuel facility until he reported ready for takeoff following a taxi distance of at least 2,000 feet. During the 8 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgment of his takeoff clearance, he and the local controller carried on a non pertinent personal exchange. The aircraft was almost completely consumed in the post crash fire; however, extensive investigation of the remains failed to identify a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure in the engine or airframe systems. The pistons, cylinder interiors, and spark plugs from all six cylinders were clean without combustion deposits. The cockpit fuel selector lever, the intermediate linkages, and the valve itself were found in the OFF position; however, an engineering analysis established that insufficient fuel was available in the lines forward of the selector to start, taxi, and perform a takeoff with the selector in the OFF position.

On October 17, 1999, about 20:25 Mountain Daylight Time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N90D, was substantially damaged while descending to the Cranbrook Airport (CYXC), Cranbrook, British Columbia. The certificated airline transport pilot was fatally injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight that originated near Lynn Lake (CYYL), Manitoba. The ferry flight was conducted under Canadian flight rules. According to a Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigator, the airplane was being ferried from England to Spokane, Washington. At the last departure point, CYYL, the airplane was refueled and the pilot filed an IFR flight plan. During the flight, the pilot was in contact with Vancouver Area Control Center. While approaching CYXC, the pilot contacted Cranbrook Flight Service Station (FSS) and was provided the latest airport information. The pilot did not report any difficulties with the airplane or flight at that time. The pilot's last transmission with the FSS was about 10 miles from the airport. After attempting to contact the airplane, FSS contacted the Rescue Coordination Center, and notified them that the airplane was overdue. An emergency locator transmitter signal was received about 21:55, but the airplane was not found until the following morning. The airplane was located on the eastern side of Lakit Mountain at the 6,500-foot level, 9 miles northeast of CYXC. The weather reported by CYXC, at 20:00 was, wind from 300 degrees at 4 knots, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet, and a broken cloud layer at 24,000 feet. The pilot (sole person on board) was killed.