Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The pilot was performing a night, VFR traffic pattern, to a full stop at a non-towered airport in a turboprop aircraft. He entered the traffic pattern (6,800 feet; 1,000 feet AGL) on an extended downwind; radar data indicated that his ground-speed was 205 knots. Over the next 3 nautical miles on down wind, radar data indicated that he slowed to a ground-speed of 171 knots, lost approximately 500 feet of altitude, and reduced his parallel distance from the runway from 4,775 feet to 2,775 feet. Witnesses said that his radio transmissions on CTAF appeared normal. The two witnesses observed a bright blue flash, followed by a loss of contact with the airplane. Rescue personnel found a broken and downed static wire from a system of three sets of power transmission wires. The dark night precluded ground rescue personnel from locating the downed aircraft; a police helicopter found the airplane approximately 2 hours after the accident. The pilot had recently completed his factory approved annual flight training. His flight instructor said that the pilot was taught to fly a VFR traffic pattern at 1,500 feet AGL (or 500 feet above piston powered aircraft), enter the downwind leg from a 45 degree leg, and fly parallel to the downwind approximately 1 to 1.5 nautical miles separation from it. His speed on downwind should have been 145 to 150 knots indicated, with 90 to 95 knots on final for a stabilized approach. The flight instructor said that the base turn should be at a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. Radar data indicates that the pilot was in a maximum descent, while turning base to final, of 1,800 to 1,900 feet per minute with an airspeed on final of 145 to 150 knots. His maximum bank angle during this turn was calculated to have been more than 70 degrees. The separated static wire was located 8,266.5 feet from the runway threshold, and was approximately 30 feet higher than the threshold. Post-accident examinations of the airplane and its engine revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations prior to impact.

The pilot was carrying out an IFR flight from Chambery in France to Dunkeswell Aerodrome using Exeter Airport as his diversion. Before departure from Chambery he had checked the weather conditions at Exeter and other airfields in its vicinity from the available TAFs and METARs covering the period of the flight and he was satisfied that conditions were suitable. He had also contacted a friend who was also a commercial pilot at about 1530 hrs. This friend lived near Dunkeswell Aerodrome and had estimated the cloud base to be approximately 1,500 feet. The aircraft departed Chambery at 1605 hrs and, apart from some airframe icing on departure, it had an uneventful transit at FL270. Approaching the south coast of England, the aircraft was descended to FL60 and it left controlled airspace at Southampton in good VMC with the lights along the south coast clearly visible. The weather at Exeter at 1720 hrs was: surface wind 130°/08 kt, varying between 110° and 170°; visibility 6,000 metres; cloud SCT 005, BKN 012; temperature +9° C; dew point +8° C and QNH 1011 mb. With approximately 50 miles to run to his destination, the pilot attempted to contact Dunkeswell Radio but received no reply so he assumed the airfield had closed for the night. The lights of Dunkeswell village and the industrial site at the north-eastern edge of the aerodrome were visible but they had a milky appearance as if shining through scattered mist pockets. The aircraft was descended to 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH and the main altimeter was set to the Dunkeswell QFE by subtracting 31 mb from the Exeter QNH to allow for the Dunkeswell elevation of 850 feet. The pilot was utilising two GPS navigation systems programmed to provide him with centreline information for Runway 23 on a CDI (Course Deviation Indicator) scale of 0.3 nm for full deflection. Whilst there was no runway lighting at Dunkeswell, the pilot had placed white reflective panels on the right edge of Runway 23. When illuminated by the aircraft landing light, these panels would show the right hand edge of the runway and also indicate the touchdown zone of the runway. The panels measured 18 cm by 9.5 cm and were mounted vertically on low, black plastic supports. The threshold for Runway 23 is displaced 290 metres from the road which runs along the northern aerodrome boundary and the first reflector was 220 metres beyond the displaced threshold. The reflectors had been positioned over a distance of 460 metres with the distances between them varying between 15 and 49 metres. The white centreline markings would also have been visible in the landing light once the aircraft was low enough. The end of the 46 metre wide runway was 280 metres from the last reflector. The pilot had carried out night approaches and landings to Runway 23 at Dunkeswell using similar visual references on many previous occasions. The pilot identified the lights of the industrial site earlier than he expected at six miles whilst maintaining 2,600 feet on the Exeter QNH. He cancelled his radar service from Exeter, which had also provided him with ranges and bearings from Dunkeswell, and made blind transmissions regarding his position and intentions on the Dunkeswell Radio frequency. Having commenced his final approach, the pilot noticed there was scattered cloud in the vicinity of the approach path. At about 2.5 nm from the runway threshold and approximately 800 feet agl, the pilot noticed a mist pocket ahead of the aircraft and so he decided to initiate a go-around and divert to Exeter. At that point the aircraft was configured with the second stage of flap lowered, the landing gear down and the airspeed reducing through 135 kt with all three aircraft landing lights selected ON. The pilot increased power and commenced a climb but he became visual with the runway once more and so he reduced power and resumed the approach. A high rate of descent developed and the radio altimeters automatic 50 feet audio warning sounded. The pilot started to increase engine power but he was too late to prevent the severe impact with terrain that followed almost immediately. The aircrafts wings were torn off as it passed between two trees and the fuselage continued across a grass field, remaining upright until it came to a stop. The passenger vacated the aircraft immediately through the normal exit in the passenger cabin and then returned to assist the pilot. Having turned off the aircraft's electrical and fuel systems the pilot also left the aircraft through the normal exit. There was a leak from the oxygen system, which had been disrupted in the accident and the pilot was unable to remove the fire extinguisher from its stowage due to the deformation of the airframe. He contacted Exeter ATC using his mobile telephone to inform them of the accident and they initiated the response of the emergency services.

The single engine airplane departed Palma de Mallorca-Son Bonet Airport at 1146LT on a flight to Sabadell with two passengers and one pilot on board. After takeoff, the pilot was instructed by ATC to proceed to the north. Seven minutes after its departure, while flying in reduced visibility due to rain falls, the aircraft struck a rocky wall located on Mt Mola de Montserra (600 metres high) located near the village of Bunyola, about 20 km north of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the ceiling was at 5,000 feet with a visibility of 8 km and rain. The mountain was shrouded in cloud and thick fog.

The single-engine airplane experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight at flight level 190 (19,000 feet) and impacted the terrain while performing a forced landing to a nearby airport. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident with clear skies and unrestricted visibilities. The pilot reported the loss of engine power about 16 minutes prior to the accident and requested clearance to the nearest airport. Air traffic control (ATC) issued vectors to the Southwest Michigan Regional Airport (BEH). About 10 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was positioned approximately 1.3 nm north of BEH at 13,500 feet. The pilot elected to follow ATC vectors verses circling down over BEH. ATC provided vectors for runway 27 at BEH. Witnesses to the accident reported seeing the airplane "spiraling down and crashing into the ground." The wreckage was located on the extended runway 27 centerline, about 1.12 nm from the runway threshold. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with a stall/spin accident. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the airplane was on a 9.5 nm final approach at 6,700 feet. Between 9.5 and 5.3 nm the airspeed fluctuated between 119 and 155 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,550 and 2,600 feet/min. Between 5.3 nm and the last radar return at 1.5 nm the airspeed dropped from 155 to 78 knots. According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) the accident airplane should be flown at best glide speed (92 knots) after a loss of engine power. An average engine-out descent rate of 700 feet/min is achieved when best glide speed is maintained during engine-out descents. An engine teardown inspection revealed that the crankshaft was fractured at the number five crankpin journal. Visual examination of the crankshaft (p/n 13F27738, s/n V537920968) showed a fatigue-type fracture through the cheek, aft of the number five crankpin journal. The exact cause of the crankshaft failure could not be determined, due to mechanical damage at the fatigue initiation point. The fracture features for the accident crankshaft was consistent with 14 previous failures of the same part number. The engine manufacturer determined the failures were most likely due to the overheating of the steel during the forging process.

An annual inspection had been completed on the airplane the same day, and on its first flight after the annual inspection, as the airplane was departing from runway 05, at Naples Municipal Airport, witnesses said the engine ceased operating. They also said that the propeller was rotating either slowly or had stopped, and they then observed the airplane enter a steep turn, followed by an abrupt and uncontrolled nose-low descent and subsequent impact with the ground. The airplane came to rest in a nose-low, near vertical position, suspended at its tail section by a fence and some trees along the eastern perimeter of the airport. It had incurred substantial damage and the pilot and two passengers who were onboard the airplane were fatally injured. Postaccident examination of the airframe, flight controls and the engine did not reveal any mechanical failure or malfunction. The flaps were found to have been set to 10 degrees, and the propeller showed little or no evidence of rotation at impact. The FAA Toxicology Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological studies on specimens obtained from the pilot and the results showed that diphenhydramine was found to be present in urine, and 0.139 (ug/ml, ug/g) diphenhydramine was detected in blood. Diphenhydramine, commonly known by the trade name Benadryl, is an over-the-counter antihistamine with sedative side effects, and is commonly used to treat allergy symptoms. Published research (Weiler et. al. Effects of Fexofenadine, Diphenhydramine, and Alcohol on Driving Performance. Annals of Internal Medicine 2000; 132:354-363), has noted the effect of a maximal over the counter dose of diphenhydramine to be worse than the effect of a 0.10% blood alcohol level on certain measures of simulated driving performance. The level of diphenydramine in the blood of the pilot was consistent with recent use of more than a typical maximum single over-the-counter dose of the medication.

The pilot of N9143B had asked the controller if he could deviate about 12 miles west, because he thought he saw "a hole" in the weather. The radar ground track plot showed the pilot had observed a 3 to 5 mile gap between two thunderstorm clusters and attempted to fly through an area of light radar echoes between the two large areas of heavier echoes. N9143B departed level flight, and radar showed that a cluster of thunderstorms, level three to four were present in the vicinity of N9143B's ground track position. Radar data showed that N9143B started an uncontrolled descent from FL260 (about 27,500 feet msl). Witnesses reported hearing the engine make a winding noise, then observed the airplane come out of the clouds about 300 feet above the ground, in a nose low spiral, and the right wing was missing. The right wing was not found at the crash site, but was located 1.62 miles from the main wreckage. The pilot of N9143B had requested and received a weather briefing. He was advised that the weather data indicated that an area forecast for his route of flight predicted thunderstorm activity and cumulonimbus clouds with tops as high as FL450 (flight level 45,000 feet), and a weather system impacting the Florida Gulf Coast, consisted of "looming thunderstorms" in that area. The pilot had contacted the Enroute Flight Advisory Service (EFAS, commonly known as "Flight Watch") for enroute weather advisories, and advised of "cells" east of St. Augustine, advised of convective SIGMET 05E in effect for southern Florida, and was advised that a routing toward the Tampa/St. Petersburg area and then southward, would avoid an area of thunderstorms.

The flight was cleared for the ILS approach to runway 5R. The flight was at mid runway, at 2,100 feet, heading 049 degrees, at a speed of 163 knots, when the pilot stated "...missed approach." He was instructed to maintain 2,000, and to fly runway heading. Radar showed N41003 started a right turn, was flying away from the airport/VOR, descending. At a point 0.57 miles from the airport/VOR, the flight had descended to 1,500 feet, was turning right, and increasing speed. The flight had descended 400 feet, and had traveled about 0.32 miles in 10 seconds. When radio and radar contact were lost, the flight was 2.35 miles from the airport/VOR, level at 1,600 feet, on a heading of 123 degrees, and at a speed of 169 knots. The published decision height (DH) was 620 feet mean sea level (msl). The published minimum visibility was 1/2 mile. The published Missed Approach in use at the time of the accident was; "Climb to 1,000 [feet], then climbing right turn to 2,500 [feet] via heading 130 degrees, and RDU R-087 [087 degree radial] to ZEBUL Int [intersection] and hold." A witness stated that the aircraft was flying low, power seemed to be in a cruise configuration, and maintaining the same sound up until the crash. The reported weather at the time was: Winds 050 at 5 knots, visibility 1/2 statute mile, obscuration fog and drizzle, ceiling overcast 100, temperature and dew point 11 C, altimeter 30.30 in HG. At the time of the accident the pilot had 10 total flight hours in this make and model airplane; 33 total night flight hours; and 59 total instrument flight hours.

The airplane's fuel tanks were fueled from a self serve fuel pump with 63 gallons of fuel prior to departure. The pilot initiated the takeoff roll from runway 30 with a 10 knot tailwind. The airplane was reported to have used the entire length of the runway during the takeoff roll. The airplane became airborne, attained a height approximately 100 feet agl, entered a descent, and subsequently, impacted the ground. A post accident fire consumed the airplane. Immediately following the accident, the pilot reported to local authorities that "he was leaving the airstrip and the plane stalled due to lack of airspeed." The 3,000-foot runway rises rapidly at its north end, such that the departure end of runway 30 was 50 feet higher than the approach end. At the time of the accident, the wind was from 130 degrees at 10 knots and the density altitude was 4,136 feet. Examination of the engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded its operation prior to the accident.

After a normal cross country flight, the airplane was on final approach for landing to runway 20, when the air traffic controller instructed the pilot to "go-around" because a preceding airplane had not cleared the runway. The airplane was observed to pitch up and enter a steep, almost 90 degree left bank. The passenger in the rear seat described the flights from and to BAF as "smooth." She stated she thought that the airplane would be landing; however, then realized the airplane was in a left turn. The airplane impacted on the roof of a commercial building, and came to rest upright on a heading of 020 degrees, in a parking lot, about 1/4 mile east of the approach end the runway. Examination of the airplane, which included a teardown of the engine, did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact malfunctions. Weather reported at the airport about the time of the accident included winds from 240 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 status miles and few clouds at 6,500 feet. The pilot owned the airplane and had accumulated about 1,660 hours of total flight experience.

The pilot had left the airplane at Asheville on the day before the accident due to low cloud ceilings and visibility at Mountain Air Airport, his destination, and completed the trip by rental car. On the day of the accident the pilot returned the rental car and at 1656 departed Asheville in N396PM, enroute to Mountain Air Airport, 27 miles north of Asheville. The last radio contact with the pilot was at 1701:44, when the pilot told controllers at Asheville that he was in visual flight rule conditions, at 4,000 feet. The last radar contact with the flight was by FAA Atlanta Center, at 1704:00, when the flight was about 5 miles south of the accident site at 3,800 feet. The flight did not arrive at the destination, an emergency locator transmitter signal was received by satellite, and search and rescue operations were begun. The pilot and the wreckage of the airplane was located the next day about 1400. The airplane had collided with 75-foot tall trees, at about the 4,800-foot msl level on the side of Bullhead Mountain, while in a wings level attitude, while on a 170 degree heading. After the initial impact the airplane continued for another 300 feet, causing general breakup of the airplane. The main wreckage came to rest on a northerly heading. All components of the airplane were located at the crash site and there was no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction of the airplane structure, flight controls, airplane systems, engine, or propeller. A witness reported that the weather near the time of the accident on the Blue Ridge Parkway, located about 3/4 mile to the west of the crash site, was very foggy. Satellite images show clouds were present at the crash site and the Asheville airport, located 20 miles south-southwest of the crash site, reported overcast clouds 2,600 feet agl or 4,765 feet msl, and visibility 4 miles in haze, at the time of the accident. An Airmet for mountain obscuration due to clouds, mist, and haze was in effect at the time the pilot departed and the at the time of the accident. No record to show that the pilot received a weather briefing from a FAA Flight Service Station was found.