Douglas DC-6

While conducting a cargo flight, the crew encountered technical problems and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crash landed in the Brus lagoon located near Brus Laguna Airfield. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was written off.

Upon landing at La China Airstrip, one of the four engine exploded and caught fire. The crew stopped the aircraft and was able to evacuate the cabin before the airplane would be destroyed by fire.

On approach to Puerto Montt-El Tepual Airport, the crew encountered very bad weather conditions with rain falls and a limited visibility due to the night. In unknown circumstances, the four engine airplane crashed in flames in a swampy area located five km short of runway. All seven crew members and 31 passengers were killed while 44 other occupants were injured.

During the takeoff roll at Asmara Airport, the right main gear collapsed. The airplane veered off runway to the right and came to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Rubelsanto Airport, the four engine airplane was too low and struck the ground short of runway. The undercarriage were torn off on impact and the airplane crash landed on its belly. All three crew members escaped uninjured.

During acceleration, the flight engineer stated, "Look at that warning light on No. 3." There was no verbal response from any other crewmember. The aircraft was accelerated normally to V1 and V2, was rotated, and was lifted off without difficulty. Shortly after the captain called for gear and flaps up, a loud noise was heard and the flight engineer announced that they had lost the No. 3 engine. The No.. 1 blade of the No. 3 propeller had and the loss of the blade caused an imbalance that caused separation, almost instantly, of the No. 3 engine from the aircraft. The propeller blade penetrated the lower fuselage of the aircraft and penetrated the lower inboard side of the No. 2 engine. As the blade passed through the fuselage, it severed pneumatic, hydraulic, and emergency airbrake lines as well as the electrical wiring for propeller controls and some engine instruments. The first officer informed the captain that the engine had separated. The aircraft continued to climb and began a right turn. An emergency was declared and the crew requested and received clearance for a landing on runway 07. Debris was discovered on the intersection of runways 07/25 and 15/23, but the pilot decided to continue the approach. The aircraft touched down near the end of runway 07. The captain called for flap retraction and for the props to be put in reverse pitch. The engine sounds increased, and the first officer advised the captain that the propellers were not going into reverse and to use the brakes. As the engine sound decreased, the captain replied that nothing was happening. Maximum power was applied and the aircraft again took off, and cleared the blast fence at the end of the runway by approximately 30 feet (9 m). At 10:39:35, the crew advised the Hollywood-Burbank Tower that they had no brakes and that they were proceeding to the Van Nuys Airport (VNY). The crew the saw that the No. 2 oil pressure was low and that there was no BMEP indication. Attempts to feather the No. 2 propeller were not successful, and the No. 2 engine stopped with the propeller blades at a positive, low pitch angle. Van Nuys cleared the flight for landing on runway 16, but the crew replied that they wouldn't make it, and requested runway 34. At 10:43:22, the Van Nuys local controller cleared the flight to land on runway 34L. While approaching the airport, the airplane was losing altitude and airspeed. The crew realized that they would not make it to the runway. The throttles were retarded and a forced landing was attempted on the Woodley Municipal Golf Course, about 1 mile south of the Van Nuys Airport. The aircraft touched down on it's main landing gear and bounced three times. The nose of the aircraft struck a 24-inch-high (61 cm) concrete foundation of a partially constructed building. The aircraft came to rest against a house trailer parked nearby and caught fire about 20 minutes after it came to rest. Three crew members were killed while three other occupants were injured.

After takeoff from Santa Marta-Simón Bolívar Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ground about an engine failure and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. Shortly later, the airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea few km offshore. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.

Destroyed by fire at Bogotá-El Dorado Airport after being struck by an Aerocondor Lockheed L-188AF Electra registered HK-1976 that crashed on takeoff. The aircraft was empty at the time of the accident.

After takeoff from runway 10 at fairbanks Airport, while in initial climb, three engines failed simultaneously. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared to return when the airplane stalled, collided with trees and crashed 1,5 mile short of runway 19. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

The aircraft landed at Southend (SEN) from Antwerp (ANR) at 07:50 hrs on a day excursion. Following a 9 hour rest period, the crew reported for duty at 18:30 to prepare for the return flight. Start up and taxiing out were normal, and a limited power check was completed before takeoff. The Captain, had given a full pre-takeoff briefing before the aircraft left Antwerp that morning, and on this occasion only called for a 'standard briefing', but emphasized that the full abort procedures would be as given during his previous instruction. The First Officer was handling the aircraft from the right hand seat, and gave a shortened takeoff briefing which included the actions required for engine failure before and after V1. Both pilots were wearing headsets, (not fitted with boom microphones) but were not using these for flight deck intercommunication purposes; the Flight Engineer was not wearing a headset. The Captain, who controlled the only source of nose-wheel steering, lined up the aircraft at the beginning of runway 24. Brakes were released and, after stabilizing all four engines at 30 inches of manifold pressure, the First Officer advanced all the right hand throttle levers to takeoff power. The Flight Engineer followed this movement with his left hand on the left-hand group of throttle levers and, when takeoff power was achieved, held the throttle friction lever with his right hand. The captain 's left hand was on the nose steering wheel. At about 75-80 knots, shortly before V1, the captain instructed the Flight Engineer to adjust the power on engines 1 and 2 which were overboosting slightly. The Flight Engineer made this adjustment coincident with the captain calling V1 at about 88 knots, and very shortly afterwards the captain saw the red 'gear unsafe' warning light illuminate. Unknown to the captain or the First Officer the Flight Engineer had made an UP selection of the landing gear selector lever. He stated subsequently that he thought the captain had instructed him to do so shortly after calling V1. The pilots maintain that no such order was given and that nothing additional to the normal procedural calls was said by either of them. The aircraft subsided on to its nose and its propellers struck the runway; throttles were closed and the captain attempted to maintain directional control by use of rudder. The aircraft came to rest 3 metres from the end of the runway with its nose on the ground and with the main landing gear still extended. As soon as the aircraft came to rest the Flight Engineer, having closed the mixture controls to idle cut off and pulled the 'ganged switches' bar, left the aircraft through the right front exit door. On seeing exhaust fires in Nos. 2 and 3 engines he returned to the flight deck and carried out the appropriate engine fire drills. However Nor 3 engine continued to burn, and he extinguished this fire with a portable CO2 appliance. During this period, evacuation drills were initiated, and the passengers left the aircraft in an expeditious and reasonably orderly manner, mostly through the front exit, but some by chute from the rear exit, and a few from an overwing emergency exit.