British Airtours

British Airtours Flight 328 (also known as flight 28M) was a charter flight from Manchester to Corfu. At 06:08 in the morning the crew were cleared to taxi to runway 24 for departure. At 06:12 the aircraft had lined up on the runway and was cleared for takeoff. The takeoff was to be performed by the co-pilot. During the takeoff run the captain made the routine 'eighty knots' call and 12 seconds later a 'thump' or 'thud' was heard. The captain immediately ordered 'stop', closed the throttles an selected reverse thrust. The maximum speed achieved was 126 knots IAS. At first the captain thought they had suffered a tyre burst or a bird strike. The co-pilot had applied maximum wheel braking, however, because of the possible tyre burst, the captain said 'Don't hammer the brakes, don't hammer the brakes'. At 45 seconds after the start of the takeoff run, 9 seconds after the 'thud', as the aircraft decelerated trough 85 knots the captain radioed ATC that they were abandoning takeoff. The fire bell rang simultaneously and he added as he cancelled reverse thrust, 'it looks as though we've got a fire on number 1'. ATC confirmed this: 'right there's a lot of fire, they're on their way now.'. At 25 seconds past the 'thud' (and 20 seconds before the aircraft stopped) the crew decided to evacuate via the starboard side. The 737 was decelerating through 36 knots then and the captain warned the cabin crew about the evacuation six seconds later. After the aircraft stopped a no. 1 engine fire drill was carried out, the no. 2 engine was shut down and the passenger evacuation drill carried out. Before completion of this drill the captain saw fuel and fire spreading forward on the left side of the aircraft. Both flight crew members escaped through the sliding window in the right hand side. Immediately after the 'thud' an intense fire developed on the left-hand side of the plane, causing some cracking and melting of windows with some associated smoke in the aft cabin. This caused some passengers to stand up in alarm and move into the aisle. Immediately after coming to a halt the purser tried to open the right front door (R1) but the escape slide container jammed on the doorframe, preventing further movement of the door. He then crossed to the L1 door and opened it (25 seconds had passed since the aircraft had stopped). The purser then returned to the R1 door and managed to clear the obstruction and was able to open the door 85 seconds after the aircraft had stopped. Meanwhile passengers had managed to open the right hand overwing exit. The R2 (right rear) door had also been opened but no one escaped through this exit. In total 17 surviving passengers escaped through the L1 door, 34 through R1 and 27 through the overwing exit.

March 17, 1977 was the fourth day of a Boeing 707-436 conversion base training programme at Glasgow-Prestwick Airport (PIK). On the day of the accident the trainee first officer was in the right hand pilot's seat and was flying the first detail. The commander was in the left hand pilot's seat, and the captain under training was acting as flight engineer, being supervised by the fourth crew member, a supervisory first officer who was seated behind the commander. After completing all the necessary checks and the engine starting procedure the commander gave the trainee first officer a comprehensive briefing on cross wind takeoff techniques with reference to the local weather forecast, which gave a surface wind of 190° /18 knots gusting to 35 knots. In particular he emphasised the need for into-wind aileron, demonstrating the amount required, and for opposite rudder. At 08:42 the aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 13. While taxiing, the 'taxiing checklist' was completed. At the light aircraft weights used for training, standardized takeoff airspeeds were used as follows: V1 - 125 knots, VR - 135 knots and V2 - 145 knots. Based on the prevailing conditions and actual aircraft takeoff weight of 94,580 kg, the true takeoff airspeeds were: V1 - 125 knots, VR - 125 knots and V2 - 142 knots; the VMCG and the VMCA were 125 knots and 119 knots respectively. After receiving ATC clearance, the aircraft entered the active runway from the fast turnoff for runway 31. From this position the takeoff run available was approximately 2,388 metres; the takeoff run required was 1,433 metres. On entering the runway the commander handed over control to the trainee first officer and the aircraft commenced its takeoff run, from a rolling start, shortly after 08:48. The Tower passed a surface wind of 220° /15 knots and the trainee applied about 15° to 20° of into-wind aileron (ie right wing down) and some left rudder. Full power was then applied and the V1 and VR airspeeds were called by the flight engineer. As the aircraft was being rotated to a pitch attitude of 4 1/2° the commander simulated a No. 1 engine failure by retarding the appropriate thrust lever, and calling out "number one engine's failed." After the aircraft became airborne it climbed away in a normal manner to a height of approximately 20 to 30 feet when suddenly the left wing dropped about 20° and the No. 1 engine nacelle struck the left edge of the runway. The aircraft then began to yaw and roll to the right and to sink to the ground. The yaw/roll continued until No. 4 nacelle struck the runway and the aircraft then tracked sideways down the runway, with the engines and other parts of the structure breaking away and the landing gear collapsing. It came to a stop almost at the intersection of runway 03/21. The distance from the start of the takeoff roll to this point was approximately 2,230 metres. A fire erupted. The external fire was rapidly dealt with but the internal fire was not extinguished for some 50 minutes.