Pensacola-Intl

The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated passenger were departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight from runway 4 in a Cessna 340A about the same time that a private pilot and pilot rated passenger were departing on a visual flight rules repositioning flight from runway 36 in a Cessna 172M. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport. The runways at the nontowered airport converged and intersected near their departure ends. According to a witness, both airplanes had announced their takeoff intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), which was not recorded; the Cessna 340A pilot's transmission occurred about 10 to 15 seconds before the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission. However, the witness stated that the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission was not clear, but he was distracted at the time. Both occupants of the Cessna 172M later reported that they were constantly monitoring the CTAF but did not hear the transmission from the Cessna 340A pilot nor did they see any inbound or outbound aircraft. Airport video that captured the takeoffs revealed that the Cessna 172M had just lifted off and was over runway 36 approaching the intersection with runway 4, when the Cessna 340A was just above runway 4 in a wings level attitude with the landing gear extended and approaching the intersection with runway 36. Almost immediately, the Cessna 340A then began a climbing left turn with an increasing bank angle while the Cessna 172M continued straight ahead. The Cessna 340A then rolled inverted and impacted the ground in a nose-low and left-wing-low attitude. The Cessna 172M, which was not damaged, continued to its destination and landed uneventfully. The Cessna 340A was likely being flown at the published takeoff and climb speed of 93 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The published stall speed for the airplane in a 40° bank was 93 KIAS, and, when the airplane reached that bank angle, it likely exceeded the critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall. Examination of the Cessna 340A wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Because of a postcrash fire, no determination could be made as to how the radios and audio panel were configured for transmitting and receiving or what frequencies were selected. There were no reported discrepancies with the radios of the Cessna 172M, and there were no reported difficulties with the communication between the Cessna 340A and the Federal Aviation Administration facility that issued the airplane's IFR clearance. Additionally, there were no known issues related to the CTAF at the airport. Toxicological testing detected unquantified amounts of atorvastatin, diphenhydramine, and naproxen in the Cessna 340A pilot's liver. The Cessna 340A pilot's use of atorvastatin or naproxen would not have impaired his ability to hear the radio announcements, see the other airplane taking off on the converging runway, or affected his performance once the threat had been detected. Without an available blood level of diphenhydramine, it could not be determined whether the drug was impairing or contributed to the circumstances of the accident.

The pilot obtained a weather briefing from an Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) and filed an IFR flight plan before departing on an IFR flight from Cornelia, Georgia, to Pensacola, Florida, on May 10, 2006.The flight service specialist provided information on a line of embedded thunderstorm activity along the route from Atlanta to Mobile including SIGMETs and advised that tops were forecasted to be at 41,000 to 50,000 feet. The specialist suggested that the pilot not depart immediately because of the weather, but said that it might be possible to land at an intermediate stop ahead of the weather, possibly in Pensacola or further north in the Crestview area. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from Cornelia to Pensacola at 16,000 feet. The pilot called the AFSS again and requested an IFR clearance. The specialist responded that the clearance was on request, and that he would work on the void time and placed the pilot on hold. The specialist obtained the clearance from Atlanta Center and returned back to provide the clearance to the pilot. The pilot was not on the telephone line. The pilot departed Cornelia without an IFR clearance and contacted Atlanta Center. The controller informed the pilot on initial contact that he was not on his assigned heading, altitude, correct transponder code, and subsequently handed the pilot off to another controller. The flight was subsequently cleared direct to Panama City, Florida, and the pilot was instructed to climb to 16,000 feet. Atlanta Center broadcasted weather alerts over the radio frequency the pilot was on for Center Weather Advisory 101, SIGMETS 73C, 74C,and AIRMET Sierra between 0903 to 0913 CDT. The National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center, issued Severe Thunderstorm Watch 329 valid from 0635 CDT until 1300 CDT. The National Weather Service Aviation Weather Center issued Convective SIGMET 73C valid from 0855 CDT until 1055 CDT. The SIGMET was for a line of thunderstorms 40 nautical miles wide, and moving from 280 degrees at 35 knots. The tops of the thunderstorms were at 44,000 feet, with 2-inch hail, and possible wind gusts up to 60 knots. These weather alerts included the route of flight for the accident airplane. The controllers did not issue the pilot with severe radar-depicted weather information that was displayed on the controller's radar display. The airplane was observed on radar level at 16,000 feet at 09:19:48 CDT heading southwest. The airplane was observed to began a continuous left turn northwest bound at 15,700 feet at 09:20:38. The pilot called Atlanta center at 09:20:48 CDT and stated, "Aero Star six eight triple nine we're going to make a reverse." and there was no further radio contact with the pilot. The last radar return was at 09:20:59. The airplane was at 15, 600 feet. The wreckage was located on May 11, 2006. Examination of the wreckage revealed the right wing separated 9 feet 2 inches outboard of the wing root. The separated outboard section of the right wing was not recovered. The components were forwarded to the NTSB Laboratory for further examination. Examination of the components revealed the deformation patterns found on the fracture surfaces were consistent with upward bending overstress of the right wing.