Crash of a Douglas C-118A Liftmaster near Orting: 4 killed

Date & Time: Apr 1, 1959
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
53-3250
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
44621
YOM:
1955
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
In unknown circumstances, the four engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located five miles from Orting, killing all four crew members who were conducting a flight out from McChord AFB.

Crash of a De Havilland L-20A Beaver near Stehekin: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 12, 1959
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
53-2806
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Ellensburg - McChord
MSN:
600
YOM:
1954
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
En route from Ellensburg to the McChord AFB, the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a mountainous area covered by snow. As the aircraft failed to arrive at destination, SAR operations were conducted but eventually suspended few days later as no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. The following summer, walkers found the wreckage in an isolated area.
Crew:
Cpt Wade L. Shankle Jr.
Passenger:
John A. Ardussi.
Source & photos:
http://washingtonwreckchasing.blogspot.ch/2009_06_01_archive.html

Crash of a Boeing B-52D-40-BW Stratofortress in Fairchild AFB: 5 killed

Date & Time: Sep 8, 1958 at 1920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
56-0681
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fairchild - Fairchild
MSN:
464052
YOM:
1956
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Spokane AFB, consisting of visual and instruments approaches and landings. While approaching runway 23, at a distance of about three miles from the threshold, the crew cancelled his instruments approach to continue on visual mode. In the mean time, the second B-52 registered 56-0661 which was on second position must switch from visual mode to instruments approach procedures. To follow the approach procedures and as both crews were not coordinated, the approach controller instructed the first crew to gain altitude while turning to the right and instructed the second crew to reduce his altitude while turning to the left. Few seconds later, at an altitude of 900 feet, both aircraft collided and crashed. On board 56-0681, five crew members were killed while two others were seriously injured. On board 56-0661, only one crew survived, all eight others have been killed.
Probable cause:
The collision was the result of the approach procedures not being followed by the crew. The two bombers were practicing landing and takeoff maneuvers that included using instrument rules for parts of their flights and visual rules for other parts. The B-52 closer to the runway had just switched off its instrument maneuvers the B-52 farther away had not yet switched on its instruments. The control tower didn’t pick up the more distant B-52 until it was about three miles from the runway, when the closer bomber was on its final approach. The tower ordered the first plane to go up and to the right – a standard breakaway maneuver – while the closer one should have followed procedures to go down and to the left, to land. Instead, both planes pulled up and to the right, and into each other. Investigations were unable to determine the reason why the crew failed to follow the standard procedures and ATC instructions.

Crash of a Boeing B-52D-30-BW Stratofortress in Fairchild AFB: 8 killed

Date & Time: Sep 8, 1958 at 1920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
56-0661
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fairchild - Fairchild
MSN:
464033
YOM:
1956
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Spokane AFB, consisting of visual and instruments approaches and landings. While approaching runway 23, at a distance of about three miles from the threshold, the crew switched from visual mode to instruments. In the mean time, another B-52 registered 56-0681 which was on first position must switch from instruments to visual mode. To follow the approach procedures and as both crews were not coordinated, the approach controller instructed the first crew to gain altitude while turning to the right and instructed the second crew to reduce his altitude while turning to the left. Few seconds later, at an altitude of 900 feet, both aircraft collided and crashed. On board 56-0681, five crew members were killed while two others were seriously injured. On board 56-0661, only one crew survived, all eight others have been killed.
Probable cause:
The collision was the result of the approach procedures not being followed by the crew. The two bombers were practicing landing and takeoff maneuvers that included using instrument rules for parts of their flights and visual rules for other parts. The B-52 closer to the runway had just switched off its instrument maneuvers the B-52 farther away had not yet switched on its instruments. The control tower didn’t pick up the more distant B-52 until it was about three miles from the runway, when the closer bomber was on its final approach. The tower ordered the first plane to go up and to the right – a standard breakaway maneuver – while the closer one should have followed procedures to go down and to the left, to land. Instead, both planes pulled up and to the right, and into each other. Investigations were unable to determine the reason why the crew failed to follow the standard procedures and ATC instructions.

Crash of a Beechcraft C18 Expeditor in the Okanogan National Forest: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 23, 1958
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N164Z
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
7231
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The aircraft was carrying a crew of two and two firefighters who should be dropped in the Okanogan National Forest. While flying at low height to drop both passengers, the aircraft was caught by downdrafts and crashed in flames. All four occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control due to downdrafts.

Crash of a Douglas SC-47A at McChord AFB: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 13, 1958
Operator:
Registration:
42-93183
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
McChord - McChord
MSN:
13066
YOM:
1944
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances at McChord AFB while completing touch-and-go maneuvers. All three crew members were killed, among them T/Sgt Roy Edwin Craft.

Crash of a Boeing B-52D-75-BO Stratofortress at Fairchild AFB: 8 killed

Date & Time: Dec 12, 1957 at 1602 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
56-0597
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fairchild - Fairchild
MSN:
17280
YOM:
1956
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, December 12, 1957, U.S. Air Force B-52D Stratofortress, No. 56-0597, from the 92nd Bombardment Wing, was taking off from Runway 5 at Fairchild Air Force Base (AFB) on a routine training mission. According to eyewitnesses, as the aircraft left the runway, it made an abnormally steep climb to an altitude of approximately 2,000 feet. Fire started coming from the jet engines and pieces of metal began flying off the engine cowlings and mounts. The aircraft stalled, executed an abrupt, right wingover and appeared to level off. But, at an altitude of approximately 500 feet, the plane nose dived and crashed in a stubbled wheat field one mile west of the base. Exploding jet fuel sent a large column of smoke into the sky, attracting scores of curious onlookers. A crew member was injured while eight other occupants were killed:
Crew:
Maj Ralph Romaine Alworth, †
Cpt Douglas Earl Gray, †
1st Lt James Dennis Mann, †
Col Clarence Arthur Neely, †
Cpt Thomas N. Peebles, †
Cpt Douglas Franklin Schwartz, †
Cpt Herbert Henry Spiller Jr., †
1st Lt Jack Joseph Vainisi, †
T/Sgt Gene I. Graye.
Source: http://www.historylink.org/File/9857
Probable cause:
It is believed the loss of control was the consequence of an incorrect wiring of stabilizer trim switch.

Crash of a Douglas C-54B-20-DO Skymaster near Blyn: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 2, 1957 at 1719 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N90449
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Fairbanks – Seattle
MSN:
27239
YOM:
1944
Flight number:
AS100
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
12033
Captain / Total hours on type:
8023.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10791
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4532
Aircraft flight hours:
28835
Circumstances:
Alaska Airlines, Inc., is an air carrier certificated to conduct scheduled operations within the Territory of Alaska and between Alaska and the continental United States. Flight 100 of March 2 originated at Fairbanks, Alaska, as a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Seattle, Washington. The aircraft, N 90449, had arrived from Seattle at 0717 March 2 as Trip 101/1. Two minor discrepancies reported by the inbound crew were corrected during a turnaround inspection and by 0930 that morning the aircraft was ready for the return flight to Seattle. The crew assigned to Flight 100, Captain Lawrence F. Currie, Copilot Lyle O. Edwards, and Stewardess Elizabeth Goods, arrived at operations and made the normal routine preparations for the flight. The pilots discussed the flight with the station agent and all necessary flight papers were completed. Weather for the route was given to the pilots. The weight and balance were determined and both were well within allowable limits. The aircraft was serviced with 2,380 gallons of fuel. The following IFR flight plan was filed with Fairbanks ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control): Alaska 100, a DC-4, departing 10,000 feet Amber 2 Snag, 12,000 Blue 79 Haines, 10,000 Blue 79 Annette, 9,500 direct Port Hardy, 10,000 Amber 1 Seattle; airspeed 185; estimating 7 hours, 44 minutes en route; proposing 0955. At 0940 the two passengers and crew boarded the aircraft. Takeoff was made in VFR weather conditions at 0958. Shortly thereafter Fairbanks center called N 90449 and relayed the ATC clearance, approving the flight plan as filed. The weather conditions at Fairbanks and en route were forecast to be generally good and the flight proceeded in the clear as planned, making routine position reports as it progressed. At 1240, when over Haines, Alaska, at 12,000 feet, Flight 100 canceled its instrument flight plan and informed ARTC that they would proceed VFR to Annette and would file DVFR 2 (Defense Visual Flight Rule) after Annette and before entering the CADIZ (Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone). Thereafter the flight proceeded, reporting its position as DVFR at 1,000 feet. The flight was observed at Patricia Bay, British Columbia, at an estimated 3,000 feet m. s. l. by a tower operator. It was also observed leaving the CADIZ. At 1717 the Alaska Airlines Seattle dispatch office received the following position report by radio from Flight 100: "Dungeness at 16 VFR estimating Seattle at 34." This was the last contact with the flight, which crashed shortly thereafter. All five occupants were killed. N 90449 crashed in heavily timbered mountainous terrain March 2 and was not located until March 3, 1957. The crash occurred approximately in the center of the "on course" zone of the northwest leg of the Seattle low frequency radio range, about 11 nautical miles southeast of the Dungeness fan marker. This leg of the Seattle range defines the center of Amber Airway 1 between the Dungeness intersection and the range station. The minimum instrument en route altitude for this segment is 5,000 feet. Because of adverse weather and inaccessibility of the location, CAB investigators were unable to reach the scene until March 6. The investigators noted that the wreckage had been disturbed prior to their arrival; some components were missing, presumably carried away by persons unknown. The path of the aircraft during the final seconds of flight was clearly defined in the heavy timber growing on the steep slope against the aircraft smashed. The aircraft’s first contact with the trees was at a point 650 feet from the wreckage. From this point it cut a level swath on a heading of 106 degrees magnetic, the width of its wing span, into the steeply rising wooded slope at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet m. s. l. The terrain immediately ahead of the aircraft‘s path rose to an altitude of 2,000. 2,100 feet MSL.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a navigational error and poor judgment exhibited by the pilot in entering an overcast in a mountainous area at a dangerously low altitude. The following findings were reported:
- No malfunction or emergency existed and the aircraft was intact prior to its initial contact with the mountain,
- Several errors and omissions in the course of the flight Indicate the crew was lax and not giving proper attention to their duties,
- A navigational error resulted in the aircraft being three to four miles west of the flight path assumed by the crew,
- The pilot flew into instrument weather without obtaining a proper clearance,
- The aircraft crashed in terrain obscured by clouds.
Final Report:

Crash of a Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateer off NAS Sand Point

Date & Time: Aug 26, 1956 at 0930 LT
Operator:
Registration:
59695
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sand Point - Sand Point
MSN:
59695
YOM:
1943
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Lt. Thorson, pilot, and Lt. Shook, copilot, were scheduled for a local 2 ½ hour training flight in P4Y-2 registered 59695 at 0930LT. Due to marginal VFR conditions, they were briefed to conduct GCA runs and remain in the local pattern until the weather improved. The pilots completed the engine run-up and the take-off checklist (inadvertently missing the flaps). the tower informed the aircraft that the field was VFR and cleared the aircraft for take-off. The aircraft became airborne just prior to reaching the end of the runway in a near level attitude, no more than one to two feet in the air. As it passed the end of the runway and over the waters edge, a drop of about 10 feet, the loss of ground effect caused it to settle immediately. The aircraft settled to the water at full power about 300 feet from the end of the 5,000 foot runway. The aircraft planed on the main gear and belly and settled to a stop about 5,000 yards past the point of initial impact. An orderly ditching procedure followed. All personnel were out of the aircraft in approximately 45 seconds and in life rafts shortly thereafter. The aircraft sank in 175 feet of water in approximately 2 ½ minutes. The personnel were rescued by the NAS Seattle crash boat about 4 minutes later. Lt. Shook and one crewman received minor injuries while vacating the aircraft. During the run-out on the water, the bomb bay doors ripped open and one bomb bay tank was torn loose from the aircraft. All propeller blades were slightly bent from impact with the water. No other damage is believed to have occurred to the aircraft. Salvage operations commenced on August 28, 1956, and the aircraft was raised to the surface on August 31, 1956. However, a shackle pin to the hoisting sling broke while attempting to tow the aircraft ashore and the aircraft again sank to a depth of 210 feet. Lines had been secured to the two inboard engines and the engines broke off at the mounts when the sling shackle pin gave way. Further efforts to salvage the aircraft were abandoned as uneconomical.
Source:
http://www.memorieshop.com/Seattle/LakeWashington/PB4Y-2.html
Probable cause:
It was concluded that the primary cause of the accident was pilot error in attempting a no-flap take-off. It was also concluded that the pilot and copilot did not take corrective action soon enough during take-off to successfully abort the take-off.

Crash of a Boeing 377 Stratocruiser 10-30 off Seattle: 5 killed

Date & Time: Apr 2, 1956 at 0810 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N74608
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seattle – Portland – Chicago – New York
MSN:
15954
YOM:
1949
Flight number:
NW002
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
32
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
14030
Captain / Total hours on type:
1557.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7297
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1143
Aircraft flight hours:
18489
Circumstances:
Flight 2 was scheduled daily between Seattle, Washington. and New York, New York, with intermediate stops at Portland, Oregon, and Chicago., Illinois. It departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0806 on an IFR flight plan to Portland, Oregon, via Victor Airway 23 to cruise at 6,000 feet. There were 32 passengers arid a crew of six consisting of Captain Robert Reeve Heard, First Officer Gene Paul Johnson, Flight Engineer Carl Vernon Thomsen, Flight Service Attendant David V. Razey, Senior Stewardess Elinor A. Whitacre. and Junior Stewardess Dorothy L. Oetting. Takeoff was made on runway 20 and the flight climbed to an altitude of 1,000 to 1,200 feet. At this time power reduced and the wing flaps which had been set at the normal 25-degree takeoff position, were retracted at an airspeed of 145 knots. Immediately the crew became aware of severe buffeting and a strong tendency of the aircraft to roll to the left. Because the buffeting began almost immediately after the flaps ware retracted, the captain believed that it was due to a split-flap condition, i. e., the wing flaps on one side of the aircraft being retracted while the flaps on the other side remained partially or fully down. Power was reduced momentarily in an attempt to alleviate the buffeting but this was not effective and maximum continuous power was again restored. After being cleared by the Seattle tower for return the captain decided not to turn the aircraft because of control difficulty and advised that he would proceed to McChord Air Force Base at Tacoma. Thereafter, the captain testified the trouble became worse and the aircraft continued to lose altitude. The captain elected to ditch and did so at approximately 0810. Touchdown was on smooth water at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots and there was no abrupt deceleration. Passengers and crew members, except the captain and first officer, left the aircraft through the main cabin door and emergency exits. The captain and first officer, after a passenger count, left the aircraft through cockpit windows and swam to the left and right wings, respectively. The aircraft sank in approximately 15 minutes and by that time all persons on the wings had been supplied with buoyant cushions from the cabin seats. Those who survived were rescued by surface craft from the 42-degree F. water within 30 to 35 minutes from the time of ditching.
Probable cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of the accident Was the incorrect analysis of control difficulty which occurred on retraction of the wing flaps as a result of the flight engineer's failure to close the engine cowl flaps - the analysis having been made under conditions of great urgency and within an extremely short period of time available for decision. The following findings were reported:
- Two minutes after takeoff an emergency was declared because of severe buffeting and control difficulty,
- The flight engineer did not close the cowl flaps to takeoff position,
- The cause of the buffeting and control difficulty was not determined by the flight crew and the captain made a decision to ditch the aircraft in Puget Sound,
- The ditching was made under favorable circumstances. The aircraft sank in about 15 minutes and all survivors were rescued from the water shortly thereafter,
- The aircraft was recovered from aver 400 feet of water and examination disclosed that all engine cowl flaps were approximately full-open,
- The buffeting and control difficulty was caused by the improper setting of the engine cowl flaps,
- There was no failure or malfunction of the aircraft, the powerplants, or control systems prior to the ditching.
Final Report: