Texas

The 1,608-hour commercial pilot departed on a scheduled cargo flight. Prior to departure, he performed a preflight inspection and visually verified all five fuel tanks were full. The flight took approximately 1 hour for the 162 nautical mile cross-country flight. Prior to his return flight, he again checked the fuel and oil. He noted that, he had 3 hours of fuel on board. About 15 minutes after departure, the pilot switched to the auxiliary tanks. The pilot stated, "after 10-15 minutes on taking fuel from the auxiliary tanks, I switched to the right locker tank." Shortly thereafter, air traffic control instructed him to start a descent, and he selected the main fuel tanks. During the approach, the right engine began to "sputter". As the pilot was going through the engine failure checklist, the left engine "started sputtering." The pilot switched the auxiliary fuel pumps to high; then changed from the main tanks to the auxiliary fuel tanks. The airplane landed short of runway 12R. Inspection of the aircraft revealed, both auxiliary fuel tanks were "dry", the right main fuel tank contained approximately 3-inches of fuel, and the left main tank was "dry", but had been breached during the landing. The right wing locker fuel tank was full of fuel, and the transfer switch was in the off position. The left fuel selector was found in the left auxiliary position and the right fuel selector was found in the right auxiliary position. The main fuel line on the right engine had no fuel in it, and the line to the fuel manifold valve was empty as well. The left main fuel line had a "couple teaspoons" of fuel in it, and the fuel line to the left fuel manifold valve was absent of fuel.

While attempting to depart from the 3,500-foot long grass airstrip with a 14 knot quartering tailwind, the 5,800-hour pilot reported that at an airspeed of approximately 95 knots, "the airplane yawed left and rolled left abruptly as the aircraft came off the ground briefly." The airplane settled back onto the ground, before again climbing back into the air approximately 20 degrees left of the runway heading. Subsequently, the airplane’s landing gear struck tree tops before it impacted the ground. A passenger added that he "noticed the flaps were up during takeoff." Approximately three minutes after the accident, a weather reporting station located 5.6 nautical miles southwest of the accident site reported wind from 010 degrees at 14 knots. Examination of the engines revealed rotational scoring throughout the first and second stage turbines. No mechanical anomalies were observed.

The 9,500-hour ATP-rated pilot was forced to secure the left engine during a maintenance test flight following the malfunction of the left propeller. The crew executed single-engine instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 13. During short final, the crew noticed that the alternator light was illuminated and the hydraulic pressure gauge indicated "0" pressure. The landing gear was already extended and the flaps were partially extended, so the crew elected to continue the approach to a full-stop landing. Upon landing, the pilot immediately turned on the direct current (DC) hydraulic pump. The pilot added that he then realized that he was unable to maintain directional control of the airplane due to the lack of nose wheel steering and the ineffective wheel brakes. As a result, the airplane continued to veer to the right and exited the runway. The airplane collided with the airport perimeter fence and continued down into a drainage ditch. The examination of the aircraft revealed that the hydraulic pump switch did not appear as if it had been turned on.

On November 22, 2004, about 0615 central standard time, a Gulfstream G-1159A, N85VT, operated by Business Jet Services Ltd., struck a light pole and crashed about 3 miles southwest of William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas, while on an instrument landing system approach to runway 4. The two pilots and the flight attendant were killed, an individual in a vehicle near the airport received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The twin-engine airplane collided with a residential structure and terrain following a loss of control after the pilot experienced difficulties maintaining course during an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach while on instrument meteorological conditions. The impact occurred approximately 3.7 miles short of the approach end of the runway. Radar data depicted that after the 8,700-hour commercial pilot was vectored to the ILS Runway 3 approach, the airplane remained left throughout the approach before turning right of the localizer approximately 2 miles before the final approach fix (FAF). Radar then showed the aircraft turn to the left of course line. When the aircraft was abeam the FAF, it was approximately 1 mile left of the course line. As the aircraft closed to approximately 1.5 miles from the runway threshold, the aircraft had veered about 1.3 miles left of the course line (at which time air traffic control instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of 270 degrees). The aircraft continued to turn left through the assigned heading and appeared to be heading back to the ILS course line. According to the radar, another aircraft was inbound on the ILS course line and Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) instructed the pilot to turn left immediately. Thereafter, the aircraft went below radar coverage. A witness, located approximately 1.25 miles northwest of the accident site, reported that he heard a very loud noise, and then observed an airplane flying toward a building, approximately 60 feet in height. The airplane was observed to have pitched-up approximately 45 - 90 degrees just before the building and disappeared into the clouds. A second witness located approximately 1 mile northwest of the accident site reported that he heard a low flying aircraft, and then observed a white twin engine airplane banking left out of the clouds. The airplane leveled out, and flew into the clouds again a few seconds later. The witness stated that the airplane was at an altitude of 100- 200 feet above the ground. A third witness located adjacent to the accident site reported that they heard the sound of a low flying airplane in the distance. As the sound became louder and louder, they looked up and observed the airplane in a near vertical attitude as it impacted trees and the side of an apartment complex. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. A weather observation taken approximately 15 minutes after the accident included a visibility 4 status miles, light drizzle and mist, and an overcast ceiling at 400 feet.

The 18,000- hour pilot was cleared for takeoff in the vintage twin-engine tail wheel equipped airplane on a 9,501- foot by 50- foot runway. The pilot was aware that there was a tailwind from approximately 160 degrees at 10 knots. Shortly after starting the takeoff roll, the airplane swerved to the right. The pilot was able to correct back to the centerline utilizing rudder control. The airplane then swerved to the left, and full right rudder was applied but the swerve could not be corrected. By the time the airplane reached the left edge of the runway, the airplane had not reached its calculated V2 speed of 110 knots. The airplane departed the left side of the runway, went airborne and shortly thereafter, the right wing dropped and contacted the ground. The airplane then spun 180 degrees, impacted the ground, slid backward, and came to rest upright. A post-crash fire consumed the aft fuselage and left wing.

The 14,000-hour airline transport pilot was hired to fly the owner of the airplane and his mother on a cross country flight. Approximately 3 hours and 15 minutes into the flight, the pilot reported that he had a rough running engine and declared an emergency. A review of ATC voice communications revealed that the pilot had changed his mind several times during the emergency about diverting to a closer airport or continuing to the intended destination. Prior to his last communication, the pilot informed ATC that he, "was not gonna make it." The sole survivor of the accident reported that the flight was normal until they approached their destination. He said, "all of a sudden the engines did not sound right." The right engine sounded as if the power was going up and down and the left engine was sputtering. The airplane started to descended and the pilot made a forced landing in wooded area. The cockpit, fuselage, empennage, and the right wing were consumed by post-impact fire. A review of fueling records revealed that the pilot had filled the main tanks prior to the flight for a total of 213.4 gallons; of which 206 gallons were usable (103 gallons per side). During the impact sequence, the left wing separated at the wing root and did not sustain any fire damage. No fuel was found in the tank, and there was no discoloration of the vegetation along the left side of the wreckage path or around the area where the wing came to rest. The left fuel selector was found set to the LEFT MAIN tank, and the right fuel selector valve was set between the LEFT and RIGHT MAIN tanks. This configuration would have allowed fuel to be supplied from each tank to the right engine. A review of the airplane's Information Manual, Emergency Procedures Engine Failure During Flight (speed above air minimum control speed) instructed the pilot to re-start the engine, which included placing both fuel selector handles to the MAIN tanks (Feel for Detent). If the engine did not start, the pilot was to secure the engine, which included closing the throttle and feathering the propeller. The propellers were not feathered. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies.

The commercial pilot, who managed the airplane and jointly owned it with one of the passengers, departed from a 3,930-foot-long, asphalt runway on a warm day. Weight and balance calculations, which investigators derived from estimated weights for total fuel, passengers, and cargo loads, determined that the airplane was likely within center of gravity limitations and about 208 pounds below its maximum gross weight. One witness stated that the airplane became airborne near the end of the runway before it began a shallow climb and clipped small branches on the tops of trees that were about 30 feet tall. That witness and others observed that the airplane continued past the trees, made a steep bank to the left, rolled inverted, and nose-dived to the ground. The witnesses' descriptions of the airplane's flightpath and the examination of the debris path and wreckage at the accident site are consistent with an impact following an aerodynamic stall. According to calculations performed using the airplane's published performance data chart, for the airplane's configuration and estimated weight and the density altitude conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane would have required about 3,800 feet on a paved, level runway to clear a 50-foot obstacle with the pilot using the short-field takeoff technique. Although the chart does not make any allowances for an upsloping runway or provide data for a 30-foot obstacle, the runway slope is slight (a 27-foot rise over the entire length) and likely did not significantly increase the airplane's takeoff roll, and interpolation of the data revealed no significant distance differences for the shorter obstacle. However, according to the chart, the 3,800-foot distance is contingent upon the pilot holding the airplane's brakes, applying full engine power with the brakes set, and then releasing the brakes to initiate the takeoff roll. In addition, the airplane's ability to achieve its published performance parameters (which are derived from test flights in new airplanes) can be degraded by a number of factors, such as pilot deviations from the published procedures, reduced engine performance, or increased aerodynamic drag associated with minor damage and wear of the airframe. It could not be determined where on the runway the pilot initiated the takeoff roll or at what point full engine power was applied. However, because the runway was only 130 feet longer than the airplane required (according to its published performance data), there was little margin for any deviations from the published takeoff procedure. Although examination of the engines, propellers, and related systems revealed no evidence of precrash anomalies, postaccident damage precluded engine performance testing to determine whether the engines were capable of producing their full-rated power. Therefore, the significance of maintenance issues with the airplane (in particular, a mechanic's assessment that the turbochargers needed to be replaced and that the airplane's required annual inspection was not completed) could not be determined with respect to any possible effect on the airplane's ability to perform as published. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and insurance records revealed evidence that the pilot may have been deficient with regard to his ability to safely operate a PA 60-601P. For example, according to FAA records, as a result of an April 2004 incident in which the pilot landed the accident airplane on a wet grassy runway with a tailwind, resulting in the airplane going off the runway and striking a fence, the FAA issued the pilot a letter of reexamination to reexamine his airman competency. However, the pilot initially refused delivery of the letter; he subsequently accepted delivery of a second letter (which gave the pilot 10 days to respond before the FAA would suspend his certificate pending compliance) and contacted the FAA regarding the matter on Monday, August 2, 2004 (the day before the accident), telling an FAA inspector to "talk to his lawyer." In addition, as a result of the same April 2004 incident, the pilot's insurance company placed a limitation on his policy that required him to either attend a certified PA-60-601P flight-training program before he could act as pilot-in-command of the accident airplane or have a current and properly certificated pilot in the airplane with him during all flights until he completed such training. There was no evidence that the pilot adhered to either of the insurance policy requirements. In addition, the FAA had a previous open enforcement action (a proposed 240-day suspension of the pilot's commercial certificate) pending against the pilot for allegedly operating an airplane in an unsafe manner in September 2003; that case was pending a hearing with an NTSB aviation law judge at the time of the accident. Although the FAA's final rule for Part 91, Subpart K, "Fractional Ownership Operations," became effective on November 17, 2003, the regulations apply to fractional ownership programs that include two or more airworthy aircraft. There was no evidence that the pilot had a management agreement involving any other airplane; therefore, the rules of Part 91, Subpart K, which provide a level of safety for fractional ownership programs that are equivalent to certain regulations that apply to on-demand operators, did not apply to the accident flight. In the year before the accident, the FAA had conducted a ramp check of the pilot and the accident airplane and also conducted an investigation that determined there was not sufficient evidence that the pilot was conducting any illegal for-hire operations.

A designated pilot examiner (DPE) was administering a type-rating check ride from the jump seat (located behind co-pilot's seat), and instructed the second-in-command (SIC) (required for the check ride and occupying the front right seat) to reduce the power on one engine to simulate a single engine approach. Approximately 23 seconds later, the airplane began to "drop rapidly." To arrest the descent, both pilots simultaneously applied full power on both engines, and the applicant (occupying the front left seat) increased the airplane's pitch attitude to 12 degrees. However, the airplane continued to descend and touched down short of the landing threshold for the runway. A post-impact fire consumed the airplane. According to the applicant, after takeoff, he demonstrated several maneuvers, and was then provided vectors for a VOR instrument approach. While executing the approach, it was "really bumpy", and they hit a gust of wind, which resulted in him having to correct the airplane's attitude back to straight and level flight. When the airplane was approximately one mile from the end of the runway, he looked outside and saw that he was high on the approach and extended the flaps to 40 degrees. Shortly after, the PIC reduced power on the left engine to simulate a single-engine approach. When the airplane was approximately 1/4 to 1/2-mile from the end of the runway, at 400 feet mean sea level (msl) (about 366 feet above ground level), Vref 110, the airplane began to sink rapidly, and it impacted the ground. The applicant said that he, "never experienced wind shear like that before...and in hindsight it would have been more helpful if they had a better understanding of the wind conditions before they tried to land." Under current FAA regulations, even though the pilot in the right seat (the applicant's flight instructor) acted as the SIC for the purpose of the check ride, the applicant was not type rated in the airplane, and technically, could not be designated as the pilot-in-command (PIC). The instructor was type rated in the airplane; and therefore, was the PIC.

The airplane lost engine power during descent. The 1,127-hour pilot elected to perform emergency engine out procedures and prepared for an emergency landing. After impact, the pilot observed the right engine nacelle engulfed in flames, which then spread to the fuselage. Review of the engine logbook revealed the engine was being operated in excess of 1,000 hours of the manufacturer's recommended time between overhauls of 3,600 hours. The airplane received post-impact fire damage. Further examination of the engine revealed severe fire damage, but no mechanical deficiencies.