Texas

The pilot reported that shortly after takeoff the engine lost power momentarily, just before losing power completely. The pilot performed an emergency landing in a nearby field. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the forced landing. The airframe, engine, and engine accessories were examined. Fuel was noted at the engine, and no anomalies were revealed that would have contributed to the accident. The cause of the loss of power could not be determined.

After takeoff, the right engine experienced a loss of power followed by the left engine losing power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane toward the nearest open field and the airplane impacted terrain during landing, resulting in a circumferential split in fuselage near the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane was equipped with 4 fuel tanks: 2 located in each wing outboard of the engine nacelle (65-gallon capacity), 1 main fuselage tank (about 44-gallon capacity), and 1 auxiliary tank located in forward section of baggage compartment (45-gallon capacity). The airplane was capable of carrying 209.5 gallons usable fuel and the pilot stated that prior to departure he filled the main fuselage tank to capacity, added 20 gallons in the auxiliary tank and 25 gallons in each wing tank, which he equated to a total of 131 gallons on board. The fuselage contained two fuel filler necks, one for each fuselage tank (main and auxiliary). The auxiliary tank was clearly placarded with a red placard visibly standing out against a silver paint stripe; the main tank was not clearly placarded, with a red placard blending easily with red paint stripe. A salvage retriever recalled that during recovery the left wing contained 17 gallons of fuel, the right wing contained 57 gallons of fuel, the main fuselage tank contained 2.5 gallons of fuel, and the auxiliary fuselage tank contained 28 gallons of fuel. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The main fuselage tank and auxiliary fuselage tank were not breached and the fuel sumps contained check valves which prevent the back-flow of fuel from one fuel tank to another. Based on the evidence it is likely that the pilot exhausted the airplane's fuel supply in the main fuselage tank, which resulted in the loss of power to both engines.

The airplane impacted terrain shortly after takeoff. The wreckage distribution was consistent with a high airspeed, low angle-of-attack impact. Examination of the ground scars and wreckage indicated that the landing gear was down, the flaps were down, and the engines were operating at a high power setting at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe, engines, and related systems revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures. According to the owner’s manual for the airplane, the flaps should have been retracted and the landing gear should have been brought up as soon as a climb profile was established. Based upon the location of the wreckage, the direction of the impact, and the location of the airport, it is likely that the airplane crashed within one or two minutes after takeoff. The extended landing gear and flaps degraded the climb performance of the airplane. The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate and had recent night flight experience. Toxicological results were positive for azacyclonol and ibuprofen but were not at levels that would have affected his performance. According to family members, the pilot normally slept from 2230 or 2300 to 0700; the accident occurred at 0015. Although the investigation was unable to determine how long the pilot had been awake before the accident or his sleep schedule in the three days prior to the accident, it is possible that the pilot was fatigued, as the accident occurred at a time when the pilot was normally asleep. The company did not have, and was not required to have guidance or a policy addressing fatigue management.

The pilot was established on the localizer portion of the instrument landing system approach outside the final approach fix in visual meteorological conditions above clouds. He was then given vectors away from the localizer course by an air traffic controller. The vectors were close together and included a left 90-degree turn, a descent, and a 180-degree right turn back toward the localizer course. During the right turn and descent, the airplane continued turning with increasing bank and subsequently impacted the ground. According to a pilot weather report and flight path data the pilot entered clouds as he was starting the right turn toward the localizer. The combination of descending turns while entering instrument conditions were conducive to spatial disorientation. Further, the heading changes issued by the air traffic controller were rapid, of large magnitude, and, in combination with a descent clearance, likely contributed to the pilot’s disorientation. Diphenhydramine, a drug that may impair mental and/or physical abilities, was found in the pilot’s toxicological test results. While the exact effect of the drug at the time of the accident could not be determined, it may have contributed to the development of spatial disorientation.

The pilot obtained three weather briefings before departure. At that time, the current weather along the route of flight showed significant convective activity and a moving squall line, and the forecast predicted significant thunderstorm activity along the planned route of flight. The pilot was concerned about the weather and mentioned that he would be looking for "holes" in the weather to maneuver around via the use of his on-board weather radar. He decided to fly a route further south to avoid the severe weather. Radar data indicates that, after departure, the pilot flew a southerly course that was west of the severe weather before he asked air traffic control for a 150-degree heading that would direct him toward a "hole" in the weather. A controller, who said he also saw a "hole" in the weather, told the pilot to fly a 120-degree heading and proceed direct to a fix along his route of flight. The airplane flew into a line of very heavy to intense thunderstorms during cruise flight at 25,000 feet before the airplane began to lose altitude and reverse course. The airplane then entered a rapid descent, broke up in flight, and subsequently impacted terrain. Review of recorded precipitation data showed that there was substantial information available to the controller about moderate to extreme weather along the aircraft’s route of flight. While the controller stated that he saw a hole or clear area ahead of the aircraft, this is contradicted by both the recorded data and the statement of a second controller working the D-position at the time of the accident. The first controller did not advise the pilot of the severe weather that was along this new course heading and the pilot entered severe weather and began to lose altitude. The controller queried the pilot about his altitude loss and the pilot mentioned that they had gotten into some "pretty good turbulence." This was the last communication from the pilot before the airplane disappeared from radar. Review of recorded precipitation data showed that there was substantial information available to the controller about moderate to extreme
weather along the aircraft’s route of flight. The controller did not provide advisories to the pilot regarding the adverse weather's immediate safety hazard to the accident flight as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65. Examination of the recovered sections of flight control surfaces revealed that all of the fractures examined exhibited signs consistent with overstress failure. There was no evidence of preexisting cracking on any of the fracture surfaces examined and no preaccident anomalies were noted with the engines.

The pilot added fuel to the multi-engine airplane prior to departure. While en route to the destination airport, the pilot noted that the fuel gauges indicated that the right main-tank appeared to be almost empty and the left tank appeared half full. The pilot initiated the crossfeed procedure in an effort to supply fuel to both engines from the left main tank. Shortly after beginning the crossfeed procedure, both engines experienced a total loss of power. The pilot notified air traffic control (ATC) and selected a field to perform a forced landing. Prior to touchdown, the right engine produced a surge of power and, in response, the airplane rolled to the left. The surge abruptly ended and the pilot continued the forced landing by lowering landing gear and extending the flaps. The airplane impacted the ground, coming to rest in an open field. A postimpact examination did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Although both fuel tanks were ruptured, the accident scene did not contain a large amount of residual fuel. A small fuel slick was found on the surface of a nearby pond; however, the grass area underneath both wings did not contain dead grass; this would have been expected if there was more than a negligible amount of fuel in the tanks at time of impact.

The pilot was spraying a marshy area for mosquitoes. After making a spray pass, he made a right 180-degree turn to an easterly heading and the right wing struck a radio tower. The pilot didn't know the extent of the damage and there appeared to be a "controllability issue." He elected to land in a pasture. During the landing, the airplane struck and killed a cow and a bull, then collided with a pile of wood, resulting in substantial damage. The unlit 100-foot radio tower was within the walls of a correctional facility, was used for ground communications, and has been there for several years. It was not marked on sectional charts.

The Learjet 40 was being operated by two A&P mechanics for the purpose to taxi out for an engine test run on the n°1 engine. During taxi it was necessary to stop the aircraft for motor vehicle traffic. The mechanic advanced the throttles for taxi and to climb a 15 to 20 foot hill. When the mechanic attempted to reduce the throttles only the n° 2 engine could be retarded. The n°1 engine was at a high power setting and could not be reduced. The aircraft left 4 skid marks as the main tires were locked for approximately the length of a little more than a football field. The mechanics could not shut down the n°1 engine. Control of the aircraft was lost with the n°1 engine at a high power setting. The right wing impacted the corner of a hanger. The nose gear broke and an embankment stopped the aircraft. The mechanics were then able to shut down both engines and exited the aircraft with no injuries.

Aircraft was on an instrument approach when it crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injuries, and the first officer sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to FedEx Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo flight. The flight departed from Fort Worth Alliance Airport, Fort Worth, Texas, about 0313. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.

The pilot was cleared to 17,000 feet approximately 7 minutes after takeoff. After arriving at 17,000 feet, radar showed the airplane in a meandering flight path increasingly off course that continued through the end of the flight, even after several prompts from the controller. The pilot was cleared to flight level 240 (24,000 feet) after about 6 minutes at 17,000 feet, and about 2 minutes later, while passing through about 18,000 feet, he made his last radio transmission, acknowledging a corrected heading. About 6 minutes later, the airplane arrived at 24,000 feet and the pilot did not make any intelligible responses to controller inquiries for the remainder of the flight. At 1456, radar showed the airplane in a descent to 21,000 feet before beginning a rapid descent and continuing to impact. The airplane was substantially damaged by the impact forces and the pilot, who was the only occupant, was fatally injured. During the review of the air traffic control recordings, it was determined that none of the voice transmissions from N43KM sounded as if the pilot was speaking through an oxygen mask microphone. At the accident scene both bleed air switches were observed to be in the closed position and the airplane pressurization switch on the console was observed to be in the dump position. No other preimpact anomalies were observed that would have prevented the normal operation of the airplane.