Crash of a Cessna 550 Citation II in Southampton

Date & Time: May 26, 1993 at 0634 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
G-JETB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oxford - Southampton - Eindhoven
MSN:
550-0288
YOM:
1981
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
16700
Captain / Total hours on type:
850.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1322
Copilot / Total hours on type:
109
Aircraft flight hours:
4315
Aircraft flight cycles:
3306
Circumstances:
Cessna Citation G-JETB was to fly eight passengers from Southampton (SOU) to Eindhoven (EIN). Because G-JETB had arrived at Oxford (OXF) the previous evening, the airplane had to be ferried to Southampton early in the morning. This as a regular occurrence. The co-pilot had agreed with the airport authorities at both Oxford and Southampton that the aircraft would operate outside normal hours on the understanding that no fire cover would be provided. Following the takeoff from Oxford at 05:19 the crew contacted Brize Norton ATC and agreed a Flight Information Service. They maintained VMC for the transit at 2,400 feet QNH and called Southampton ATC on their alternate radio at 05:25 when they were approximately 30 nm from Southampton. The Southampton controller was surprised at their initial call and advised them that the airport did not open until 06:00. The crew informed him that arrangements had been made for an early arrival and the controller asked them to standby while he checked this agreement. At 05:27 he called G-JETB, informed the crew that they could land before the normal opening hours and asked them to confirm that no fire cover was required. The crew confirmed this and were then told that runway 02 was in use with a wind of 020 deg./14 kt and that there was a thunderstorm right over the airport. The crew then advised Brize Norton radar that they were going to Southampton ATC and left the Brize Norton frequency. Following a further check with Southampton they were given the 0520 weather observation: "Surface wind 040 deg/12 kt, thunderstorms, 2 oktas of stratus at 800 feet, 3 oktas of cumulonimbus at 1,800 feet, temperature 12 C, qnh 1007 mb, qfe 1006 mb, the runway is very wet." At 05:30 the controller asked the crew for the aircraft type and, after being told that it was a Citation II, told the crew that the visibility was deteriorating ("Now 2,000 metres in heavy thunderstorms" ) and cleared them to the Southampton VOR at 3,000 feet QNH. After checking that they were now IFR the controller confirmed the clearance, and the QNH of 1007 mb, and informed the crew that there was no controlled airspace and that he had no radar available to assist them. Shortly afterwards the controller advised the crew that: "Entirely at your discretion you may establish on the ILS localiser for runway 20 for visual break-off to land on runway 02." The commander accepted this offer and, within the cockpit, asked the co-pilot for the surface wind. He was informed that it was 040 degrees but that earlier they had been given 020 deg/14 kt. At 05:32 the commander had positioned on the ILS for runway 20 and began his descent; the co-pilot advised Southampton that they were established. The controller acknowledged this and again passed the QNH. Shortly afterwards he asked the crew to report at the outer marker and this message was acknowledged. At 05:33 the crew called that they were visual with the runway and the controller cleared them for a visual approach, left or right at their convenience, for runway 02. As this transmission was taking place, the commander informed his co-pilot that they would land on runway 20. The commander decided this because he could see that the weather at the other end of the runway appeared very black and he had mentally computed the tailwind component to be about 10 kt. After a confirmation request from the co-pilot to the commander, the co-pilot informed the Southampton controller that they would land on runway 20. The controller then advised them that: "You'll be landing with a fifteen knot, one five knot, tailwind component on a very wet runway" ; this was immediately acknowledged by the co-pilot with: "roger, copied thank you". The crew continued with their approach, initially at 15 kt above their computed threshold speed (VREF) of 110 kt and then at a constant VREF+10 kt. Within the cockpit the commander briefed the co-pilot that if they were too fast the co-pilot was to select flap to the takeoff position and they would go-around; they also discussed the use of the speedbrake and the commander stated that he would call for it when he wanted it. The speed at touchdown was within 5 kt of the target threshold speed and touchdown was in the vicinity of the Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPIs), according to witnesses in the Control Tower and on the airport; the commander was certain that he had made a touchdown within the first 300 feet of the runway. The PAPIs are located 267 metres along the runway. Speedbrake was selected as the aircraft touched down and, although the commander applied and maintained heavy foot pressure on the brakes, no retardation was apparent; external observers reported heavy spray from around the aircraft. At some stage down the runway the commander stated that the brakes were not stopping them and the co-pilot called for a go-around ; the commander replied : "No we can't" as he considered that a go-around at that stage would be more dangerous. He maintained brake pressure and, in an attempt to increase distance, steered the aircraft to the right edge of the runway before trying to steer back left. Initially the aircraft nose turned to the left and the aircraft slid diagonally off the right side of the runway on to the grass. It continued across the grass for a distance of approximately 233 metres while at the same time yawing to the left. However, 90 metres beyond the end of the runway there is an embankment which forms the side of the M27 motorway and G-JETB slid down this embankment on to the motorway. The aircraft continued to rotate as it descended and came to rest, having turned through approximately 150 degrees, with its tail on the central barrier. During these final manoeuvres the aircraft collided with two cars travelling on the eastbound carriageway; the aircraft and one of the cars caught fire. During the approach of the aircraft, the airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) duty officer had discussed with the duty ATC controller the imminent arrival of G-JETB. Although not all checks had been complete, the fire officer offered his two fire vehicles as a weather standby ; he did not declare his section operational but agreed with ATC that they would position themselves to the west of the runway. When the aircraft was 1/2 to 2/3 down the runway, the ATC controller considered that the aircraft would not stop in the runway available and activated the crash alarm. The fire section obtained clearance to enter the runway after G-JETB had passed their position and followed the aircraft. Assessing the situation on the move, the fire officer ordered the FIRE 2 vehicle to disperse through the crash gate to the motorway, and took his own vehicle (FIRE 1) to the edge of the embankment. On arrival, the fire section contained the fires. The occupants of the aircraft and cars escaped with minor injuries.
Probable cause:
The investigation identified the following causal factors:
- The commander landed with a reported tailwind of 15 knots which was outside the aircraft maximum tailwind limit of 10 knots specified in the Cessna 550 Flight Manual.
- The copilot did not warn the commander that he was landing with a reported tailwind component which was outside the aircraft limit.
- With a tailwind component of 10 knots, the landing distance available was less than the landing distance required.
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed L-1329 JetStar 731 in Southampton

Date & Time: Nov 27, 1992 at 1616 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N6NE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Istanbul – Southampton
MSN:
5006
YOM:
1961
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8400
Circumstances:
Completing a flight from Istanbul to Southampton, the aircraft flew a procedural ILS and landed on runway 20. The crew report that they encountered wind shear on the final approach and they increased power to compensate for a loss of 10 knot of airspeed. The aircraft landed some 500 feet into the runway and, after touchdown, maximum braking appeared to be ineffective. The crew suspected aquaplaning and activated reversed thrust but they report that correct deployment was not indicated on the flight deck and so they assumed that it was not operating. Despite weaving along the remaining 1,500 feet of runway they were unable to prevent the aircraft from over running the end. The aircraft came to rest some 75 metres into the grass area beyond. Debris, consisting of earth and stones was ingested by the engines and the right wing tank was punctured. An inspection of the runway 10 minutes previously showed that, although the runway was wet, there was no standing water. A runway friction test was carried out at 1646 hrs and this gave the friction on the first, second and third runway segments as 0.67 Mu, 0.66 Mu and 0.57 Mu respectively.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.60G Moth in East Stratton

Date & Time: Aug 8, 1989 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-AANF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Liss - Popham
MSN:
49
YOM:
1929
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1300
Captain / Total hours on type:
70.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on a flight from Liss to Popham and was being accompanied by a PA 18 which was in contact with Farnborough Radar. Overhead East Stratton, the Gypsy Moth experienced a loss of power and the pilot elected to carry out a precautionary landing. The landing was satisfactory. The pilot had shut down the engine and climbed out of the cockpit before he became aware of burning straw under the tail. Attempts to remove the straw and extinguish the fire were unsuccessful, and the aircraft was rapidly engulfed in flames. The fuel tank exploded, resulting in a substantial fire and some damage to trees and bushes surrounding the field.
Probable cause:
Loss of engine power in flight for undetermined reasons.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 441 Conquest II in Blackbushe: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 26, 1987 at 1145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-MOXY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Leeds - Blackbushe
MSN:
441-0154
YOM:
1980
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Aircraft flight hours:
5135
Circumstances:
The accident occurred at Blackbushe airfield following a go-around from an approach to land on runway 26. The aircraft appeared to begin the go-around normally but was then seen to bank to the left and start turning left. The turn continued through 135° of heading, at a low height, with the bank angle increasing progressively, until the aircraft crashed into trees, semi-inverted, approximately 550 meters from the runway 26 threshold. The reason for the initiation of the go-around was an unsafe main landing gear indication caused by a defective microswitch. The reasons for the subsequent loss of control could not be determined.
Probable cause:
The effectiveness of the investigations was considerably reduced by the lack of flight recorders. There was no evidence of pilot incapacitation. Extensive examination of the wreckage revealed no flap or flying control malfunction, neither was there any evidence of failure of either engine or propeller control mechanism. The curved flight path of the aircraft from go-around to impact and progressive increase in bank angle suggest that an asymmetric thrust condition was most probable.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-5D Buffalo in Farnborough

Date & Time: Sep 5, 1984 at 1618 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GCTC
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Farnborough - Farnborough
MSN:
103
YOM:
1980
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10400
Captain / Total hours on type:
1300.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3600
Copilot / Total hours on type:
30
Aircraft flight hours:
902
Circumstances:
During the 1984 Farnborough International Air Display de Havilland Canada was to fly a display using DHC-5D C-GCTC, DHC-6 Twin Otter C-GFJQ, and both Dash 7 and Dash 8 prototypes C-GNBX and C-GDNK. Brakes were released at 16:16 and the Buffalo commenced its takeoff run as the third aircraft in the DHC combine behind the Dash 7 and Dash 8. Immediately after takeoff the Buffalo carried out a steep climb to a height of 1000 feet agl. Following a descending turn to the right, the airplane carried out a low level flypast along the display line at height of 250 feet agl and an airspeed of 215 kts. The Buffalo then entered a climbing turn to the left through about 270 degrees, before reversing bank in order to position for a right hand final approach for a STOL landing back onto runway 25. During this manoeuvre the landing gear was selected down and the copilot lowered the ramp and opened the rear cargo door. At a height of 450 feet agl the nose dropped significantly and the rate of descent increased. The DHC-5 continued in a steep side-slipping and descending turn to the right. Shortly before touchdown the rate of descent reduced slightly. The aircraft then landed very hard. The nose gear collapsed, both wings failed and the propellers disintegrated after contacting the runway. Debris caused some damage to vehicles and three aircraft in the static display area.
Probable cause:
An error of judgement by the aircraft commander. Unfavourable weather conditions, a transitory handling problem whilst flying outside the tested flight regime and the pressure on the commander to complete his flying sequence, where probably contributing factors.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver AL1 in Popham

Date & Time: Feb 1, 1983
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XV272
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Popham - Popham
MSN:
1651
YOM:
1967
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew (on student pilot and one instructor) was completing a local training flight at Popham Airfield. On final approach, the student pilot mistakenly selected full flaps, causing the aircraft to lose height and struck the ground. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft was written off. Both occupants were uninjured.
Probable cause:
Wrong flaps selection on part of the student pilot on final approach.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver AL1 in Dummer Hill: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XP819
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
1482
YOM:
1961
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Middle Wallop on a liaison flight with one passenger and one pilot on board. While trying to land in a field in foggy conditions, the airplane overshot then struck a fence and crashed in flames near the M3 motorway. The aircraft was destroyed by fire and both occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Blackbushe: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 19, 1975 at 0811 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-BBPV
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Blackbushe - Stansted
MSN:
31-7305097
YOM:
1973
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5391
Captain / Total hours on type:
122.00
Aircraft flight hours:
771
Circumstances:
The aircraft was en route from Blackbushe to Stansted when about three minutes after takeoff it descended to aerodrome level and flew into some trees which were obscured by fog and low cloud. The aircraft caught fire and the pilot, the sole occupant, was killed.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the aircraft descending into fog covered ground. No reason for this loss of height could be positively established but there is a strong possibility that the pilot's ability to fly the aircraft became impaired by the onset of symptoms associated with coronary artery disease.
Final Report:

Crash of a Breguet Bre.1150 Atlantic in Farnborough: 6 killed

Date & Time: Sep 20, 1968 at 1513 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
43/F-XCVX
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Farnborough - Farnborough
MSN:
43
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
Registered 43 (F-XCVX), the aircraft was engaged in a demo flight at the annual Farnborough Airshow and was carrying five officers of the flottille 22F based at Nîmes-Garons Naval Air Station, France. Following several circuits, the crew decided to make a new low pass in front of the spectators with the left engine shut down and its propeller feathered. On final, while at an altitude of 300 feet and a speed of 140 knots with the flaps down to 10°, the aircraft stalled and crashed in a huge explosion on a parking located few hundred yards short of runway. Upon impact, the empennage was torn off and crashed on the roof of the staff mess of the British Air Force Aeronautical Research Center. All five crew members were killed as well one man on the ground.
Crew:
Cpt Jean-Yves Saint-M'Leux,
OE1 G. Durand,
EV C. Lemaire,
QM R. Bequier,
S/Maj A. Goasguen.
Probable cause:
As a result of the undercarriage having been left extended, it is possible that the air speed at the time of unfeathering the port prop was less than normal, and less than intended by the pilot. This in itself would not have resulted in an accident. Possibly because of [a] control jam, the rudder deflection necessary at this speed to balance the asymmetric thrust of the starboard engine and the drag of the unfeathered port propeller, was not applied. This was the most important cause, and allowed yaw, sideslip and roll to develop to the extent that the pilot had inadequate control of the port turn which he had initiated. The aircraft’s height and speed were insufficient to permit recovery by a reduction of power on the starboard engine. Bank therefore increased beyond the point at which level flight could be sustained, and the aircraft stalled in the turn and crashed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver AL1 at RAF Middle Wallop

Date & Time: Jul 5, 1967
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XV269
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1620
YOM:
1966
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to RAF Middle Wallop, the single engine airplane was too low, struck a hedge and eventually came to rest against a tree. There were no casualties but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Too low approach on part of the pilot-in-command.