Crash of an Avro 748-378-2B in Stansted

Date & Time: Mar 30, 1998 at 2331 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-OJEM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Stansted - Leeds-Bradford
MSN:
1791
YOM:
1982
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
40
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6100
Captain / Total hours on type:
3950.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
250
Aircraft flight hours:
18352
Aircraft flight cycles:
19122
Circumstances:
Immediately after take-off from London (Stansted) Airport, on a night flight with 30 passengers and 4 crew on board, an uncontained failure of the right engine occurred. This resulted in sudden power loss and a major engine bay fire. The commander elected to land back on the runway. The aircraft overran the paved surface, and uneven ground in the overrun area caused the nose landing gear to collapse. After the aircraft had come to rest, with the engine bay fire continuing, the crew organized a rapid evacuation and all the occupants escaped, with little or no injury. The engine bay fire was extinguished by the Airport Fire Service (AFS), but fuel release continued for some hours.
Probable cause:
The engine failure was caused by high-cycle fatigue cracking of the High Pressure (HP) turbine disc. Four similar Dart turbine failures had occurred over the previous 26 year period. These had been attributed to a combination of turbine entry flow distortion and turbine blade wear. The following causal factors were identified:
- Significant reduction in the fatigue strength f the HP turbine disc due to surface corrosion,
- Inadequate control of the fit between engine turbine assembly seal members, possibly influenced by inadequate turbine clamping blot fit, causing sufficient reduction in the natural frequency of an HP turbine disc vibratory mode to allow its excitation within the normal operating speed range and consequent excessive stressing of the disc,
- Fuel leakage from the engine bay fuel system, resulting in a major nacelle fire,
- Failure to identify the turbine assembly seal member fit and HP turbine disc corrosion as possible contributors to disc fatigue damage after previous similar failures.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DH.89 Dragon Rapide in Audley End: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 30, 1991 at 1326 LT
Registration:
G-AHGD
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Biggleswade - Audley End
MSN:
6862
YOM:
1946
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
15840
Captain / Total hours on type:
15.00
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, departed Biggleswade bound for Audley End to take part to an airshow. On completion of the fourth turn, which was wider than previous turns, the aircraft rolled out on a westerly heading and rpm on both fixed-pitch propellers was reduced to around idle. The aircraft decelerated in straight and level flight with the flaps lowered and in a progressively more nose-up attitude. At low airspeed, mid-way along the display axis, the aircraft rolled to starboard and entered a spin to the right from a height of between 400 and 500 feet. It crashed approximately 300 metres north of the display axis and behind a line of trees which obscured spectator's view of the impact. The pilot was killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control at low height after a buckle on the seat belt became entangled with the flying controls.
Final Report:

Ground accident of a Vickers 806 Viscount in Southend

Date & Time: Jan 11, 1988 at 1244 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-APIM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
412
YOM:
1958
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While parked at Southend Airport, the four engine aircraft was struck by a Fairflight Short 330-200 registered G-BHWT and that would be convoyed from Southend to Biggin Hill for maintenance. After being parked at Southend Airport for a long time without any maintenance and due to hydraulic problems, the Short 330 was taxiing when the nosewheel steering system failed and the crew lost control of the aircraft that veered to the left and collided with the parked Viscount. Both pilots on board the Short escaped uninjured and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Corrosion within the emergency brake accumulator had allowed nitrogen to enter the main hydraulic system of the Short 330. In the past, the aircraft had been parked in the open for a considerable time without servicing.

Crash of a Short 330-200 in Southend

Date & Time: Jan 11, 1988 at 1244 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BHWT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Southend - Biggin Hill
MSN:
3049
YOM:
1980
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After being parked at Southend Airport for a long time without any maintenance and due to hydraulic problems, it was decided to ferry the aircraft from Southend to Biggin Hill. While taxiing, the nosewheel steering system failed and the crew lost control of the aircraft that veered to the left and collided with a parked British Air Ferries Vickers 806 Viscount registered G-APIM. Both pilots escaped uninjured and both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Corrosion within the emergency brake accumulator had allowed nitrogen to enter the main hydraulic system. In the past, the aircraft had been parked in the open for a considerable time without servicing.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Stansted: 6 killed

Date & Time: Oct 20, 1987 at 1200 LT
Registration:
G-HAST
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Stansted – Tatenhill
MSN:
421B-0828
YOM:
1974
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
500
Captain / Total hours on type:
200.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on an IFR flight from Stansted Airport to Tatenhill Aerodrome with a pilot and five passengers on board. Shortly after takeoff from runway 23 at Stansted the pilot reported that he had a problem and wished to return. Stansted ATC cleared him for a left hand circuit and return. As the aircraft turned left hand towards a downwind leg the left bank was observed to suddenly increase and it turned onto its back before descending vertically and crashing into a wooded area to the southwest of the airport. Immediately after the impact there was a fierce fire; all the occupants were killed instantaneously.
Probable cause:
Examination confirmed that the right hand propeller and engine has been delivering power normally before impact, but that the left propeller and engine had not been producing power. The left engine drive fuel pump had also suffered fire damage, and the rubber seals were leaking. Upon disassembly it was found that the aneroid unit within the pump was corroded and could not have functioned. The possible adverse effects of the corrosion within the fuel pump aneroid unit to engine performance were investigated using another similar engine in a test facility. It was found that this condition caused the engine to misfire and run roughly at high power settings, but that the engine ran normally at low power. The tests, whilst not totally representative of the conditions on the accident flight, showed no tendency for the engine to fail completely, although sudden full throttle applications grossly aggravated the rough running. Thus no reason for the apparent marked power loss associated with the left engine fitted to G-HAST has been established.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Southend: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 12, 1987 at 0535 LT
Registration:
G-WSJE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Southend - Bergamo
MSN:
BB-484
YOM:
1979
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
4320
Captain / Total hours on type:
50.00
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Southend Airport on a cargo flight to Bergamo, carrying newspapers and magazines. Two minutes and 30 seconds after liftoff, while climbing in limited visibility due to the night and low clouds, the airplane entered a dive and crashed on a garage, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Examination of the propeller assemblies indicated that, although the right-hand propeller appeared to have been at fine pitch and rotating at high revolutions at impact, the left-hand propeller had been rotating much more slowly and appeared to have been at, or close to, its fully feathered position. The firewall shut-off fuel valve for the left-hand engine was found in its closed position, consistent with the action of shutting down this engine at some point prior to the impact. A strip examination of the left-hand engine was conducted and showed no evidence of damage to its rotating assemblies prior to the impact with the garage. The only damage identified on this engine as not being consistent with the impact was a ruptured diaphragm within the low-pressure compressor bleed valve. This rolling diaphragm is designed to hold the compressor bleed valve closed a high power settings and to provide smooth opening of the compressor bleed valve with reduction of compressor discharge pressure.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31T Cheyenne II in Southend: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 13, 1986 at 0832 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-IHVI
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cologne - Southend
MSN:
31-8020007
YOM:
1980
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3081
Captain / Total hours on type:
311.00
Circumstances:
A flight plan for the flight from Cologne to Southend was filed on the evening of 12 March 1986. The pilot obtained by telephone details of the actual weather conditions at Southend at 0650 hrs on 13 March 1986. He took off from Cologne at 0714 hrs with a company colleague as his sole passenger. The aircraft flew without incident using the airways as FL220 until cleared by ATC to descend towards Southend. At 0820 hrs the pilot established radio communications with the approach controllers. He was passed details of the existing weather conditions and said that he would try the approach. He requested and was given radar guidance to land on runway 24 at Southend. The published operating minimum for an approach using the 3 cm surveillance radar is an Obstacle Clearance Limit (OCL) of 280 feet. radar guidance for the approach terminates at half a nautical mile from touchdown. The recommended Decision Height (DH) and Runway Visual Range (RVR) published in the UK Air PIlot (RAC 4-6-13) is 380 feet and 800 meters respectively. The approach was flown accurately in azimuth, and advisory heights to maintain a 3° glide path were passed to the pilot. The aircraft's flight path was observed on the London Air Traffic Control descent profile. The radar talkdown was terminated at half a mile and the aircraft was cleared to land. when the aircraft was not sighted from the control tower at the expected time of landing the alarm was raised. Members of the airfield fire service were already positioned on the airfield at 'weather standby'. They initiated a search for the aircraft. It was learned that it had crashed close to an industrial estate which lies about half a mile from the threshold of runway 24. The aircraft had been seen on the normal approach path but at a height judged to be lower than normal. Two eye withnesses saw the aircraft bank sharply to the left before it crashed into a small field. There was a minor post-impact fire in the area of the left engine, which was quickly extinguished by those first on the scene using a hand held extinguisher. The passenger was assisted in opening the main cabin door and he was escorted from the wreckage. The pilot was killed on impact. The passenger, who had been seated in a rearwards facing seat behind the copilot's station, stated that he had glimpsed the ground shortly before the accident but could give no information indicating the cause of the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor in Orsett

Date & Time: Nov 26, 1979
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BEXM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Shoreham - Southend
MSN:
111
YOM:
1977
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route from Shoreham to Southend, the pilot was forced to attempt an emergency landing for unknown reasons. The twin engine airplane crash landed in Orsett, Essex. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Stansted: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 4, 1978 at 1518 LT
Operator:
Registration:
G-AYMM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cambridge - Stansted
MSN:
421B-0033
YOM:
1970
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3113
Captain / Total hours on type:
1401.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2472
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged upon a flight test for the renewal of its Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA). The sole occupants were the pilot and an observer. Following an ILS approach to runway 23 at Stansted Airport an overshoot (go-around) was initiated and at about 200 feet the starboard engine cut out. The commander attempted unsuccessfully to restart the engine by use of the starter motor. The aircraft lost speed and height and crashed just outside the airport. The observer was killed and the pilot injured.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the pilot failing to feather the propeller and raise the flaps after the starboard engine had cut during an overshoot manoeuvre. A contributory factor is considered to have been the absence of any prescribed procedure in the Flight Manual to meet this eventuality. The reason for the malfunction of the starboard engine both during the stall test and later during the overshoot could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-6B in Southend

Date & Time: Oct 4, 1974 at 2001 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OO-VGB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Southend - Antwerp
MSN:
43830/352
YOM:
1953
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
99
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
21000
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3000
Aircraft flight hours:
43017
Circumstances:
The aircraft landed at Southend (SEN) from Antwerp (ANR) at 07:50 hrs on a day excursion. Following a 9 hour rest period, the crew reported for duty at 18:30 to prepare for the return flight. Start up and taxiing out were normal, and a limited power check was completed before takeoff. The Captain, had given a full pre-takeoff briefing before the aircraft left Antwerp that morning, and on this occasion only called for a 'standard briefing', but emphasized that the full abort procedures would be as given during his previous instruction. The First Officer was handling the aircraft from the right hand seat, and gave a shortened takeoff briefing which included the actions required for engine failure before and after V1. Both pilots were wearing headsets, (not fitted with boom microphones) but were not using these for flight deck intercommunication purposes; the Flight Engineer was not wearing a headset. The Captain, who controlled the only source of nose-wheel steering, lined up the aircraft at the beginning of runway 24. Brakes were released and, after stabilizing all four engines at 30 inches of manifold pressure, the First Officer advanced all the right hand throttle levers to takeoff power. The Flight Engineer followed this movement with his left hand on the left-hand group of throttle levers and, when takeoff power was achieved, held the throttle friction lever with his right hand. The captain 's left hand was on the nose steering wheel. At about 75-80 knots, shortly before V1, the captain instructed the Flight Engineer to adjust the power on engines 1 and 2 which were overboosting slightly. The Flight Engineer made this adjustment coincident with the captain calling V1 at about 88 knots, and very shortly afterwards the captain saw the red 'gear unsafe' warning light illuminate. Unknown to the captain or the First Officer the Flight Engineer had made an UP selection of the landing gear selector lever. He stated subsequently that he thought the captain had instructed him to do so shortly after calling V1. The pilots maintain that no such order was given and that nothing additional to the normal procedural calls was said by either of them. The aircraft subsided on to its nose and its propellers struck the runway; throttles were closed and the captain attempted to maintain directional control by use of rudder. The aircraft came to rest 3 metres from the end of the runway with its nose on the ground and with the main landing gear still extended. As soon as the aircraft came to rest the Flight Engineer, having closed the mixture controls to idle cut off and pulled the 'ganged switches' bar, left the aircraft through the right front exit door. On seeing exhaust fires in Nos. 2 and 3 engines he returned to the flight deck and carried out the appropriate engine fire drills. However Nor 3 engine continued to burn, and he extinguished this fire with a portable CO2 appliance. During this period, evacuation drills were initiated, and the passengers left the aircraft in an expeditious and reasonably orderly manner, mostly through the front exit, but some by chute from the rear exit, and a few from an overwing emergency exit.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the Flight Engineer's action in selecting landing gear UP before the aircraft was airborne. He did this in the mistaken belief that the Captain had ordered him to do so.
Final Report: