Training

The airplane, flown by an airline transport pilot, departed in day visual meteorological conditions for an 18-nautical mile flight from the home base airport to another airport where the pilot planned to conduct a practice instrument approach. The pilot contacted approach control and requested a practice ILS approach. The controller instructed the pilot to proceed northwest bound and maintain 2,500 feet msl. Radar indicated the airplane tracked a northerly heading instead of a northwesterly heading as instructed. The airplane continued on a northerly heading until 1113:48 when it was about 5 miles southwest of the destination airport at 1,900 feet msl with a ground speed of 172 knots. At this point, the controller instructed the pilot to turn southbound and remain clear of Class C airspace. Radar coverage for the next 50 seconds was intermittent. At 1114:29, radar picked up the airplane about 4 miles southwest of the destination airport at 1,800 feet msl, a ground speed of 106 knots, and a heading of 101 degrees. The airplane continued heading east-southeast for about 30 seconds and its ground speed continued to decay. At 1114:58, it entered an abrupt descent, going from 1700 feet to 200 feet in 15 seconds. The last radar return was recorded at 1115:13 and showed the airplane at 200 feet msl, a ground speed of 64 knots, and a heading of 093 degrees. Several witnesses observed the airplane descend in a "flat spin" and impact a shallow canal in a residential area. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the canal in a nearly flat and level attitude. No evidence of any pre-impact mechanical discrepancies with the airframe or engines was found that would have prevented normal operation. Testing of the electronic engine controls revealed that both units were functional, but under some conditions would trip to manual mode. Further investigation determined that the units tripping to manual mode was due to an electrical overstress that failed the same thermistor within each unit. The reason for the electrical overstress or when it occurred could not be determined; however, it is probable it occurred at impact when the units were submerged in water. Even if the units tripped to manual mode in flight, this would only result in the loss of the torque and temperature limiting and propeller synchrophaser systems, meaning the pilot would have to manually adjust the power levers as required to maintain the proper torque and exhaust gas temperature. Post accident toxicology testing of the pilot's blood revealed chlorpheniramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine, at more than ten times higher than the level expected with a typical maximum over-the-counter dose. It is probable that the pilot's performance and judgment were substantially impaired by his very high blood level of chlorpheniramine.

A designated pilot examiner (DPE) was administering a type-rating check ride from the jump seat (located behind co-pilot's seat), and instructed the second-in-command (SIC) (required for the check ride and occupying the front right seat) to reduce the power on one engine to simulate a single engine approach. Approximately 23 seconds later, the airplane began to "drop rapidly." To arrest the descent, both pilots simultaneously applied full power on both engines, and the applicant (occupying the front left seat) increased the airplane's pitch attitude to 12 degrees. However, the airplane continued to descend and touched down short of the landing threshold for the runway. A post-impact fire consumed the airplane. According to the applicant, after takeoff, he demonstrated several maneuvers, and was then provided vectors for a VOR instrument approach. While executing the approach, it was "really bumpy", and they hit a gust of wind, which resulted in him having to correct the airplane's attitude back to straight and level flight. When the airplane was approximately one mile from the end of the runway, he looked outside and saw that he was high on the approach and extended the flaps to 40 degrees. Shortly after, the PIC reduced power on the left engine to simulate a single-engine approach. When the airplane was approximately 1/4 to 1/2-mile from the end of the runway, at 400 feet mean sea level (msl) (about 366 feet above ground level), Vref 110, the airplane began to sink rapidly, and it impacted the ground. The applicant said that he, "never experienced wind shear like that before...and in hindsight it would have been more helpful if they had a better understanding of the wind conditions before they tried to land." Under current FAA regulations, even though the pilot in the right seat (the applicant's flight instructor) acted as the SIC for the purpose of the check ride, the applicant was not type rated in the airplane, and technically, could not be designated as the pilot-in-command (PIC). The instructor was type rated in the airplane; and therefore, was the PIC.

According to the pilot, during climb-out from runway 09 at an altitude of approximately 500 feet the right engine warning red magnetic chip detector light illuminated. The pilot decided to shut down the right engine and return to the airport. Shortly after making that decision the left engine began to lose power. The airplane was unable to maintain altitude, and the pilot prepared to make an off-airport emergency landing in a field. The airplane collided with the trees as the pilot maneuvered for the emergency landing. Examination of the airframe, and flight controls revealed no anomalies. Examination of the left and right engine revealed no mechanical anomalies. Examination of cockpit fuel selector controls revealed that the left engine fuel selector handle was in the off position and the right engine fuel selector handle was set in the left tank position. During the in-flight engine secure procedures the pilot is required to place the inoperative engine fuel selector in the off position.

The purpose of the flight was for the instructor-pilot to prepare the first and second pilots for their FAA Part 135 competency and proficiency checks scheduled to be conducted in the accident airplane the following week, with operator proving tests to follow shortly thereafter. The first pilot obtained a computer science corporation (CSC) direct user access terminal service (DUATS) weather briefing and filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The instructor-pilot was listed as the pilot-in-command. The airplane took off and proceeded to its designated practice area. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the pilots practiced various maneuvers under the direction of the instructor-pilot, including steep turns and approaches to stalls. Then the first pilot was asked the to demonstrate an approach-to-landing stall. The first pilot asked the instructor-pilot if he had "ever done stalls in the airplane?" The instructor-pilot replied, "It's been awhile." The first pilot remarked, "This is the first time I've probably done stalls in a jet. Nah, I take that back, I've done them in a (Lear)." The instructor pilot said he had stalled "the JetStar on a [FAR] one thirty five ride." Flaps were extended and the landing gear was lowered. Digital electronic engine control (DEEC) recorded a power reduction that remained at idle. According to national track analysis program (NTAP) data, the stall was initiated from an altitude of 5,000 feet. The stick shaker sounded and shortly thereafter, the recording ended. The consensus of 25 witness' observations was that the airplane was flying at low altitude and doing "erratic maneuvers." One witness said it "seemed to stop in midair," then pitched nose down. Some witnesses said that the airplane was spinning. Other witnesses said it was in a flat spin. Still another witness said the airplane fell "like a falling leaf." The airplane impacted marshy terrain in a nose-down, wings-level attitude. Wreckage examination revealed the landing gear was down and the flaps were set to 25 degrees. Both engines' compressor/turbine section blades were gouged and bent in the opposite direction of rotation, and there were rotational scoring marks on both cases. No discrepancies were noted.

Upon landing at Trollhättan-Målöga Airport, the aircraft nosed over and came to rest upside down. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged. It was apparently repaired.

The airplane experienced an in-flight loss of control and crashed into a residential area. The flight departed VFR and when near the destination airport flew between areas with VIP Level 5 reflectivity. There was no record of a preflight weather briefing. The flight continued towards the destination airport and encountered lesser intensity reflectivity. An individual at the destination airport reported hearing an occupant of the airplane ask, "...for an advisory for the field", and "...what the weather was like." The individual at the airport advised that the winds appeared to be in favor for runway 16, which was left hand traffic, the runway was wet, and the rain seemed to be letting up. There were no further communications from the accident aircraft. A pilot-rated witness located north of the destination airport, and nearly due west of the accident site reported seeing the airplane on what he thought was final approach to runway 16, but the airplane was "very low." The witness reported the airplane made a, "sudden, sharp turn to the left [flying eastbound]." He then lost sight of the airplane and proceeded to the accident site. Another pilot-rated witness who was located in a vehicle approximately 1/4 mile west-northwest of the accident site reported observing an airplane flying from the northwest. The airplane banked to the left flying eastbound at a, "...very slow airspeed and banking and yawing left and right." While flying eastbound it appeared to him that whomever was flying the airplane was executing a go-around as evidenced by the landing gear retracting, followed by the flaps. The airplane then appeared to climb which appeared very unstable, again yawing left and right. The airplane then banked to the right, stalled, and entered a spin impacting the ground. Still another witness who was located approximately 1/10th of a nautical mile east-southeast from the accident site reported he came out of his house after the rain ended and was facing west. He saw the accident airplane from the northwest and thought it had descended lower than normal. The airplane was flying above the tops of nearby trees and while flying in a southeasterly direction, pitched up, "darn near got 90 degrees", rolled to the left, and descended straight down. He reported that he did not hear the engines, and thought he should have been able to hear them if the pilot had "revved them up." He estimated his view of the flight lasted approximately 10-15 seconds, and couldn't tell if the landing gear was extended. He did not see any smoke trailing the airplane, and after the impact he ran into his house, called 911, got into his car, and drove to the scene. He heard an explosion, and saw flames. He got to the airplane and helped rescue a passenger who was beating on the aircraft's door. The airplane descended nearly vertical in a residential area and damaged trees approximately 30 feet above ground level. A post crash fire consumed the cockpit, cabin, portions of both wings, and portions of both engines. Examination of the flight controls, both engines, propellers, and propeller governors revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction. Accessories of both engines including the magnetos were destroyed by the post crash fire. Additionally, both servo fuel injectors were heat damaged which precluded bench testing. During disassembly of the right servo fuel injector, the hub stud was found separated from the hub at the fuel diaphragm. No determination was made whether this occurred during disassembly or occurred preimpact. No determination could be made as to who was operating the controls at the time of the accident.

The Mishap Student pilot (MSP) was flying an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 21 at Keesler AFB. They were in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) at night and the runway was wet. After some deviations on the approach, they arrived over the threshold on a normal glide slope and faster (about 114 kts) than the computed approach speed of 108 kts. The aircraft touched down approximately 1500 feet down the runway. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) actuated the speed brakes/spoilers switch and the student began to immediately apply brake pressure. After 4-5 seconds, the instructor recognized that the aircraft was not decelerating and declared that she was taking control of the aircraft. The instructor immediately applied maximum braking with no perceived deceleration. She then grabbed the glare shield in an attempt to gain additional leverage on the brakes and again felt no perceived deceleration. At this point, the aircraft was rapidly running out of available runway. The instructor selected the emergency brakes just prior to arriving at the departure end threshold and the brakes locked resulting in a hydroplane skid. The aircraft departed the prepared surface and came to a halt 190 feet later. As a result of the runway departure, the right main and nose gear collapsed, and the forward fuselage and both wings were heavily damaged.

The crew departed Boufarik AFB on a local training flight. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew informed ATC about an engine fire and elected to return for an emergency landing. Few seconds later, control was lost and the aircraft crashed in the district of Beni Mered, less than 2 km from the end of runway 22. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire as well as eight houses. All four crew members were killed as well as 11 people on the ground. Six other people on the ground were seriously injured.

The crew departed Iwakuni AFB at 0900LT on a training mission over the Sea of Japan. At 1045LT, the aircraft returned to Iwakuni and the crew completed several touch-and-go manoeuvres on runway 02. During one of these procedures, the aircraft went out of control upon touchdown and crashed beside the runway, bursting into flames. All four crew members were killed.

The flight crew of the Fan Jet Falcon (DA-20) were practicing ILS approaches in instrument meteorological conditions with low clouds and rime ice. A first officer (FO) in training occupied the right seat, while the pilot-in-command (PIC), who was also the company chief pilot/check airman/designated flight instructor, occupied the left seat and was handling the radios. On the second approach, the airplane struck trees and burned, 1.57 nm from approach end of the runway. The landing gear was found extended, and the trailing edge and droop leading edge flaps were retracted. The wing and engine cowl anti-ice valves were found closed, consistent with it being off in the cockpit. Radar data revealed that on approach, the airspeed decreased from 188 knots to 141 knots at the outer marker, and continued to decrease down to 106 knots, when the airplane entered an abrupt descent and disappeared from radar. Simulator flights matched the radar profile with a flight idle approach, a power reduction inside the outer marker, and 1/4 inch of ice on the wings. In the simulator, the airplane stalled about 2 miles from the end of the runway with an airspeed of 103 kts. At flight idle, the engine power in the last 2 minutes of approach was below the recommended power setting for wing or engine anti-ice to be effective. Vref and stall speeds were computed to be 129 kts and 96 kts, with wing flaps and droop leading edges retracted. The PIC had about 1,100 hours in the make and model. The PIC did not have any documented previous flight instruction experience in make and model or any other multi-engine airplanes. The PIC had given 4 pilot proficiency checks in the DA-20 since receiving his check airman designation. The company Director of Operations reported that the accident FO was the first student the PIC had taken through the initial second-in-command course. The PIC and FO had received all of their turbojet experience with the operator.