Training

The crew departed Montpellier-Méditerranée Airport at 0802LT for a local training flight with TRI, one TRE and one pilot under supervision. Following a touch and go on runway 31R, the instructor decided to reduce the power on the right engine and to perform a low pass over the runway. Then the aircraft turned to the left, lost height, rolled to the left and crashed in a pond located to the right of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

The pilot's father had just purchased the airplane for his daughter, and she was receiving model-specific training from a contract flight instructor. Her former flight instructor was aboard as a passenger. The engines were started and they quit. They were restarted and they quit again. They were started a third time, and the airplane was taxied for takeoff. Shortly after starting the takeoff roll, the pilot reported an unspecified engine problem. The airplane drifted across the median and parallel runway, then rolled abruptly to the right, struck the ground, and cartwheeled. The landing gear was down. Neither propeller was feathered. Disassembly of the right engine and turbocharger revealed no anomalies. Disassembly and examination of the left engine and turbocharger revealed the mixture shaft and throttle valve in the throttle and fuel control assembly were jammed in the idle cutoff and idle rpm positions, respectively. Manifold valve and fuel injector line flow tests produced higher-than-normal pressures, indicative of a flow restriction. Disassembly of the manifold valve revealed the needle valve in the plunger assembly was stuck in the full open position, collapsing the needle valve spring. A scribe was used to free the needle valve, and the manifold valve and fuel injector lines were again flow tested. The result was a lower pressure. Plunger disassembly revealed the threads had been tapped inside the retainer and metal shavings were found between the retainer and spring. The Teledyne Continental Motor (TCM) retainer has no threads. GPS download showed that 2,698 feet had been covered between the start of the takeoff roll and the attainment of rotation speed. Maximum speed attained was 132 mph. Computations indicated distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle was 2,000 feet, distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle (single engine) was 2,600 feet, and accelerate-stop distance was 3,000 feet.

The aircraft was on a base training flight at Kilimanjaro International Airport. At 0410 hrs it was cleared to the local flying area for upper air works, followed by VOR/ILS approaches to runway 09 via NDB KB. 5H-PAC took off and proceeded to the local flying area where the crew members did upper air works for about 30 minutes. According to the commander, these included clean and dirty stalls, level flights at different speeds, 45 degree turns left and right and exercises on unusual attitudes. Subsequent to these they returned to the airport via NDB KB for ILS approach to runway 09. They carried out a missed approach and proceeded to join RH circuits for touch-and-go operations on runway 09. The last operations before the accident was simulated engine failure after take off followed by single engine overshoot, this time using runway 27. This was approved and the commander was reminded that the surface wind was 090 degrees 08 knots. The aircraft turned left and positioned on right base for runway 27. It was subsequently given a landing clearance. The weather at the material time was fine with temperature 23 degrees Celsius. The controller, who was handling the flight, said that the final approach was perfect. The landing gear was down. The aircraft passed the threshold of runway 27 at about 70 feet above the ground and continued to flare on a straight and level attitude with the landing gear retracted. It continued in this attitude for a distance of about one and a half kilometers down the runway subsequent to which it drifted off the runway to the right. The controller asked the pilot to explain his intentions. There was no reply. Instead, the aircraft was observed to yaw violently as it drifted further to the right. Moments later, it impacted the ground on a grass hedge and skidded along the width of taxiway Y before it came to rest. The commander said that he repossessed the controls immediately when the aircraft started yawing but there was no time effect recovery. There was fuel spillage but fire did not break out. The two pilots, who had not put on their shoulder straps, sustained facial injuries.

Following an uneventful passenger flight from Reykjavik to Sauðárkrókur, the crew decided to fly to Siglufjörður Airport to perform a competence control flight for this airfield. On approach in good weather conditions (visibility over 10 km with clouds at 1,500 feet), the captain disconnected the GPWS system to avoid repetitive alarms. After landing on runway 07, he attended to perform a touch-and-go so he increased engine power and took off. During initial climb, the landing gears were raised and the crew made a right hand turn circuit at an altitude of 500 feet. Following a second approach to runway 07, the aircraft landed on its belly and slid for 280 metres before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot and sole occupant of the DHC-2 seaplane, registration C-GJST, serial number 1368, was on his first flight of the season on the Ottawa River at Gatineau, Quebec. This training flight, conducted according to visual flight rules, was to consist of about 12 touch-and-go landings. The aircraft took off at approximately 1300 eastern daylight time, and made several upwind touch-and-go landings in a westerly direction. At approximately 1340 eastern daylight time, the aircraft was seen about 50 feet above the surface of the water proceeding downwind in an easterly
direction, in a nose-down attitude of over 20 degrees. The right float then struck the water and the aircraft tumbled several times, breaking up on impact. Despite the waves and gusting wind on the river, some riverside residents who witnessed the accident attempted a rescue, but the aircraft sank before they could reach it. Even though the pilot was wearing a seat-belt, he sustained head injuries at impact and drowned.

The crew was returning to Miramar NAS following a routine training mission in Grand Junction. On final approach to Miramar NAS by night, the aircraft crashed near the interstate 15, about 2,400 metres short of runway 24R. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed. A weather observation taken from the base at 2045LT reported five-mile visibility with light fog or haze, and a cloud ceiling at 800 feet.
Crew:
Lt Col T. Nicholson,
Lt Col Robert Zeisler.
Passengers:
Sgt Francisco Cortez,
Cpl Jeremy Lindroth.

One instructor and two pilots under supervision departed Marseille-Marignane Airport on a training flight. Several scooping manoeuvres were completed on the Sainte-Croix Lake located about 85 km northeast of Marseille. While completing a new scooping procedure, the aircraft approached in a high nose attitude and disintegrated upon landing. The main wreckage sank to a depth of 31 metres off Les Salles-sur-Verdon. One pilot was found alive but seriously injured due to hypothermia (the water temperature was 6° C) while both other occupants, Jean Beauvais and Jean-Pierre Laty, were killed.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Madrid-Getafe AFB when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances near Parla, about 8 km south of the airbase. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The aircraft, with two pilots on board, was being operated for pilot type endorsement training. Air Traffic Control (ATC) had cleared the pilots to conduct upper level air work between 4,000 and 5,000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) within a 5 NM radius of Green Island, Queensland. Following the upper level air work, the crew requested, and were granted a clearance for, a simulated engine failure and descent to 2,000 ft. The pilot in command (PIC) reported that while completing the simulated engine failure training, he had retarded the power lever to the FLIGHT IDLE stop and the fuel condition lever to the LOW IDLE range, setting a value of 55% engine gas generator speed (Ng). The pilot under training then set the glide attitude at the best glide speed (for the operating weight) of about 79 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The PIC then instructed the pilot under training to place the propeller into the feathered position, and maintain best glide speed. The PIC reported that he instructed the pilot under training to advance the emergency power lever (EPL) to simulate manual introduction of fuel to the engine. According to the PIC, he then noticed that there was no engine torque increase, with the engine inter-turbine temperature (ITT or T5) and Ng rapidly decreasing, and a strong smell of fuel in the cockpit. While the pilot under training flew the aircraft, the PIC placed the ignition switch to the ON position and also selected START on the engine starter switch. He then reportedly placed the EPL to the CLOSED position, the propeller to the UNFEATHERED position and the fuel condition lever to the IDLE CUTOFF position to clear the excess fuel from the engine. The PIC reported that they then increased the aircraft airspeed to 120 KIAS, at which point he reintroduced fuel into the engine by advancing the fuel condition lever. He reported that following these actions, the strong fuel smell persisted. As the aircraft approached 1,500 ft, the PIC broadcast a MAYDAY, informing ATC that they had a 'flameout' of the engine and that they were going to complete a forced landing water ditching near Green Island. While the pilot under training flew the aircraft, the PIC placed the propeller into the feathered position, closed the fuel condition lever to the IDLE CUTOFF position and turned off the starter and ignition switches. They then completed a successful landing in a depth of about 2 m of water near Green Island. The pilots evacuated the aircraft without injury. The aircraft, which sustained minor damage during the ditching, but subsequent substantial damage due to salt water immersion, was recovered to the mainland. Following examination of all connections and control linkages, the engine was removed for examination under the supervision of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) at the engine manufacturer's overhaul facility. The engine trend monitoring (ETM) data logger was also removed from the aircraft for examination.

The Ted Smith Aerostar 601 aircraft, registered VH-WRF, departed Coolangatta at 1301 ESuT with a flight instructor and a commercial pilot on board. The aircraft was being operated on a dual training flight in the Byron Bay area, approximately 55 km south-south-east of Coolangatta. The aircraft was operating outside controlled airspace and was not being monitored by air traffic control. The weather in the area was fine with a south-easterly wind at 10 - 12 kts, with scattered cloud in the area with a base of between 2,000 and 2,500 ft. The purpose of the flight was to introduce the commercial pilot, who was undertaking initial multi-engine training, to asymmetric flight. At approximately 1445, the operator advised Australian Search and Rescue that the aircraft had not returned to Coolangatta, and that it was overdue. Recorded radar information by Airservices Australia revealed that the aircraft had disappeared from radar coverage at 1335. Its position at that time was approximately 18 km east-south-east of Cape Byron. Search vessels later recovered items that were identified as being from the aircraft in the vicinity of the last recorded position of the aircraft. Those items included aircraft checklist pages, a blanket, a seat cushion from the cabin, as well as a number of small pieces of cabin insulation material. No item showed any evidence of heat or fire damage. No further trace of the aircraft was found.