Crash of a Beechcraft A90 King Air in Itaguazurenda: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 11, 1996 at 0830 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N3333D
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Itaguazurenda - Itaguazurenda
MSN:
LJ-259
YOM:
1967
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was completing a local post maintenance flight with one pilot and two mechanics on board. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of 210 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed. All three occupants were killed. According to the representatives of the owner of the airplane, recent maintenance had been performed on the engines, propellers, and the nose landing gear.

Crash of an Embraer XC-95B Bandeirante in Queluz: 8 killed

Date & Time: Aug 30, 1996 at 0947 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
2315
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
São José dos Campos - São José dos Campos
MSN:
110-289
YOM:
1980
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed São José dos Campos Airport at 0840LT on a test flight on behalf of the Brazilian Aeronautics Institute of Technology. On board were six passengers and two pilots. About an hour into the flight, the aircraft struck a mountain located near Queluz. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-31T Cheyenne II in Malvern: 5 killed

Date & Time: May 29, 1996 at 1835 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N333LM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Malvern - Malvern
MSN:
31-792005
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
7500
Captain / Total hours on type:
700.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4483
Circumstances:
After the completion of scheduled maintenance and a normal ground run up, the airplane departed the airport for a local test flight. Witnesses observed the airplane in a nose high attitude, turn to the left, and then saw the nose drop toward the ground approximately 1 1/2 miles from the departure end of the runway. The airplane impacted hilly terrain and was consumed by a post impact fire. Detailed examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no defects or anomalies that would have contributed to the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane after takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Gippsland GA8 Airvan in Latrobe Valley

Date & Time: Feb 7, 1996 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-PTR
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Latrobe Valley - Latrobe Valley
MSN:
GA8-0001
YOM:
1995
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Circumstances:
The prototype GA-8 aircraft was undertaking test flying from the manufacturer's facility at the Latrobe Valley airfield. The test flying was scheduled by the designer under the provisions of a permit to fly approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. For a series of spin tests the aircraft was fitted with fixed and jettisonable ballast, a jettisonable pilot's door, and a tail mounted anti-spin parachute attached to a long lanyard. On this flight the aircraft was set up at 9,000 feet above ground level with full power, flaps fully down, an extreme aft centre of gravity (C of G) and maximum all up weight. The test pilot, who was the only occupant, applied full left rudder and full right aileron to initiate a spin. After the aircraft entered a spin to the left the pilot applied standard control inputs to effect a recovery to normal flight. The aircraft did not respond and at 6,500 feet, 13 seconds after the spin commenced, the pilot jettisoned the ballast and deployed the anti-spin parachute. The aircraft still did not respond and at about 32 seconds into the spin, at 5,200 feet, the pilot initiated release of the jettisonable door, released his harness, baled out, and was clear of the aircraft as it passed through 3,600 feet. At 1,800 feet the aircraft was observed to stop spinning. Fifty seconds after the commencement of the spin, the aircraft dived into the ground and was destroyed. The pilot sustained minor injuries during his landing.
Probable cause:
This was a prototype aircraft and some deficiencies and/or problems during testing are to be expected. With this particular aircraft the fact that the inadequate rudder hinge moment was masked throughout flight testing meant that the inadequate rudder performance during critical spin recovery was not clearly detected until it combined with other factors to become critical. These other factors included an ineffective anti-spin parachute, extensive blanking of the fin and rudder, and flight at the extremes of the weight and C of G envelope. It is not known what , if any, effect the previous rerigging of the elevator controls had on this flight.
The following factors were reported:
1. The rudder and fin effectiveness was inadequate for the spin test being undertaken.
2. The anti-spin protection systems were ineffective.
3. The aircraft was not able to be recovered from an intentional spin.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Columbia

Date & Time: Jan 19, 1996 at 0923 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N50KW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Columbia - Columbia
MSN:
784
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
16878
Captain / Total hours on type:
4348.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6073
Circumstances:
The flight departed on a maintenance test flight with known wind gusts to 27 knots. Before takeoff the pilot performed an NTS check to each engine with no discrepancies noted. During flight the pilot performed an NTS check to the left engine. Two attempts to restart the left engine were unsuccessful. Each time the propeller came out of the feathered position and started to rotate but there was no fuel flow or ignition. The flight returned to land and while on short final to runway 29 with the wind from 250 degrees at 20 knots, a witness observed the airplane pitch nose up then down then heard the sound of power applied to the right engine. The airplane than rolled to the left, pitched nose down, impacted the ground coming to rest nearly inverted with the wing section separated. Postaccident examination of the left engine and accessories revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left engine fuel shutoff valve was found in the 'closed' position and no fuel was found aft of the fuel shutoff valve. The pilot stated that he has no recollection of the accident. The left and right engines had just been installed following 'hot section' work to both, and both were then started the day after installation with no discrepancies noted by company maintenance personnel.
Probable cause:
A total loss of power on one engine for undetermined reasons, and the pilot-in-command's failure to maintain airspeed (VMC) resulting in an in-flight loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the wind gusts encountered while on final approach to land.
Final Report:

Ground accident of an Antonov AN-72V in Kiev

Date & Time: Feb 10, 1995 at 1609 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UR-72966
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kiev - Kiev
MSN:
36572092847
YOM:
1992
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Kiev-Gostomel Airport to assist the crew of the first AN-70 prototype in its test flight. The goal of the flight was to test the stability and controllability of the airplane for the certification program. While cruising at an altitude of 3,200 metres, the crew of the AN-70 elected to approach the AN-72 but misjudged the distance, causing both airplanes to collided. The tail of the AN-70 struck the fuselage of the AN-72. The crew of the AN-72 was able to return to Kiev-Gostomel Airport and to complete a safe landing. All crew members were uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages. Upon impact, the AN-70 lost its left stabiliser and also a part of the tail. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed in a wooded area located in Veliky Lis, about 45 km northwest of Kiev-Gostomel Airport. All seven occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the collision was the consequence of errors on part of the AN-70 crew who misjudged the distance between both aircraft and initiated a hazardous maneuver without knowing the exact position of the second aircraft. The following contributing factors were reported:
- The collision occurred while both aircraft were facing sun,
- Both crew did not use appropriate radio communications,
- Loss of situational awareness,
- Loss of the left horizontal stabiliser as well as part of the tail, failure of all four hydraulic systems, loss of controllability.

Crash of an Antonov AN-70 in Veliky Lis: 7 killed

Date & Time: Feb 10, 1995 at 1609 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kiev - Kiev
MSN:
01 01
YOM:
1994
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Aircraft flight hours:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft, first prototype of this model AN-70, departed Kiev-Gostomel Airport on a test flight with seven crew members on board. The goal of the flight was to test the stability and controllability of the airplane for the certification program. An Antonov AN-72 registered UR-72966 and also operated by Antonov Design Bureau departed the same airport to take part to the same control flight. While cruising at an altitude of 3,200 metres, the crew of the AN-70 elected to approach the AN-72 but misjudged the distance, causing both airplanes to collided. The tail of the AN-70 struck the fuselage of the AN-72. The crew of the AN-72 was able to return to Kiev-Gostomel Airport and to complete a safe landing. All crew members were uninjured but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe structural damages. Upon impact, the AN-70 lost its left stabiliser and also a part of the tail. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed in a wooded area located in Veliky Lis, about 45 km northwest of Kiev-Gostomel Airport. All seven occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the collision was the consequence of errors on part of the AN-70 crew who misjudged the distance between both aircraft and initiated a hazardous maneuver without knowing the exact position of the second aircraft. The following contributing factors were reported:
- The collision occurred while both aircraft were facing sun,
- Both crew did not use appropriate radio communications,
- Loss of situational awareness,
- Loss of the left horizontal stabiliser as well as part of the tail, failure of all four hydraulic systems, loss of controllability.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2S Marquise off Hamamatsu: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 19, 1994
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
53-3219
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
919
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a post maintenance test flight. En route, the copilot informed ATC about technical problems when control was lost. The aircraft entered a dive and crashed in the sea off Hamamatsu. All four crew members were killed.

Crash of a Rockwell Sabreliner 40 in Khartoum

Date & Time: Oct 15, 1994
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7143N
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Khartoum - Khartoum
MSN:
265-70
YOM:
1962
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
In 1992 an Egyptian-American airline pilot, Essam al-Ridi, was tasked to purchase a light aircraft on behalf of Osama bin Laden who wanted to use it to ferry among other Stinger missiles from Afghanistan to Sudan. The aircraft was purchased and ferried to Khartoum, Sudan, where it was parked for a long period of time. In 1994 al-Ridi was asked to prepare the plane to be used. It appeared that the tires had deflated, the engine intakes and exhaust were full of sand and the batteries were dead. The tires were inflated and the hydraulics were charged with hydraulic fluid only, without using any nitrogen. The engines were started and the aircraft took off for a test flight. After flying three touch and goes the aircraft landed. The main braking system failed and the alternate braking system did not work either. Fuel was cut off and the engines were shut down. The aircraft failed to stop and traveled off the runway at a speed of 60 knots until it ran into a sandpile. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and was left behind at Khartoum.
Source: ASN and http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-05.htm

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 Marquise in Urnäsch: 1 killed

Date & Time: Sep 3, 1994 at 1531 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HB-LLP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Zurich - Zurich
MSN:
767
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
5488
Captain / Total hours on type:
666.00
Aircraft flight hours:
5845
Circumstances:
The day prior to the accident, both propellers have been changed at Basel Airport and the pilot returned to his base in Zurich. Due to poor weather conditions en route, he was unable to conduct a test of both propellers, reason why a test flight was scheduled on September 3. After his departure from Zurich-Kloten Airport runway 28, the pilot flew to the east and was cleared to climb to FL130, the assigned altitude where the test should be performed. Ten minutes after takeoff, he informed ATC that he would shut the right engine down. The aircraft lost speed and height then deviated from the prescribed flight path. The pilot was able to restart the right engine and to regain control when, three minutes later, he informed ATC he would shut the right engine down for the second time. The aircraft entered a right turn then a rapid descent and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Detailed examination of the right engine and its peripherals as well as a simulator reconstitution were able to identify the probable causes of the accident:
- Malfunction of the Negative Torque System (NTS) on the right engine,
- Blocking of the condition lever in the 'fuel off' position prior to the 'emergency stop' position,
- Continuation of a technical control flight despite the malfunction of the Negative Torque System (NTS),
- Loss of control during an extreme asymmetrical thrust caused by the fact that the right propeller was in windmilling position with a high number of rounds.
Final Report: