Private

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.

The airplane encountered in-flight icing, and the pilot diverted to an airport to attempt to knock the ice off at a lower altitude. During the instrument approach, the pilot advised the tower controller of the ice, and that it depended on whether or not the ice came off the airplane if she would land. As the airplane broke out of the clouds, it appeared to tower personnel to be executing a missed approach; however, it suddenly "dove" for the runway. The tower supervisor noticed that the landing gear were not down, and at 75 to 100 feet above the runway, advised the pilot to go around. The airplane continued to descend, and by the time it impacted the runway, the landing gear were only partially extended, and the propellers and airframe impacted the pavement. The pilot then attempted to abort the landing. The damaged airplane became airborne, climbed to the right, stalled, and nosed straight down into the ground.

According to Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) personnel, the pilot was given the current weather information before attempting his first instrument approach into Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), Lawrenceville, Georgia, which included: winds calm, visibility 1/2-mile in fog, and ceiling 100 feet. The pilot acknowledged the current weather information and elected to continue for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway-25 approach. During the first landing attempt, the pilot reported that he was going to execute a missed approach, but that he saw the airport below and wanted to attempt another approach. The ARTCC controller provided the pilot with radar vectors back to the ILS runway-25 approach and again updated the pilot with current weather conditions. During the second approach the tower controller advised the pilot that he was left of the runway-25 centerline. Shortly after the pilot acknowledged that he was left of the centerline, the tower controller saw a bright "orange glow" off of the left side of the approach end of runway 25. Although the weather conditions were below approach minimums for the runway 25-approach, the pilot elected to attempt the landing. A flight inspection of the ILS was completed on December 26, 2006, and the results of the inspection revealed that the ILS runway-25 approach system was satisfactory. Examination of the airframe, flight control system components, engines and system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

According to an airport employee at the Charleston Executive Airport (JZI), Charleston, South Carolina, the pilot contacted the JZI UNICOM radio frequency to request an airport advisory. The airport employee informed the pilot that the "winds were from 180 at 12 knots gusting to 17." The pilot then responded that he would be landing on runway 18, and was advised by the employee that there was no "runway 18." The pilot then stated that he would land on runway 27, and shortly thereafter said that he would land on runway 22. The employee said that out of curiosity he stepped outside to witness the approach of the airplane. He said that the airplane was southwest of the airport moving northeast perpendicular to runway 22, at an altitude of approximately 500 feet. He watched as the airplane was on a left base for runway 22. He said that the airplane overshot the runway and began a "tight, low right turn" away from the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane stalled and completed two revolutions before it was lost from his sight. Examination of the airframe, flight controls, engine assemblies and accessories revealed no evidence of a pre-crash mechanical failure or malfunction. A forensic toxicology test was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The specimens contained, Tramadol (also known by the trade name Ultram), which is used for the management of moderate to severe pain. The level of Tramadol found in the pilot's blood on post-mortem toxicology testing was at least twice that of maximal regular doses of the substance. Single doses have been shown to cause mild impairment of psychomotor abilities in healthy volunteers. Diphenhydramine was also found in the blood of the pilot. The pilot may have been impaired, at that time, due to the use of Tramadol or Diphenhydramine or both.

Prior to takeoff, the pilot contacted Eglin Clearance Delivery for a weather briefing. He was informed of severe thunderstorms in the area and worked out a plan with the Clearance Delivery operator to avoid them. The flight originated from Destin Florida Airport, Destin, Florida about 0832 central standard time en route to Marsh Harbor, Bahamas. Eglin South Approach Control provided vectors to steer the flight around the weather. At 0841:30, the flight was handed off to Tyndall Approach Control. The flight was informed that it was entering "a line of weather that's going to continue for the next 15 miles." At 0844:10, Tyndall Approach Control alerted all aircraft of "hazardous weather." Tyndall Approach Control also informed the flight that their station was not equipped with the same detailed weather radar that Eglin had, and instructed the flight to continue on its current vector, which was provided by Eglin. About 4 minutes later, the pilot contacted ATC to request a block altitude clearance because he was "up and down here quite a bit." The controller provided a clearance for 4,000 through 6,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and there were no further communications with the flight. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed after impacting the ground near Greenhead, Florida. According to the Sheriff, the property owner who initially located the wreckage, said that there was heavy rain, thunder, lightning and wind in the area at the time of the accident. The NTSB conducted a meteorological study and weather data along with the airplane's track and found it to be consistent with the airplane encountering a level 5 thunderstorm.

While on an instrument approach for landing, the local tower air traffic controller observed on the BRITE radar repeater scope that the airplane passed the outer marker (OM), 600 feet below the permissible crossing altitude. The controller issued a low altitude alert to the pilot and cleared him to land. The controller also reminded the pilot that the minimum descent altitude for the Localizer Directional Aid (LDA) approach was 440 feet, and provided instructions for the missed approach. At that point the pilot reported that he had the airport in sight and acknowledged the landing instructions. The controller again cleared the pilot to land on the prescribed runway for the instrument approach, and the pilot acknowledged the landing clearance. Shortly thereafter the controller instructed the pilot to execute the missed approach as the radar track showed that the airplane was off course. The pilot was instructed to initiate a climbing left turn to the VOR. The pilot said he had the airport in sight and that he saw one of the cross runways and wanted to land. The controller told the pilot that circling to that runway was not an authorized procedure for the LDA approach and again instructed the pilot to perform the missed approach. A witness stated that he was working on a storage container, about 50 feet in height, when the airplane passed overhead. He estimated the airplane to be about 50 feet higher than the storage container. The airplane made a turn westbound and the witness looked away for a second. When he looked back the airplane was in a nose and left wing down attitude and then it impacted the ground. Another witness located on the airport's north-northeast corner also observed the airplane flying toward the airport. He reported simultaneously hearing the engine power up and observed the left wing stall prior to it impacting the ground. Both witnesses reported that they did not hear anything wrong with the engine. Examination of the airframe, power plant, and propeller revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Internal damage signatures in the engine and propeller were consistent with the production of significant power at the time of impact. A review of the weather in the area revealed that while light rain and mist were occurring near the accident site, no meteorological phenomena existed that would have adversely affected the flight. The pilot and two passengers were killed while a third passenger, a boy aged 12, was seriously injured. He died from his injuries few hours later.

The 7,660-hour airline transport rated pilot lost control of the twin-engine airplane while attempting to abort the landing. Dark night conditions prevailed for the attempted landing on runway 18. Runway 18 was reported to be 5,280-feet long, by 50 feet wide. The asphalt runway was reported to be dry and in good condition at the time of the accident. The pilot stated in the accident report (NTSB form 6120.1/2) that "I saw the one row of lights on short final and my mind played a trick on me. I had the thought that I was off-course and that those lights were houses." The pilot delayed making the decision to execute a go-around and by the time he added power the airplane had touched down in the "turnaround" area to the right of the approach end of runway 18. During the inadvertent touchdown the airplane rolled to the left and the left propeller struck the ground, resulting in damage to the left engine. The pilot added that he elected to retard the right engine to avoid losing control of the airplane and the airplane impacted the ground to the left of the runway. The airplane came to rest in an area of small bushes and mesquite trees. The pilot was able to egress the airplane unassisted through the main cabin door, and was not injured. A post-impact fire developed and consumed the airplane. The pilot reported that he was familiar with the airport and had operated several airplanes in and out of that location. Weather reported at Del Rio International Airport, located approximately 11 miles north of the accident site, was clear skies, 3 miles visibility, with winds from 150 degrees at 5 knots, temperature of 70 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 29.95 inches of Mercury. The pilot added that he was not aware that the first 5 or 6 runway lights on the left side of the runway (at the approach end) were out of service when he initiated the night landing approach.

Shortly after takeoff from Flamingo Bay, the single engine aircraft crashed in the sea few dozen metres offshore. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

On short final to Mexicali Airport, the aircraft encountered windshear and lost height. The undercarriage struck the ground short of runway threshold and were torn off. The aircraft landed on its belly and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the day of the accident, the pilot was returning to his home airport, after dropping off friends at a different airport. No weather briefing or flight plan was filed with Flight Service for either flight. A witness and radar data depicted the accident airplane on a straight-in approach for runway 1, in a landing configuration, at a ground speed of approximately 120 knots. The last radar target was recorded about 1/4 mile from the runway threshold, at an altitude of approximately 150 feet agl. The wreckage was later found about 1/2 mile east of the runway threshold. Review of weather information revealed general VFR conditions along the route of flight, and at reporting stations near the accident site. Gusty winds, low-level wind shear, and moderate to severe turbulence also prevailed at the time of the accident. In addition, weather radar depicted scattered light snow showers in the vicinity of the accident site, and possibly a snow squall. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. The pilot had a total flight experience of 14,000 hours, with 8,500 hours in multiengine airplanes, including 2,600 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. He also had 4,100 hours of instrument flight experience.