Private

Shortly after takeoff from Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport, while in initial climb, one of the engine caught fire. The pilot attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in a field past the runway end, bursting into flames. All six occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft departed Valencia-Arturo Michelana Airport on a private flight to Puerto Ordaz, carrying one passenger and two pilots. While cruising at an altitude of 30,000 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a near vertical attitude. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

According to witnesses, the airplane departed runway 35 and was observed flying in and out of the clouds. Several of the witnesses observed the airplane initiate a turn to the west. One witnesses commented that it was dark but he could still see the silhouette of the airplane. He observed the airplane descend below the trees. All of the witnesses reported flames and "fireballs." On scene evidence was consistent with the airplane impacting trees in a left turn. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of the airplane, flight controls, engines, and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. Weather observations and radar data depicted low clouds, and restricted visibility due to rain and mist, in the vicinity of the airport. Toxicological examination revealed cetirizine, an antihistamine, consistent with use within the previous 12 hours. Most studies have not found any significant impairment from the medication, though it is reported to cause substantial sedation in some individuals.

The airplane departed under daytime visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country flight from an airport on the east side of a mountain range to a destination on the west side of the mountains. The airplane, which had been receiving flight following, then collided with upsloping mountainous terrain in a mountain pass while in controlled flight after encountering instrument meteorological conditions. The controller terminated radar services due to anticipation of losing radar coverage within the mountainous pass area, and notified the pilot to contact the next sector once through the pass while staying northwest of an interstate highway due to opposing traffic on the south side of the highway. The pilot later contacted the controller asking if he still needed to remain on a northwesterly heading. The controller replied that he never assigned a northwesterly heading. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. Radar data revealed that while proceeding on a northeasterly course, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 6,400 feet mean sea level (msl). A few minutes later, the radar data showed the airplane turning to an easterly heading and initiating a climb to an altitude of 6,900 feet msl. The airplane then started descending in a right turn from 6,900 feet to 5,800 feet msl prior to it being lost from radar contact about 0.65 miles southeast of the accident site. A weather observation station located at the departure airport reported a scattered cloud layer at 10,000 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation system located about 29 miles southwest of the accident site reported a broken cloud layer at 4,000 feet agl. A pilot, who was flying west bound at 8,500 feet through the same pass around the time of the accident, reported overcast cloud coverage in the area of the accident site that extended west of the mountains. The pilot stated that the ceiling was around 4,000 feet msl and the tops of the clouds were 7,000 feet msl or higher throughout the area. Postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight plan in near-zero visibility with mist, light freezing rain, and moderate mixed and clear icing. After departure, and as the airplane entered a climbing right turn to a track of about 260 degrees, the pilot reported to air traffic control that she was at 1,000 feet, climbing to 10,000 feet. The flight remained on a track of about 260 degrees and continued to accelerate and climb for 38 seconds. The pilot then declared an emergency, stating that she had an attitude indicator failure. At that moment, radar data depicted the airplane at 3,500 feet and 267 knots. Thirteen seconds later, the pilot radioed she wasn't sure which way she was turning. The transmission ended abruptly. Radar data indicated that at the time the transmission ended the airplane was in a steep, rapidly descending left turn. The fragmented airplane wreckage, due to impact and subsequent explosive forces, was located in a wooded area about 6 miles south-southwest of the departure airport. Examination of the accident site revealed a near vertical high-speed impact consistent with an in-flight loss of control. The on-site examination of the airframe remnants did not show evidence of preimpact malfunction. Examination of recovered engine remnants revealed evidence that both engines were producing power at the time of impact and no preimpact malfunctions with the engines were noted. The failure, single or dual, of the attitude indicator is listed as an abnormal event in the manufacturer's Pilot's Abbreviated Emergency/Abnormal Procedures. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information: one incorporated in the primary flight display unit on the pilot's side, another single instrument on the copilot's side, and the standby attitude indicator. In the event of a dual failure, on both the pilot and copilot sides, aircraft control could be maintained by referencing to the standby attitude indicator, which is in plain view of the pilot. The indicators are powered by separate sources and, during the course of the investigation, no evidence was identified that indicated any systems, including those needed to maintain aircraft control, failed. The pilot called for a weather briefing while en route to the airport 30 minutes prior to departure and acknowledged the deteriorating weather during the briefing. Additionally, the pilot was eager to depart, as indicated by comments that she made before her departure that she was glad to be leaving and that she had to go. Witnesses indicated that as she was departing the airport she failed to activate taxi and runway lights, taxied on grass areas off taxiways, and announced incorrect taxi instructions and runways. Additionally, no Federal Aviation Administration authorization for the pilot to operate an aircraft between 29,000 feet and 41,000 feet could be found; the IFR flight plan was filed with an en route altitude of 38,000 feet. The fact that the airplane was operating at night in instrument meteorological conditions and the departure was an accelerating climbing turn, along with the pilot's demonstrated complacency, created an environment conducive to spatial disorientation. Given the altitude and speed of the airplane, the pilot would have only had seconds to identify, overcome, and respond to the effects of spatial disorientation.

While flying a non precision approach, the pilot deliberately descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and attempted to execute a circle to land below the published circling minimums instead of executing the published missed approach procedure. During the circle to land, visual contact with the airport environment was lost and engine power was never increased after the airplane had leveled off. The airplane decelerated and entered an aerodynamic stall, followed by an uncontrolled descent which continued until ground impact. Weather at the time consisted of rain, with ceilings ranging from 300 to 600 feet, and visibility remaining relatively constant at 2.5 miles in fog. Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) audio revealed that the pilot had displayed some non professional behavior prior to initiating the approach. Also contained on the CVR were comments by the pilot indicating he planned to descend below the MDA prior to acquiring the airport visually, and would have to execute a circling approach. Moments after stating a circling approach would be needed, the pilot received a sink rate aural warning from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). After several seconds, a series of stall warnings was recorded prior to the airplane impacting terrain. EGPWS data revealed, the airplane had decelerated approximately 75 knots in the last 20 seconds of the flight. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions with the airplane or any of its systems. Toxicology testing detected sertraline in the pilot’s kidney and liver. Sertraline is a prescription antidepressant medication used for anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and social phobia. The pilot’s personal medical records indicated that he had been treated previously with two other antidepressant medications for “anxiety and depression” and a history of “impatience” and “compulsiveness.” The records also documented a diagnosis of diabetes without any indication of medications for the condition, and further noted three episodes of kidney stones, most recently experiencing “severe and profound discomfort” from a kidney stone while flying in 2005. None of these conditions or medications had been noted by the pilot on prior applications for an airman medical certificate. It is not clear whether any of the pilot’s medical conditions could account for his behavior or may have contributed to the accident.

The pilot attempted to intercept an instrument landing system localizer three times without success. The pilot told Air Traffic Approach Control that he was having trouble performing a "coupled" approach and that he was trying to "get control" of the airplane. The airplane disappeared from radar, subsequently impacting a field and then a barn. The airplane came to rest in an upright position and a post crash fire ensued. A review of radar and voice data for the flight revealed that during the three approach attempts the pilot was able to turn to headings and climb to altitudes when assigned by air traffic control. Postmortem toxicology results were consistent with the regular use of a prescription antidepressant, and the recent use of a larger-than-maximal dose of an over-the-counter antihistamine known to cause impairment. There were no preimpact anomalies observed during the airframe and engine examinations that would have prevented normal operation.

During the landing approach, a witness saw the twin-engine airplane slow and stall. The airplane crashed short of the runway, in a residential backyard. An airport manager flew with the pilot 8 days before the accident. The manager reported that during his flight the pilot flew the approach and landing with the aural stall warning horn activated. The manager advised the pilot of the aural warning, however no corrective action was taken by the pilot during that flight. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. The pilot had about 12.6 hours of flight time in the accident airplane, of which 7.7 hours were dual instruction. Due to the lack of any mechanical problems with the airplane, the pilot's minimal experience in twin-engine airplanes, and his history of flying the airplane too slow, it is probable that he allowed the airspeed to decay below a safe speed, and inadvertently stalled it.

While descending to La Romana Airport following a flight from Caracas, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and ditched the aircraft about 64 km off Saona Island, southeast of La Romana. One passenger was killed while six other occupants were rescued by Porto Rico Coast Guards.

According to a witness, prior to arriving in the run-up area the pilot lowered the airplane's flaps. After the right flap fully extended, the flap key on the drive shaft inside the 90-degree drive assembly adapter fractured, in overload, in the direction of flap extension. Before takeoff, the pilot raised the flaps; however, with the fractured key, the right flap would have remained fully extended. The pilot could have identified this condition prior to takeoff, either visually or by means of the flap indicator, which received its input from the right flap actuator. The pilot subsequently took off, and the airplane turned left, but it is unknown at what point the pilot would have noted a control problem. The pilot climbed the airplane to 250 to 300 feet and allowed the airspeed to bleed off to where the airplane stalled and subsequently spun into the ground. Airplane manufacturer calculations revealed that the pilot should have been able to maintain control of the airplane at airspeeds over 70 knots. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the best two-engine angle of climb airspeed was 99 knots and the best two-engine rate of climb airspeed was 120 knots.