Private

The airplane was loaded more than 500 pounds (about 12 percent) over the certificated maximum gross weight. The airplane lifted off from the 3,500-foot-long runway about one-half to two-thirds down the length of the runway. The pilot retracted the airplane's landing gear and flaps before reaching the airplane manufacturer's recommended retraction speeds. The airplane was unable to gain sufficient altitude and subsequently impacted trees and a house located beyond the departure end of the runway. A postaccident examination of the wreckage and recorded non-volatile memory revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical abnormalities.

The instrument-rated pilot was issued a clearance to descend to 4,000 feet for radar vectors to a non precision instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The last 1 minute 23 seconds of radar data indicated the airplane leveled at 4,000 feet for about 35 seconds and then varied between 3,800 feet and 3,900 feet for the remainder of the flight for which data was available. During this timeframe, the airspeed decreased from 131 knots to 57 knots. Witnesses observed the airplane descending in a spin, and one reported hearing the engine running. Recorded engine data showed an increase in engine power near stall speed, which was likely the pilot's response to the low airspeed. The airplane damage was consistent with a low-speed impact with some rotation about the airplane's vertical axis. The pilot did not make any transmissions to air traffic control indicating any abnormalities or emergency. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. During training on the accident airplane, the instructor recommended that the pilot get 25 to 50 hours of flight in visual meteorological conditions before flying in IMC in order to gain more familiarity with the radios, switches, and navigation equipment. The pilot only had 14 hours of flight time in the accident airplane before the accident flight, however it could not determined whether this played a role in the accident.

About one minute after takeoff, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that the airplane's control wheels were locked. The controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land on any runway. No further transmissions were received from the pilot and the airplane continued straight ahead. Witnesses observed the airplane in a slow, level descent, until it impacted wires and then the ground. During a postaccident examination of the airplane, flight control continuity was confirmed to all the flight controls. Due to the impact and post-crash fire damage, a cause for the flight control anomaly, as reported by the pilot, could not be determined; however, several unsecured cannon plugs and numerous unsecured heat damaged wire bundles were found lying across the control columns forward of the firewall. Examination of the airplane logbooks revealed the most recent maintenance to the flight controls was performed about four months prior to the accident. The airplane had flown 91 hours since then.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard at Jeffersonville-Clark County Airport. There were no injuries among the people on board and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages to the left wing and the tail section.

Three minutes after takeoff from Tegucigalpa-Toncontin Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed few km from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

During takeoff, one witness noted that at least one engine seemed to be running rough and not making power. Several other witnesses, located about 1/2 mile northwest of the airport, observed the accident airplane pass overhead in a right turn. They reported that the engine noise did not sound normal. Two of the witnesses noted grayish black smoke emanating from the airplane. The airplane then rolled left and descended nose down into the front yard of a residence. Review of maintenance records revealed the airplane underwent an annual inspection and extensive maintenance about 3 months prior to the accident. One of the maintenance issues was to troubleshoot the right engine that was reportedly running rough at cruise. During the maintenance, the right engine fuel pump, metering valve, and fuel manifold were removed and replaced with overhauled units. Additionally, the right engine fuel flow was reset contrary to procedures contained in an engine manufacturer service information directive; however, the fuel pump could not be tested due to thermal damage and the investigation could not determine if the fuel flow setting procedure contributed to the loss of power on the right engine. On-scene examination of the wreckage and teardown examination of both engines did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Teardown examination of the right propeller revealed that the blades were not at or near the feather position, which was contrary to the emergency procedure published by the manufacturer, to secure the engine and feather the propeller in the event of an engine power loss. The right propeller exhibited signatures consistent with low or no power at impact, while the left propeller exhibited signatures consistent of being operated with power at impact.

The airplane was on an instrument flight in night instrument meteorological conditions approaching the destination airport. The pilot contacted the approach control facility by radio and was subsequently cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to the destination airport. During the approach, the air traffic approach controller advised the pilot twice that the airplane was to the right of the approach course. The controller suggested a left turn of 5 to 7 degrees to the pilot. Once the airplane was back on the inbound course, the approach controller instructed the pilot to contact a tower controller. The pilot never contacted the tower controller, but later reestablished contact with the approach controller, who provided radar vectors for a second attempt at the ILS approach. During the second approach, the controller again advised the pilot that the airplane was to the right of the approach course and provided the pilot a low altitude alert. The airplane then started a climb and a turn back toward the inbound course. The controller advised the pilot that the airplane would intercept the inbound course at the locator outer marker (LOM) for the approach and asked if the pilot would like to abort the approach and try again. The pilot declined and responded that he would continue the approach. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted a building about 0.4 nautical miles from the LOM. The building and airplane were almost completely consumed by the postimpact fire. A postaccident examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure. The airplane's turning ground track and the challenging visibility conditions were conducive to the onset of pilot spatial disorientation.

A witness reported that the multi-engine turboprop airplane was on final approach to land when it suddenly veered to the left and entered a rapid descent. The witness stated that he heard the "whine of the engines" before the airplane impacted terrain about 1/2 mile south of the runway threshold. In the days preceding the accident flight, the airplane had been at a maintenance facility to resolve a vibration in the rudder system while the autopilot system was engaged. There were no anomalies reported with the autopilot system during a test flight completed immediately before the accident flight. However, anomalies with the rate gyro were noted by a mechanic who recommended replacing it, but the pilot departed on the accident flight without the recommended repair having been completed. Further, examination of the autopilot annunciator panel indicated that the autopilot was likely not engaged at the time of impact, likely because the airplane was on a short final approach for landing. Accordingly, any existing autopilot faults would not have affected the flight as the autopilot system was likely not in use. There were no failures identified with the primary flight controls, engines, or propellers that would have prevented the pilot from maintaining control of the airplane manually. Toxicological testing revealed the presence of Zolpidem in the pilot's blood (Zolpidem, the trade name for Ambien, is used for short-term treatment of insomnia); however, the reported levels would likely not have resulted in any impairment.

During the preflight inspection, some water was present in the fuel sample; it was drained until a clear sample was observed. Subsequently, the fuel tanks were topped off, and the remaining preflight inspection revealed no other anomalies. The pilot initiated a takeoff and upon reaching rotation speed, the airplane became airborne and the landing gear was retracted. The right engine immediately lost power, and the pilot feathered the engine and attempted to return to the airport. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. The pilot informed the air traffic controller that the airplane had lost all power. The airplane subsequently collided with trees and terrain and a post crash fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of fuel retrieved from the right main fuel tank, as well as fuel from the fixed base operator, revealed no anomalies. The left fuel selector valve was observed in the plugged port (no fluid flow) position, but it was most likely moved to that position during the accident sequence. The right fuel selector valve was partially aligned with the main fuel passageway and was unobstructed. The reason for the loss of engine power to both engines was not determined.

The visibility at the time of the accident was 1/2 mile with fog and the vertical visibility was 100 feet. A witness stated that the pilot checked the weather, but that he appeared to be in a hurry and took off without performing a preflight inspection of the aircraft. After takeoff, air traffic control instructed the pilot to turn left to a heading of 270 degrees. The pilot reported to the controller that he was at 1,300 feet climbing to 3,000 feet and the controller cleared the pilot to climb to 4,000 feet; the pilot acknowledged the clearance. Witnesses on the ground noted that the airplane was loud; one witness located about 1.5 miles from the departure airport reported that the airplane flew overhead at treetop height. The airplane impacted trees and a residence about 2.3 miles north-northeast of the departure airport. The airplane's turning ground track and the challenging visibility conditions were conducive to the onset of pilot spatial disorientation. Post accident inspection failed to reveal any mechanical failure that would have resulted in the accident. The pilot purchased the airplane about three months prior to the accident; at that time he reported having 72.6 hours of instrument flight experience and 25 hours of multi-engine experience, with none in the accident airplane make and model. After purchasing the airplane, the pilot received 52 hours of flight instruction in the accident airplane in 7 days. Logbook records were not located to establish subsequent flight experience.