Private

The twin engine aircraft departed Mönchengladbach on a flight to Augsbourg, carrying four passengers and one pilot. On descent to Augsburg Airport, the pilot was informed by ATC that weather conditions at destination were worse than predicted, that the visibility was estimated between 225 and 250 metres, thus below minimums. The pilot acknowledged and informed ATC about his intention to attempt an approach and that he would divert to Oberpfaffenhofen if necessary. On short final, at a height of 200 feet, the pilot established a visual contact with the runway lights and decided to continue. After passing over the threshold, he reduced the engine power when the aircraft entered a stall and impacted the runway surface. On impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for 104 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. Four occupants were seriously injured and the fifth was slightly injured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

The aircraft had taken off on a private flight with the pilot being the sole occupant on board. The pilot had filed an IFR flight plan and had informed air traffic control (ATC) at FALA that the aircraft had a fuel endurance of 4 hours and his estimated flying time to FACT was approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes. After take-off the aircraft climbed to its cruising altitude of 36 000 feet (FL360) as was seen on the radar recordings. The pilot maintained communication with ATC until overhead Kimberley. Shortly thereafter the aircraft was observed to change course, turning slightly left before the town of Douglas. The aircraft remained at FL360 and was observed to fly south towards the waypoint OKTED, which was a substantial distance to the east of FACT. FACT could not get communication with the aircraft and the aeronautical rescue co-ordination centre (ARCC) was advised of the situation. The aircraft was kept under constant radar surveillance. The ARCC requested assistance from the South African Air Force (SAAF) and a Gripen (military jet) from Air Force Base Overberg (FAOB) was dispatched to intercept the aircraft. The pilot of the Gripen intercepted the aircraft approximately 3 minutes before it impacted the terrain. The Gripen pilot was unable to get close enough to the aircraft as it was flying very erratically, and he could therefore not see whether the pilot was conscious or not. The aircraft was observed entering a left spiral and continue spiraling down until it impacted the ground. The pilot was fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed during the impact sequence.

According to the pilot, he checked the winds via his onboard weather reporting device during the run-up, and he stated that the 25 knot wind sock was about ¾ full just moments before the takeoff roll. He reported that during the takeoff roll the airplane encountered a significant wind gust from the right. He stated that the wind gust forced the airplane to exit the left side of the runway, the landing gear collapsed, and the airplane collided with metal pylons which surrounded the wind sock. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, fuselage, horizontal stabilizer and elevator. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation. According to the Airport/Facility Directory, the Airport Remarks state: Airport located in mountainous terrain with occasional strong winds and turbulence. Lighted windsock available at runway ends and centerfield. With southerly crosswinds in excess of 15 knots, experiencing turbulence and possible windshear along first 3000´ of Runway 27. The reported wind at the airport during the time of the accident was from 200 degrees true at 22 knots, with gusts at 33 knots, and the departure runway heading was 27. According to the pilot operating hand book the maximum demonstrated crosswind component for this airplane is 17 knots. The crosswind component during the time of the accident was 26 knots.

The aircraft was approaching Dunkeswell Airfield, Devon after an uneventful flight from Fairoaks, Surrey. The weather at Dunkeswell was overcast, with rain. The pilot held an IMC rating but there is no published instrument approach procedure at Dunkeswell. As the aircraft turned onto the final approach, it commenced a descent on what appeared to be a normal approach path but then climbed rapidly, probably entering cloud. The aircraft then seems to have stalled, turned left and descended to “just below the clouds”, before it climbed steeply again and “disappeared into cloud”. Shortly after, the aircraft was observed descending out of the cloud in a steep nose-down attitude, in what appears to have been a spin, before striking the ground. All four occupants were fatally injured.

Shortly after takeoff from a grassy airstrip located just outside from the town of Taylor, some 15 km southeast of Fort St John, the single engine aircraft crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants, a father and his son, were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport, while climbing, the pilot declared an emergency after the failure of the right engine. He attempted an emergency landing in an open field when the aircraft crashed in a prairie located near the Los Andes hippodrome, some 5 km northeast of Guaymaral Airport, bursting into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while both other occupants were killed.

The commercial pilot was conducting a personal flight. He reported that he did not recall what happened the day of the accident. One witness, who was former pilot, reported that he saw the airplane fly over his house and that the engines sounded as if they were "out of sync." A second witness, who lived about 5 miles away from the airport, reported that she saw the airplane flying unusually low. She added that the engines sounded terrible and that they were "popping and banging." A third witness, who was holding short of the runway waiting to take off, reported that he saw the airplane approaching the runway about 75 ft above ground level (agl). He then saw the airplane descend to about 50 ft agl and then climb back to about 75 ft agl, at which point the airplane made a hard, right turn and then impacted terrain. Although a postaccident examination of both engines revealed no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation, the witnesses' described what appeared to be an engine problem. It is likely that one or both of the engines was experiencing some kind of problem and that the pilot subsequently lost airplane control. The pilot reported in a written statement several months after the accident that, when he moved the left rudder pedal back and forth multiple times after the accident, neither the torque tubes nor the rudder would move, that he found several of the rivets sheared from the left pedal, and that he believed the rudder had failed. However, postaccident examination of the fractured rivets showed that they exhibited deformation patterns consistent with overstress shearing that occurred during the accident sequence. No preimpact anomalies with the rudder were found.

The single engine aircraft departed Cannes-Mandelieu Airport on a private flight to Triengen, Switzerland, with one passenger and one pilot on board. Shortly after takeoff from runway 17, while in initial climb, the pilot noticed engine troubles and the speed dropped. He was able to maintain a straight-in path and eventually ditched the airplane few hundred metres offshore. Both occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft sank and was lost.

Shortly after takeoff in day visual meteorological conditions, when the airplane was climbing through 3,000 ft mean sea level, a complete electrical failure occurred that affected electrical instrumentation and additional airplane equipment, including the landing gear. The pilot reported that he performed the electrical failure checklists and could not restore power. After additional troubleshooting with no success, he chose to divert to and land at another airport. While in the traffic pattern at his diversion airport, he attempted to lower the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures but could not confirm the landing gear were down and locked. Without any capability to communicate or confirmation that the landing gear were down, he decided to leave the airport traffic pattern and land on a nearby field to avoid airport traffic; the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, landing gear doors, engines, and propellers during the off-airport landing. The reason for the loss of electrical power could not be determined. Examination of the cockpit revealed that the landing gear's emergency engage handle, also known as the "J" handle, was not pulled up and turned, which was one of the steps listed in the airplane flight manual for the manual landing gear extension procedure. The "J" handle engages the clutch and allows for the handle to operate the landing gear chain. Without engaging the "J" handle, the landing gear handle pumping action would not have worked, which resulted in the gear-up landing.

**This report was modified on April 2, 2020. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original report.**
After the airplane touched down on the 4,422-ft-long runway, the airline transport pilot applied the brakes to decelerate; however, he did not think that the brakes were operating. He continued "pumping the brakes" and considered conducting a go-around; however, there was insufficient remaining runway to do so. The airplane subsequently continued off the end of the runway, impacted a berm, and came to rest upright, which resulted in substantial damage to the right wing. During postaccident examination of the airplane, brake pressure was obtained on both sets of brake pedals when they were depressed, and there was no bleed down or reduction in pedal firmness when the brakes were pumped several times. Examination revealed no evidence off any preimpact anomalies with the brake system that would have precluded normal operation. In addition, the pilot indicated that he was not aware of and was not trained on the use of the ALL INTERRUPT button, which is listed as a step in the Emergency Procedures section of the airplane flight manual and is used to disable the anti-skid brake system functions and restore normal braking when the brakes are ineffective; thus, the pilot did not follow proper checklist procedures. According to data downloaded from the airplane's diagnostic storage unit (DSU), the airplane touched down 1,280 ft beyond the runway threshold, which resulted in 2,408 ft of runway remaining (the runway had a displaced threshold of 734 ft) and that it traveled 2,600 ft before coming to rest about 200 ft past the runway. The airplane's touchdown speed was about 91 knots. Comparing DSU data from previous downloaded flights revealed that the airplane's calculated deceleration rate during the accident landing was indicative of braking performance as well as or better than the previous landings. Estimated landing distance calculations revealed that the airplane required about 3,063 ft when crossing the threshold at 50 ft above ground level. The target touchdown speed was 76 knots. However, the airplane touched down with only 2,408 ft of remaining runway faster than the target touchdown speed, which resulted in the runway overrun.