Private

The airline transport pilot and two passengers departed in the twin-engine, pressurized airplane on a business flight in night instrument meteorological conditions. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began to deviate from its assigned altitude and course. The controller queried the pilot, who responded that the airplane was "… a little out of control." After regaining control of the airplane, the pilot reported that he had experienced a "trim issue." The airplane continued on course and, about 13 minutes later, the pilot again reported a trim malfunction and said that he was having difficulty controlling the airplane. The flight's heading and altitude began to deviate from the course for the last 8 minutes of radar data and became more erratic for the last 2 minutes of radar data; radar and radio communication were subsequently lost at an altitude of about 18,300 ft in the vicinity of the accident site. Several witnesses reported hearing the airplane flying overhead. They all described the airplane as being very loud and that the engine sound was continuous up until they heard the impact. The airplane impacted a field in a relatively level attitude at high speed. The wreckage was significantly fragmented and the wreckage path extended about 1/4 mile over several fields. Examination of the available airframe and engine components revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The accident airplane was equipped with elevator, rudder, and aileron trim systems; however, not all components of the trim system and avionics were located or in a condition allowing examination. Although the airplane was equipped with an electric elevator trim and autopilot that could both be turned off in an emergency, the investigation could not determine which trim system the pilot was reportedly experiencing difficulties with. It is likely that the pilot was unable to maintain control of the airplane as he attempted to address the trim issues that he reported to air traffic control.

The commercial pilot was conducting an instrument approach following a 3.5-hour cross-country instrument flight rules (IFR) flight in a single-engine turboprop airplane. About 1.6 miles from the runway threshold, the airplane began a climb consistent with the published missed approach procedure; however, rather than completing the slight left climbing turn toward the designated holding point, the airplane continued in an approximate 270° left turn, during which the airplane's altitude varied, before entering a descending right turn and impacting terrain. Tree and ground impact signatures were consistent with a 60° nose-low attitude at the time of impact. No distress calls were received or recorded from the accident flight. A postimpact fire consumed a majority of the cockpit and fuselage. Weather information for the time of the accident revealed that the pilot was operating in IFR to low IFR conditions with gusting surface winds, light to heavy snow, mist, cloud ceilings between 700 and 1,400 ft above ground level with clouds extending through 18,500 ft, and the potential for low-level wind shear and clear air turbulence. The area of the accident site was under AIRMETs for IFR conditions, mountain obscuration, moderate icing below 20,000 ft, and moderate turbulence below 18,000 ft. In addition, a winter storm warning was issued about 6 hours before the flight departed. Although the pilot received a weather briefing about 17 hours before the accident, there was no indication that he obtained updated weather information before departure or during the accident flight. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation; however, the extent of the fire damage precluded examination of the avionics system. The airplane was equipped with standby flight instruments. An acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot had experienced an avionics malfunction several months before the accident during which the airplane's flight display went blank while flying an instrument approach. During that occurrence, the pilot used ForeFlight on his iPad to maneuver back to the northeast and fly the approach again using his own navigation. During the accident flight, the airplane appeared to go missed approach, but rather than fly the published missed approach procedure, the airplane also turned left towards to northeast. However, it could not be determined if the pilot's actions were an attempt to fly the approach using his own navigation or if he was experiencing spatial disorientation. The restricted visibility and turbulence present at the time of the accident provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. Additionally, the airplane's turning flight track and steep descent profile are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation.

The instrument-rated private pilot and four passengers boarded the multiengine airplane inside a hangar. The pilot then requested that the airplane be towed from the hangar to the ramp, since he did not want to hit anything on the ramp while taxiing in the dense fog. Witnesses heard the pre-takeoff engine run-up toward the end of the runway but could not see the airplane as it departed; the engines sounded normal during the run-up and takeoff. A witness video recorded the takeoff but the airplane was not visible due to the dense fog. During the takeoff roll the airplane's tires chirped, which is consistent with the wheels touching down on the runway with a side load. The video ended before the accident occurred. The witnesses stated that the takeoff continued and then they heard the airplane impact the ground and saw an explosion. The weather conditions at the time of the accident included visibility less than 1/4 mile in fog and an overcast ceiling at 300 ft above ground level. The airplane's weight at the time of the accident was about 105 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight, which exceeded the center of gravity moment envelope. The excess weight would have likely extended the takeoff roll, decreased the climb rate, and increased the amount of elevator pressure required to lift off of the runway. A majority of the airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. The ground impact marks and wreckage distribution were consistent with the airplane rolling left over the departure end of the runway and impacting the ground inverted in a nearly vertical, nose-low attitude. Examination of the engines revealed operating signatures consistent with takeoff power at the time of impact. The elevator trim tab and actuator were found beyond their full up travel limits and the trim cable exhibited tension overload separations near the actuator. It is likely that, when the cable separated in overload, the chain turned the sprocket and extended the actuator rod beyond full travel. No anomalies were observed with the airframe, engines, or cockpit instrumentation that would have precluded normal operation. The investigation was unable to determine the status of the autopilot during the accident takeoff. Based on the evidence it's likely that when the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions the pilot experienced spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

Before departing on the flight, the private pilot, who did not hold a current medical certificate, fueled the multiengine airplane and was seen shortly thereafter attempting to repair a fuel leak of unknown origin. The pilot did not hold a mechanic certificate and review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed 2 years before the accident. After performing undetermined maintenance to the airplane, the pilot reported to a witness that he had fixed the fuel leak. The pilot then taxied to the runway for takeoff. Witnesses reported that a large fuel stain was present on the ramp where the airplane had been parked; however, the amount of fuel that leaked from the airplane could not be determined. The pilot aborted the first takeoff shortly after becoming airborne. Although he did not state why he aborted the takeoff, he told the tower controller that he did not need assistance; shortly thereafter, he requested and was cleared for a second takeoff. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and was cleared to land on any runway. Witnesses reported that the airplane was between 400 ft and 800 ft above the ground in a left bank and appeared to be turning back to land on an intersecting runway. They thought the airplane was going to make it back to the runway, but the airplane's bank angle increased past 90° and the nose suddenly dropped; the airplane subsequently impacted terrain. One of the pilots likened the maneuver to a stall/spin, Vmc roll, or snap roll. Examination of the flight controls and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The position of the fuel valves was consistent with the fuel being shut off to the left engine. The fuel valves, with the exception of the left main valve, functioned when power was applied. The left main valve was intact, but the motor was found to operate intermittently. The amount of fuel found in the left engine injection servo was less than that in the right engine; however, the cylinder head temperatures and exhaust gas temperatures were consistent between both engines for the duration of the flight, and whether or to what extent the left engine may have experienced a loss of power could not be determined. The available evidence was insufficient to determine why the pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to the airport; however, the airplane's increased left bank and nose-down attitude just before impact is consistent with a loss of control.

The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.

The pilot performed a preflight inspection of the turboprop airplane and an engine run-up with no anomalies noted. The takeoff roll and lift off from the runway were normal; however, when the pilot initiated a landing gear retraction, the engine torque decreased, but the rpm did not change. The torque then surged back to full power and continued to surge as the pilot attempted to return to the runway. The left wing of the airplane struck the ground, and the airplane came to rest in the grass on the side of the runway. Examination of the engine, engine accessories, and propeller revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available
information.

On 22 November 2017, the pilot-in-command (PIC) accompanied by the first officer (FO) took off from the Cape Town International Airport (FACT) on a private flight to the Rand Airport (FAGM). The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) by day and the approach was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR). The PIC was the pilot flying (PF) and was seated on the left seat and the FO was occupying the right seat. The air traffic controller (ATC) on duty at FAGM tower stated that the FO reported in-bound for a fullstop landing at FAGM. The last wind direction data for Runway 29 was transmitted to the FO as 230°/11 knots (kts) and Query Nautical Height (QNH): 1021. The FO acknowledged the transmission and the crew elected to land on Runway 11. The PIC stated that the approach for landing was stable and that the touchdown was near the first taxiway exit point. According to the FO, the aircraft floated for a while before touchdown. This was confirmed during the investigation. During the landing rollout, the PIC applied the brakes and the brakes responded for a short while, however, the aircraft continued to roll without slowing down. At approximately 300 metres (m) beyond the intersection of Runway 35 and Runway 11, the PIC requested the FO to apply emergency brakes. The FO applied the emergency brakes gradually and the aircraft continued to roll before the brakes locked and the tyres burst. The aircraft skidded on the main wheels and continued for approximately 180m until it overshot the runway. The undercarriage went over a ditch of approximately 200 millimetres in depth at the end of the runway into the soft ground and the aircraft came to a stop approximately 10m from the threshold facing slightly left off the extended centre line Runway 11. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the impact sequence and none of the occupants sustained injuries. The crash alarm was activated by the tower and the fire services responded to the scene.

The aircraft took off from the Bom Futuro Municipal Aerodrome (SILC), Lucas do Rio Verde - MT, to the Anápolis Aerodrome (SWNS) - GO, in order to carry out a transfer flight, with a pilot and three passengers on board. During the flight, the pilot identified conflicting information related to the amount of fuel remaining and chose to make an intermediate landing on an unapproved runway, located in the city of Goiás Velho - GO, in order to check the data visually. After the conference, the N154KQ took off from that location and, reaching approximately 300ft height, the aircraft lost power, colliding with vegetation 1.86 km from the runway used for takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed by the fire. The pilot suffered serious injuries and the three passengers suffered minor injuries.

The pilot of the turbine-powered airplane reported that, while landing in a gusting crosswind, it was "obvious" the wind had changed directions. He performed a go-around, but "the wind slammed [the airplane] to the ground extremely hard." Subsequently, the airplane veered to the right off the runway and then back to the left before coming to rest. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 270° at 19 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The pilot landed on runway 20.

The commercial pilot and passenger departed on a local flight in the twin-engine airplane. According to a witness, the pilot took off from the private grass runway and departed the area for about 10 minutes. The airplane then returned to the airport, where the pilot performed a low pass over the runway and entered a steep climb followed by a roll. The airplane entered a nose-low descent, then briefly leveled off in an upright attitude before disappearing behind trees and subsequently impacting terrain. The pilot's toxicology testing was positive for ethanol with 0.185 gm/dl and 0.210 gm/dl in urine and cavity blood samples, respectively. The effects of ethanol are generally well understood; it significantly impairs pilot performance, even at very low levels. Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit any person from acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 0.040 gm/dl or more ethanol in the blood. While the identified ethanol may have come from sources other than ingestion, such as postmortem production, the possibility that the source of some of the ethanol was from ingestion and that pilot was impaired by the effects of ethanol during the accident flight could not be ruled out. Toxicology also identified a significant amount of diphenhydramine in cavity blood (0.122 µg/ml, which is within or above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 µg/ml; diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and central postmortem levels may be about two to three times higher than peripheral or antemortem levels.). Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine that causes more sedation than other antihistamines; this is the rationale for its use as a sleep aid. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The pilot had been diagnosed with memory loss about 8 months before the accident. It appears that he had some degree of mild cognitive impairment, but whether his cognitive impairment was severe enough to have contributed to the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. However, it is likely that the pilot's mild cognitive impairment combined with the psychoactive effects of diphenhydramine and possibly ethanol would have further decreased his cognitive functioning and contributed to his decision to attempt an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a non-aerobatic airplane.