Private

The pilot departed on the cross-country flight with the airplane about 730 lbs over its maximum gross weight. While in cruise altitude at 27,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control that he observed weather on his radar along his route and ahead of his position. The areas of weather included thunderstorms with cloud tops up to 43,000 ft msl. The controller acknowledged the weather; however, she did not provide specifics to the pilot, including the size and strength of the area of precipitation or cloud tops information, nor did she solicit or disseminate any pilot reports related to the conditions, as required. The airplane entered an area of heavy to extreme precipitation, likely a thunderstorm updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions. Tracking information indicated that the airplane climbed about 300 ft, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight at high altitude. The recovered wreckage was found scattered along a path about 2.6 miles in length. Both wings separated, and most of the empennage was not located. The airplane was likely about 148 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The pilot, who owned the airplane, did not possess an instrument rating. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat was instrument-rated but did not meet resency of experience requirements to act as pilot-in-command. Toxicology testing detected a small amount of ethanol in the pilot’s liver but not in muscle. After absorption, ethanol is uniformly distributed throughout all tissues and body fluids; therefore, the finding in one tissue but not another is most consistent with post-mortem production. Hazardous weather avoidance is ultimately the pilot’s responsibility, and, in this case, the airplane was sufficiently equipped to provide a qualified pilot with the information necessary to navigate hazardous weather; however, the controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm and the resulting loss of airplane control and inflight breakup.

The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in a turbofan-powered airplane. Shortly after departure, the airplane entered a witness-estimated 90° left bank with the nose parallel to the horizon; as the airplane began to roll out of the turn, the nose remained at or below the horizon before it dropped and the airplane impacted the ground. Flight track data revealed that, shortly after departure, the airplane's ground speed immediately began decreasing from its maximum of 141 knots during takeoff and continued decreasing until the last recorded data point, which showed that the airplane had a ground speed of 100 knots. The surface wind reported about 10 minutes before the accident was from 170° at 9 knots, gusting to 14 knots, which resulted in a 1- to 2-knot tailwind component. Given this information and the airplane's configuration at the time of the accident, the airplane's indicated airspeed (IAS) would have been between about 86 and 93 knots. The airplane's stall speed was calculated to be 100 knots IAS (KIAS) with a bank angle of 45° and 118 KIAS with a bank angle of 60°. Thus, the pilot failed to maintain airspeed or accelerate after departure, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall A pilot who had flown with the accident pilot twice before the accident reported that, during these flights, the pilot had flown at reduced power settings and slower-than-normal airspeeds. During the flight 1 year before the accident, he reached over and pushed the power levers forward himself. He also stated that every time he had flown with the pilot, he was "very behind the airplane." Postaccident examination of the engines revealed no signs of preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation, and both engines exhibited circumferential rub marks on all rotating stages, blade tip bending opposite the direction of rotation, and debris ingestion through the gas path, indicating that the engine had power at impact. Further, the right engine full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) nonvolatile memory recorded no faults. (The left engine FADEC could not be downloaded due to damage.) The Airplane Flight Manual stated that the pilot must, in part, advance the throttle lever to the maximum takeoff detent for the FADEC's nonvolatile memory to record a logic trend snapshot 2 seconds after takeoff. The lack of a FADEC logic trend snapshot is consistent with the pilot not fully advancing the throttles during the takeoff and initial climb and is likely why he did not attain or maintain sufficient airspeed. The flight track data, pilot witness account, and airplane damage are consistent with the pilot failing to fully advance the power levers while maneuvering shortly after takeoff, which led to his failure to maintain sufficient airspeed and resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall.

While descending to Urimán Airport following an uneventful flight from La Paragua, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted ground and came to rest against a group of palm trees located 13 km from Urimán. Both pilots were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was performing a personal cross-country flight. While en route to the intended destination, the pilot contacted air traffic control to report that the airplane was having a fuel pump issue and requested to divert to the nearest airport. The pilot stated that the request was only precautionary and did not declare an emergency during the flight; he provided no further information about the fuel pump. As the airplane approached the diversion airport, witnesses observed the airplane flying low and rolling to the left just before impacting terrain, after which a postcrash fire ensued. An examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident examination and review of recorded data indicated that the left engine was secured and in the feather position, and that the right engine was operating at a high RPM setting. The left engine-driven fuel pump was found fractured. Further examination of the fuel pump revealed fatigue failure of the pressure relief valve. The fatigue failure initiated in upward bending on one side of the valve disk and progressed around both sides of the valve stem. As the cracks grew, the stem separated from the disk on one side and began to tilt in relation to the disk and the valve guide due to the non-symmetric support, which caused the lower end of the stem to rub against the valve guide, creating wear marks. The increasing stem tilt would have impinged against the valve guide, and the valve might have begun to stick in the closed position. If the valve were stuck in the closed position, it would not be able to open, and the outlet fuel pressure could rise above the set point pressure. Because the pump was driven by the engine, there would not be a way for the pilot to shut it off, disconnect it, or bypass it. Instead, the fuel pressure would continue to rise until the valve were to unstick. Thus, the pilot was likely experiencing variable fuel pressure as the valve became stuck and unstuck. Examination of the spring seat and the diaphragm plate, which were in contact with each other in the fuel pump assembly, revealed wear marks on the surface of each component, with one mark on the diaphragm plate and two wear marks on the spring seat. The two wear marks on the spring seat were distinct features separated by material with no wear indications in between. The only way that these wear marks could have occurred were if the spring seat was separated from the diaphragm plate and reinstalled in a different orientation. Thus, it is likely that the pilot had encountered a fuel pump problem before the accident flight and that someone tried to troubleshoot the problem. The last radar data point indicated that the airplane was traveling at a groundspeed of about 98 knots, and had passed north of the airport, traveling to the southwest. The minimum control speed for the airplane with single-engine operation was 88 knots. However, it is likely that if the pilot initiated a left turn back toward the airport, that the right engine torque and the 14 knot wind with gusts to 24 knots would have necessitated a higher speed. Because appropriate control inputs and airspeed were not maintained, the airplane rolled in the direction of the feathered engine (due to the left fuel pump problem), resulting in a loss of control. The pilot's toxicology report was positive for cetirizine, sumatriptan, gabapentin, topiramate, and duloxetine. All of these drugs act in the central nervous system and can be impairing alone or in combination. Although this investigation could not determine the reason(s) for the pilot's use of these drugs, they are commonly used to treat chronic pain syndromes or seizures. It is likely that the pilot was experiencing some impairment because of multiple impairing medications and was unable to successfully respond to the in-flight urgent situation and safely land the airplane.

The pilot landed the seaplane into an easterly wind, then noticed that the surface wind was greater than forecast. Unable to taxi to the beaching location, he elected to return to his destination. He maneuvered the airplane into the wind and applied takeoff power. He described the takeoff run as "bumpy" and the water conditions as "rough." The pilot reported that the left float departed the airplane at rotation speed, and the airplane subsequently nosed into the water. The pilot and passengers were assisted by a nearby vessel and the airplane subsequently sank into 50 ft of water. Inclement sea and wind conditions prevented recovery of the wreckage for 52 days, and the wreckage was stored outside for an additional 13 days before recovery by the salvage company. Extensive saltwater corrosion prevented metallurgical examination of the landing gear components; however, no indication of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure was found.

The pilot began the takeoff roll in visual meteorological conditions. The airplane was airborne about 1,300 ft down the runway, which was about 75% of the normal ground roll distance for the airplane’s weight and the takeoff environment. About 2 seconds after rotation, the airplane rolled left. Three seconds later, the airplane had reached an altitude of about 80 ft above ground level and was in a 90° left bank. The nose then dropped as the airplane rolled inverted and struck the ground in a right-wing-low, nose-down attitude. The airplane was destroyed. Postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies with the airframe or engines that would have precluded normal operation. The landing gear, flap, and trim positions were appropriate for takeoff and flight control continuity was confirmed. The symmetry of damage between both propeller assemblies indicated that both engines were producing equal and high amounts of power at impact. The autopsy revealed no natural disease was present that could pose a significant hazard to flight safety. Review of surveillance video footage from before the accident revealed that the elevator was in the almost full nose-up (or trailing edge up) position during the taxi and the beginning of the takeoff roll. Surveillance footage also showed that the pilot did not perform a preflight inspection of the airplane or control check before the accident flight. According to the pilot’s friend who was also in the hangar, as the accident pilot was pushing the airplane back into his hangar on the night before the accident, he manipulated and locked the elevator in the trailing edge up position to clear an obstacle in the hangar. However, no evidence of an installed elevator control lock was found in the cabin after the accident. The loss of control during takeoff was likely due to the pilot’s use of an unapproved elevator control lock device. Despite video evidence of the elevator locked in the trailing edge up position before the accident, an examination revealed no evidence of an installed control lock in the cabin. Therefore, during the night before the accident, the pilot likely placed an unapproved object between the elevator balance weight and the trailing edge of the horizontal stabilizer to lock the elevator in the trailing edge up position. The loss of control was also due to the pilot’s failure to correctly position the elevator before takeoff. The pilot’s friend at the hangar also reported that the pilot was running about one hour late; the night before, he was trying to troubleshoot an electrical issue in the airplane that caused a circuit breaker to keep tripping, which may have become a distraction to the pilot. The pilot had the opportunity to detect his error in not freeing the elevator both before boarding the airplane and again while in the airplane, either via a control check or detecting an anomalous aft position of the yoke. The pilot directed his attention to the arrival of a motorbike in the hangar alley shortly after he pulled the airplane out of the hangar, which likely distracted the pilot and further delayed his departure. He did not conduct a preflight inspection of the airplane or control check before the accident flight, due either to distraction or time pressure.

Two instrument-rated commercial pilots and one passenger were conducting a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions when they began discussing an electrical malfunction; they then reported the electrical problem to air traffic control. The airplane subsequently made a descending right turn and impacted wooded terrain at a high speed. Most components of the airplane were highly fragmented, impact damaged, and unidentifiable. Based on the limited discussion of the electrical problem on the cockpit voice recorder and the damage to the airplane, it was not possible to determine the specific nature of the electrical malfunction the airplane may have experienced. While it was not possible to determine which systems were impacted by the electrical malfunction, it is possible the flight instruments were affected. The airplane's descending, turning, flight path before impact is consistent with a system malfunction that either directly or indirectly (through a diversion of attention) led to the pilot's loss of awareness of the airplane's performance in instrument meteorological conditions and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.

The two commercial pilots were conducting a personal, cross-country flight. A video surveillance camera at the airport captured their airplane’s approach. Review of the video revealed that, as the airplane approached the approach end of the landing runway, it began to climb, rolled left, became inverted, and then impacted terrain. The left thrust reverser (T/R) was found open and unlatched at the accident site. An asymmetric deployment of the left T/R would have resulted in a left roll/yaw. The lack of an airworthy and operable cockpit voice recorder, which was required for the flight, precluded identifying which pilot was performing pilot flying duties, as well as other crew actions and background noises, that would have facilitated the investigation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that it was not equipped, nor was required to be equipped, with a nose landing gear (NLG) ground contact switch intended to preclude inflight operation of the thrust reverser (T/R). The left T/R door was found unlatched and open, and the right T/R door was found closed and latched. Further, electrical testing of the T/R left and right stow microswitches within the cockpit throttle quadrant revealed that the left stow microswitch did not operate within design specifications. Disassembly of the left and right stow microswitches revealed evidence of arc wear due to aging. Based on this information, it is likely that the airplane’s lack of an NLG ground contact switch and the age-related failure of the stow microswitches resulted in an asymmetric T/R deployment while on approach and a subsequent loss of airplane control. Also, there were additional T/R system components that were found to unairworthy that would have affected the control of the T/R system. Operational testing of the T/R system could not be performed due to the damage the airplane incurred during the accident. Toxicology testing results of the pilot’s specimens indicated that the pilot had taken diazepam, which is considered impairing at certain levels. However, the detected amounts of both diazepam and its metabolite nordiazepam were at subtherapeutic levels, and given the long half-life of these compounds, it appears that the medication was taken several days before the accident; therefore, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident and thus that his use of diazepam was a not factor in the accident.

The pilot departed on a short cross-country flight in the twin-engine airplane. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were present at the time. While en route at an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported that the airplane was "picking up icing" and that he needed to "pick up speed." The controller then cleared the pilot to descend, then to climb, in order to exit the icing conditions; shortly thereafter, the controller issued a low altitude alert. The pilot indicated that he was climbing; radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost shortly thereafter. The airplane impacted a field about 7 miles short of the destination airport. Examination of the airplane was limited due to the fragmentation of the wreckage; however, no pre-impact anomalies were noted during the airframe and engine examinations. Extensive damage to the pitot static and deicing systems precluded functional testing of the two systems. A review of data recorded from onboard avionics units indicated that, about the time the pilot reported to the controller that the airplane was accumulating ice, the airplane's indicated airspeed had begun to diverge from its ground speed as calculated by position data. However, several minutes later, the indicated airspeed was zero while the ground speed remained fairly constant. It is likely that this airspeed indication was the result of icing of the airplane's pitot probe. During the final 2 minutes of flight, the airplane was in a left turn and the pilot received several "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP PULL UP" annunciations as the airplane conducted a series of climbs and descents during which its ground speed (and likely, airspeed) reached and/or exceeded the airplane's maneuvering and maximum structural cruising speeds. It is likely that the pilot became distracted by the erroneous airspeed indication due to icing of the pitot probe and subsequently lost control while maneuvering.

The instrument-rated private pilot and passenger departed into instrument meteorological conditions with a 600-ft cloud ceiling in an airplane that was about 550 lbs over gross weight. Air traffic control data showed the airplane in a climbing left turn that continued beyond the assigned heading. After reaching 1,400 ft msl, the airplane continued turning left and its altitude and speed began to vary. The airplane continued in a left spiral, completing more than two full circles, then decelerated in a right turn and rapidly descended until impact with terrain. Examination of the flight control system revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions and downloaded engine data indicated normal engine operation. Downloaded data from the autopilot system revealed three in-flight error codes. The first error code, which likely occurred about 1 minute after takeoff, would have resulted in the autopilot, if it was engaged at the time, disengaging. The subsequent error codes likely occurred during the erratic flight profile, with the autopilot disengaged. Before the accident flight, the pilot had informed a mechanic, who is also a pilot, of intermittent issues with the autopilot system and that these issues were unresolved. The mechanic had flown with the accident pilot previously and assessed his instrument flying skills as weak. The flight instructor who provided initial flight training for the turbine engine transition stated the pilot's instrument flying proficiency was poor when he was hand flying the airplane. Toxicology testing revealed that the pilot had used marijuana, and his girlfriend stated the pilot would take a marijuana gummy before bedtime to sleep more soundly. However, given that no psychoactive compounds were found in blood specimens, it is unlikely that the pilot was impaired at the time of the accident. The instrument conditions at the time of the accident, the airplane's erratic flightpath, and the pilot's reported lack of instrument proficiency when flying by hand support the likelihood that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation sometime after takeoff. In addition, given the reports of the intermittently malfunctioning autopilot that had not been fixed, it is likely the pilot experienced an increased workload during a critical phase of flight that, in combination with spatial disorientation, led to the pilot's loss of airplane control.